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"Leaving it to posterity to write the rest." With
these words Hume commends himself and his works to the judge¬
ment of the world. One hundred and fifty years later Norman
Kemp Smith writes, "Posterity ... has for the most part dealt
1
very harshly with the author of the Treatise." In this
thesis we will look at both sides of the coin, for, though it
may have seemed to Kemp Smith in 1939 that posterity's verdict
had been overwhelmingly against, the tide was slowly changing.
Kemp Smith's own article bears eloquent testimony to that.
Although Kemp Smith's work has been a great influence in the
interpretation of Hume's philosophy, he has not labored alone.
Others, motivated perhaps by a desire for historical veracity,
or perhaps by the changing philosophical scene during the
first half of the twentieth century, have also contributed to
the new interpretation of Hume. Kemp Smith and those who
shared his views on Hume have not worked in vain, as is evi¬
denced in a recent anthology of philosophical experiences
where Harold Taylor writes, "I share with Emanuel Kant one
ohilosophical attribute. We were both awakened by David
2
Hume." In defining the nature of this awakening Taylor con-
1. Norman Kemp Smith, Hume and Present Day Problems, Aristo
telian Society, Supplementary Volume HVTII, 1939, P. i.
2. Harold Taylor, "Thinkers Who Influenced Me," Mnmapfrfj of




The implications of Hume's philosophy became clearer as
I read ... the Treatise and Enquiry ... with a sense of
excitement and discovery. I discovered that I disagreed
with those who had given Hume his place in the history
of philosophy as a skeptic who destroyed the possibility
of rational certainty, as a man who employed "the fallacy
of simple location," who destroyed the logical construct
of the self, who atomised experience into discreet units,
who made necessary the opinion of Kant. It seemed to me
that Hume was a a '-naturalist...
It was, for Taylor, the discovery of naturalism through Hume
which resulted in the develooment of his own philosophic
2
position. The surprising thing about these lines by Taylor
is that today they occasion so little comment, and yet we can-
3
not imagine their having been written before 1900. Since the
turn of the century Hume has become one of the most dynamic
and influential of the modern philosophers. Vie no longer read
Hume to refute him but, rattier, for guidance. Fifty year3 ago
his influence was, at best, negative. Today, philosophers of
almost all schools look to Hume, at one time or another, for
1. Taylor, p. 137.
2. Taylor, p. 138.
3. A typical evaluation of Hume in 1899 is as follows: "His
character was peculiarly devoid of qualities of an heroic
and lofty cast. His mental constitution is defective
through absence of the finer sentiments, aesthetic tastes
and emotional feelings. These limitations were fatal to
the highest attainment in literature of any class, not
excepting even philosophy ... his emotional feebleness
rendered it impossible for his writings to become power¬
ful as a direct social force; while his lack of appreci¬
ation of, and reverence for, the ideal, excluded his
philosophical works from the number of the greatest mas¬
terpieces of literature ... there is a total absence of
that constructive power which can alone create great
literary masterpieces." "ilson Stuart, English Philos¬
ophical Styles, Manchester, 1899, P. 85.
3
inspiration. It cannot be doubted that the re-interpretation
of his philosophy has played a considerable role in his emer¬
gence.
Not only re-interpretation but also the changing
philosophical scene has affected Hume's latter day fortunes.
It is this factor -which binds the interpretation of his philos¬
ophy and his relation to the logical positivists so closely
together. Historians of philosophy seek to present a more
objective account of Hume's life and philosophy. The positi¬
vists and their allies, in presenting Hume's doctrines in the
light of contemporary philosophical developments, seek to
demonstrate the truth of his philosophy. Sometimes the posi¬
tivists take advantage of contemporary interpretation, some¬
times they do not; but, nonetheless, their use of doctrines
at least derived from Hume's philosophy represent his emergence
as a positive force in the modern world,
A few words must be added concerning the underlying
method used in the consideration and judgement of Humean in¬
terpretation, Two divergent methods can be used in the inter¬
pretation of Hume's philosophy. Charles W, Hendel maintains
that "We cannot ever afford to lose sight of the biography of
a man of letters." Alfred B. Gla the, on the other hand, con¬
siders Hume not as a "man of letters" but "as a philosopher
[who] ... is known only through the statements which — for us
1. Charles W, Hendel, Studies in the Philosophy of David
Hume, Princeton, 19^5* p. 19.
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— are his philosophy." It is the contention of this thesis
that the conclusions of the first method are, for the histor¬
ian, more significant and pertinent. The philosopher, not
bound by a strict criterion of historical method, can make
use of the results of either procedure. For him the various
conclusions are only true or false insofar as they represent
what he believes to be a true or false philosophical position.
But, as we shall see, it is Important for the philosopher not
to talk like an historian if he is not actually being one.
He may say that such and such a view is derived from Hume's
philosophy, but he may attribute such and such a view to Hume
only if he is speaking as an historian. Just as surely, the
historian must refrain from any dogmatio assertion that one
view is the only correct view v?hich can to be derived from
Hume*s philosophy.
The treatment of the relationship of Hume to the
logical positivists is, in its simplest form, an analysis of
positlvists' references to Hume. Such a procedure was found
to be imperative because of the impossibility of tracing any
significant historical relationship or connection between
contemporary positivism and Hume. We are primarily interested
1. Alfred B, Glathe, Hume's Theory of the Passions and of
Morals, University of California Press, 1950,' p. '26.
T.H. Greenalso states this same position, "We have been
learning of late to know much more about philosophers,
but it is possible for knowledge about philosophers to
flourish inversely as the knowledge of philosophy." The
Works of Thomas Hill Green, edited by R.L. Nettleship,
London, 1*99, P.X
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in what posterity has written, and have, to a great extent,
avoided merely comparative discussions of Hume's philosophy
with that of the positivists.
6.
CHAPTER I
FIRST VALUATIONS OF HUME'S PHILOSOPHY
AND IJIKSTSSN-m CENTURY HISTORIES OF PHILOSOPHY
Before coming to any conclusion about the tradi¬
tional interpretation of Hume's philosophy, the background
for that interpretation should be examined. The exceptional
character of its beginnings are unique in philosophy.
It is generally agreed that the Treatise of Human
Nature is not only one of the greatest philosophical v/orks in
Snglish literature but that it is also the central and defini¬
tive work of Hume's philosophical writing. It is true that
some of the central doctrines of the Treatise, re-written and
revised by Hume, were published as the Enquiries concerning
the Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of
Morals, and that Hume publicly disowned the Treatise, or at
least its style, and wished the Enquiries to be regarded as
definitive of his philosophical position. But aside from the
problems this posed for historical interpretation, the con¬
sequences were the same in Hume's day as in ours. Then, as
no\*?, attention focused on the Treatise and it is on the
Treatise that traditional interpretation rests. Whether or
not this procedure is justified is of no consequence in deter¬
mining the interpretation.
If the vievi? is accepted that the Treatise occupies
the central position in Hume's philosophical work, we are then
7.
forced feo another conclusion; that from 1739-40 until 1819
the general interpretation of the Treatise depended not on
that book itself, but on quotations and interpretations from
books written about it. The Treatise, published in 1739 and
1740 in an edition of one thousand copies, was not reprinted
again until 1819. During this period interest did not lapse,
in spite of appearanoes.
Two books, Thomas Reid's Inquiry into the Mind on
the Principles of Common Sense. 1764 and James Beattie's Essay
on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; in Opposition to
Sophistry and Scepticism, 1770, written specifically attacking
and refuting the Treatise had a phenomenally large sale.
1
Reid's book, written "primarily as a refutation of Hume" and
more specifically, the Treatise, was reprinted and issued in
new editions fourteen times between 1764 and 1819. It was
also translated into French and German, 3eattie's book could
not find a publisher in Edinburgh and was finally printed in
London at the author's own expense. Although it was more in
the nature of a diatribe against the Treatise than a system¬
atic refutation, it was very popular. Between 1770 and 1819
it was published in thirteen new editions and translated into
Dutch, German and French. The inference drawn from these
facts is that, except for direct quotations, most of the read¬
ers had to accept Reid's and Beattle's version of what the
1, T.E, Jessop, A Bibliography of David Hume and of Scottish
Philosophy. London, 1938, p. 164.
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Treatise contained. It is obvious that the copies of the
Treatise available could have supplied only the smallest por¬
tion of the readers. The question then is, what sort of pic¬
ture of the contents and consequences of the Treatise did Held
and Beattle present?
Held's opening comments on the Treatise, more lyri¬
cal than discursive, give only an emotional impression of
Hume's work. In section III he loosely traces the development
of philosophy from Descartes to Locke and states that their
common denominator was their attempts, all unsuccessful, to
prove the existence of an external world. Berkeley, however,
cut the knot and proved by "unanswerable arguments what no
1
man in his senses can believe," i.e. the non-existence of
corporeal substance, Hume, further,
... proceeds on the same principles, but carries them to
their full length: and as the Bishop undoes the whole
material world, this author, upon the same grounds, un¬
does the world of spirits and leaves nothing in nature,
but Ideas and impressions without any subject on which
they may be Impressed, 2
This is the last Instance in the introduction of a systematic
exposition of Hume's principles, as then Reid continues In
what can hardly be called anything but invective. He concludes
the introduction by saying that' either Hume's reasoning is
"... sophistry and so deserves contempt; or there is no truth
1. Reid's Works, Edited by Sir William Hamilton, p. 101,
Edinburgh, 1846,
2. Reld's Works, p. 102,
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in human faculties — and then why reason?" He deals direct¬
ly with the Treatise from time to time in the exposition of
his own theory during the remainder of the book, but it is
always in connection with the denial of the self or the denial
of the existence of substance.
In the conclusion of his Inquiry Reid gives a more
systematic account of the critical philosophy or Cartesian
system. He says that by analysis the Cartesians, {this clas¬
sification includes Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley,
and Hume) find that sensations corresponding to secondary
qualities cannot resemble any quality of body. Hence, Des¬
cartes, Locke and Malebranche infer that these qualities, not
being qualities of bodies, are sensations of the mind.
Berkeley went one step further than his predecessors and dis¬
covered, "that no sensation whatever can or could possibly
resemble any quality of insentient being such as body is sup-
2
posed to be." From this point of analysis, it is then only
a short step to Hume's position. Reid observes that "the
modern scepticism is the natural issue of this new system; and
although it did not bring forth this monster until the year
1739 it may be said to have carried it in its womb from the
3
beginning." Both Locke and Descartes failed to reach the log¬
ical conclusions through "lack of light" and Berkeley through
1. Reid's Works. p. 10L.
2. -teld* a Works, p. 206.
3. Reid' a' Works', p. 206.
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fright. "The author of the Treatise on Human Nature, more
1
daring and intrepid ... shoots directly into the gulf," and
asks I'srhat you mean when you assert the existence of such
things as body, spirit, time or place, cause or effect? Grant¬
ing that our ideas of these existences are either ideas of
sensation or reflection, then, from what sensation or what op¬
eration of the mind are they copied? On this basis the ques¬
tion cannot be answered.
This represents both the spirit and substance of
Reid's references to the Treatise In the Inquiry, It is not,
however, Reid's final treatment of Hume's philosophy* He
deals with it in much greater detail in the Essays on the In¬
tellectual Powers of Man, 1735* This book was much less popu¬
lar than the earlier Inquiry, and until 1827 only the original
edition had been published. It must also have been leas ef¬
fective, for the general tone of interpretation remained the
same as that propagated by the Inquiry, i.e. that Hume up¬
on the principles he has borrowed from Locke and Berkeley, has
with great acuteness, reared a system of absolute scepticism,'
On the face of it there are two criticisms which can
be made of Reld's interpretation. First, he always speaks of
the Treatise as if It were a well known, widely read book,
when, in reality, It must have been fairly obscure. The sec¬
ond criticism is the impression he gives that the Treatise is
1. Raid's Works, p, 208.
only composed of one volume and that on the understanding.
Of course he may have considered that the basic doctrines laid
down in Book I rendered Hume*s further work unimportant. Or
he may have considered his own work as limited in scope, and
he thus dealt only with Book I, The first possibility seems
more probable when one views what Reid believed to be the con¬
tents and implications of Book I. He thought that its central
theme was a continuation of the Cartesian system and that the
final result of this would be the complete destruction of the
basis for all human knowledge. In thia case further writings
of the Treatise were either manifestations of this pernicious
sceptical philosophy or sophistries.
Seattle, in his Essay, takes his principles and in¬
terpretation directly from Reid. He does not, however, echo
Reid's politeness and respect for Hume's arguments. In fact
he distinguishes himself by the extreme bitterness of his at¬
tacks on Hume. The work had great popularity and influence;
it was a favorite of Dr. Johnson and George III, among others,
1
and it is said that this is the book which awoke Kant from
his dogmatic slumbers (through Seattle's quotations of Hume}.
Aside from the repetition of Reid*s philosophical arguments,
the book is a moral condemnation of Hume for having construc¬
ted his system. As Beattie says in the preface to the seventh
edition, 1807,
1. K?mp Smith, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,
New York, 1950, p. XXVIII.
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Ever since I began fco attend to setters of this
kind, I had heard Mr. Hume's philosophy mentioned as
a system very unfriendly to religion, both revealed
and natural; and this author spoken of as a teacher of
sceptical and atheistical doctrines, and withal, as a
most acute and ingenious writer. 1
He goes on to substantiate the first part of this accepted
opinion, but finds little basis for the latter part. The Es¬
say of Beattie is superior to the Inquiry of Reid in one res¬
pect. Beattie includes a great many direct and fairly sub¬
stantial quotations from the Treatise, which in view of the
scarcity of that book was a good thing. Otherwise Beattie's
work can be looked upon as little more than a sequel to Reid's
original criticism.
It is always difficult to specify traditional inter¬
pretation, and although the interpretation of Hume is uniform
in the nineteenth century the problem is present. What should
one consider as representative of traditional interpretation?
T.H. Huxley's volume in the English Men of Letters series of
which twenty-nine thousand copies were printed, T.H. Green's
famous introduction to the Treatise in the Green and Grose
edition of Hume's philosophical works, or William Knight's
work in the Blackwood philosophical series? All are eminent
philosophical studies and all, without doubt, support to one
degree or another Reid and Beattie's original evaluation and
interpretation of Hume's philosophy. They are, nevertheless,
1. Seattle, An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth;
in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism, Seventh edl-
tlon, London, 1867, p. XXI.
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unsuitable as a basis of analysis, because they are not only
explorations of Hume's theories and doctrines, but also ex¬
positions and supporting arguments for each respective
author's particular philosophic point of view. Each can be
said to follow Held and Seattle in such and 3uch a way with
quotations as proof; but then because of the philosophic posi¬
tion represented each also deviates to such a degree that
Hume's philosophy becomes, as it were, secondary, Huxley says
that in his explanation of Hume's philosophy, "often more is
1
seen of his [Huxley's] thread than Hume's beads." In string¬
ing together what he considers the relevant passages of Hume's
philosophy, his own philosophy often becomes the more promi¬
nent one. What is true of Huxley is also true of Knight and
Green, This is in no sense a criticism of their respective
works but does disqualify them as principal sources for the
analysis of general interpretation.
The immediate objection to this disqualification is
that their own position must have gained prominence at the
expense of Hume's, and yet we accept them without question.
This was the case with Seattle and Held but it must be remem¬
bered that in the latter half of the eighteenth century no
other source of interpretation was available. Theirs had to
be the prominent interpretation because it was the only one
advanced, and no matter how they biased that interpretation
1. T.H, Huxley, English Men of Letters, Hume, London, 1902,
p. 45.
in the exposition of their own position it is the one whieh
has to be considered. In the latter half of the nineteenth
century this is not true, as sources began to appear which
make the determination of traditional interpretation very much
easier. At this time the various histories of literature and
philosophy began to be published. These are frankly historic -
cal studies of the development of philosophy and should be
free of many of the disadvantages of more specialized works.
They should also give as clear an idea of the traditional in¬
terpretation of Hume1s philosophy as it Is possible to obtain.
The first history we shall examine is Alexander
Bain's History of Mental and Moral Philosophy. 1863. He be¬
gins by saying that "Hume Is chiefly noted for having embraced
the views of Berkeley with the exception of that relating to
a separate soul. He thus reduced all existence to perceptions
1
and ideas." Further, the refusal to admit anything that can¬
not be traced to a primary impression is a cardinal doctrine
In Hume's philosophy from beginning to end. Bain then out¬
lines the sceptical conclusions to which Hume seems led, i.e.
the denial of the self and of the law of cause and effect.
However, Bain says, Hume did not really deny the necessity of
cause and effect and the existence of the self. "Hume was a
man fond of literary effects as well as of speculation, we do
2
not always know when he is in earnest." This is Bain's
1. Alexander Bain, Mental and Moral Science, London, 1863,
p. 205.
2, Bain, p. 207.
final word on Hume's metaphysics. A short outline of his
moral theory follows, but no attempt is made either to con-
nect it with his metaphysics or to interpret it.
The most prominent deviation from the Reid-Beattie
interpretation seen here is the implication that Hume's analy¬
sis and conclusions were a literary display; that is to say,
he wrote philosophy with tongue in cheek. No matter what
Reid's and Beattie's opinion of Hume's philosophy vas they al¬
ways took it seriously. Bain seems to think that the argu¬
ments of the Treatise were a sort of 'reduetio ad absurdum.'
He is supported in this view in one way or another by two of
his most respected contemporaries. Leslie Stephens sayg,con¬
cerning Hume's famous statement, that reason is and ought to
be the servant of the passions, and that "Hume aimed at being
1
paradoxical in his earlier treatise." In other words he did
not really mean what he said. Selby-Bigge says of Hume's
Treatise in his introduction to the Essays "that it was pretty
2
plain he just meant to be offensive" in insisting that jus¬
tice was an artificial virtue. In other words, again Hume did
not really mean what he said. The general impression we re¬
ceive from Bain is, then, that he agrees with Beattie and Reid
but does not think that Hume really believed in all serious¬
ness the conclusions at which he arrived.
1. Leslie Stephens, English Thought in the Eighteenth Century,
Vol. II, London, 18/6, p. SS.
2. David Hume, jjfcauirles, Edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge M.A.,
Second Edition, 1902, Oxford, Impression of 1936, p. XXVII.
16.
From an English History of Mental and Moral Phi¬
losophy we now turn to the Frenchman H.A. Tainefs History of
English. Literature. Although technically it is not a philos¬
ophical work, it reflects what must have been and perhaps
still is a widely held opinion. In this respect it must have
helped mould the general opinion of Hume to a great extent.
Talne's evaluation of the metaphysics of the period, and
1
Hume's in particular, is not In the least complimentary.
Talne has no praise for Reid either, and says of him that
"rarely in this world has speculation fallen lower." The only
ray of sunshine in the whole scene is the emergence of the
"moral sense" theory in which Hume had but a part. Talne be¬
lieves that Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Price, Smith, Ferguson and
Hume find here their most original and durable ideas.
1. H.A. Taine, Taine's History of English Literature. Yol,
II, translated by H. Tan Laun, p. ?2. "
Locke was almost as poor, (as Ilewton) gropes about, hesi¬
tates, does little more than guess, doubts, starts on an
opinion to advance and withdraw It by turns, not seeing
its far off consequences, nor above all exhausting any¬
thing. In short, he forbids himself lofty questions and
Is very much inclined to forbid them to us ...» If Hume,
more bold, goes further, it is in the same track; he pre¬
serves nothing of lofty science; he forbids speculation
altogether. According to him we know neither substances,
nor causes, nor laws. When we confirm that one object is
conjoined to another object, it is by custom; 'all events
seem entirely loose or separate.' If we give them a con¬
nection 'it is our Imagination that creates it.' The
conclusion Is that we shall do well to purge our mind of
all theory, and only believe that we may act. Let us ex¬
amine our wings only to cut them off, and let us confine
ourselves to walking. So finished, a pyrrhonism serves
only to cast the world back on established beliefs. In
fact Reid, being honest, is alarmed. He see3 society




The empiricism of Locke was the result of the mind
being placed in a receptive rather than a creative position
in regard to the external world. Experience is seen as deter¬
mining the content of the mind, and hence, the type and struc¬
ture of our knowledge. The ultimate tost of the truth of this
knowledge is its verification in experience. The mind is a
blank tablet upon which the world writes, and the final appeal
is always baok to this external writer. In general, the doc¬
trine, in conjunction with theological economical and poli¬
tical conditions of its time, has two consequences. First, it
results in the fervent affirmation of the principal of induc¬
tive reasoning in science and an attempt to extend its use to
all human activity, which, in philosophy, led to the "English
systems of morals""*" of the eighteenth century. The second
consequence, confined to theoretical philosophy, Is a revolu¬
tion in metaphysics. It is in this latter respect, too, that
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume exert their full weight. Their
method is analytical and they are Interested, not in what the
mind does, but In what it is capable of doing. Locke sets up '
the principles,
... that prior to all metaphysical considerations and
controversies the general question must be decided, how?
far human insight extends, and that this is possible
only by exact exhibition of the sources by which it is
brought about.,.. From that time onwards, epistemology
... was brought into the front rank of philosophical
1. I.E. Erdmann, A History of Philosophy, Vol. II, trans,




The foundations of empiricism are found in Locke's
doctrine of ideas. Up until his time, ideas had been the
foundation of all knowledge, but the fundamental ideas in our
mind were held to be innate or not derived from experience.
Locke, as opposed to this position, holds that there are no
innate ideas, and bases his assertion on two facts. First,
the so-called innate ideas asserted by those who hold to their
existence, are of such a complex character that their initial
presence in the mind would be impossible. Secondly, we can
find no single practical axiom which is universally valid for
2
all mankind. After coming to this conclusion he then goes
on to examine the ideas which come from experience. Objects
are known by their qualities, and Locke divides these quali¬
ties into two classes, primary and secondary. The former em¬
braces what objects are in themselves and consist of the dif¬
ferent manifestations of matter, solidity and extension.
Secondary qualities, however, lie not in the object but in the
perceiver, and being appearances consist of a "certain relation
3
to our organ of sense." Our ideas are further divided. In
reflection we reproduce the copy of the original, and thus we
have ideas of reflection and ideas of sensation. Also included
in the ideas of reflection are the immediate sensations which
1. W, Windelband, A History of Philosophy, trans, by J.H.
Tufts, London, 1893, p. 447.
2. Srdmann, p. 106.
3. Erdmann, p 106.
20.
arise from the mind itself. In thought the ideas of reflec¬
tion are combined by the mind into our complex ideas in much
the same way as a small number of words are combined to make
a great many different sentences. Complex ideas, however,
are combined in three ways — modes, relations and substances.
These complex ideas are the work of the understanding and un¬
like simple ideas of reflection have no counterpart in reality
or experience. There is one exception. Although no external
or internal experience gives us conception of the idea of sub¬
stance we must consider It to be real, since there must be
some primary quality to which secondary qualities adhere. In
the case of primary qualities we do not know what they are,
but tiiat they are.
Berkeley is the link between Locke and Hume in that
he resolved Locke's inconsistency concerning substance. This
inconsistency was real, for Locke himself showed that the
conception of substance contains "all the relations which we
1
are accustomed to class under the name of necessity." Our
conceptions of substance are a complex Idea and hence, being
combinations of the understanding, have no counterpart in
experience. Nonetheless, Locke says they are real and regu¬
late the world, which is in direct conflict with his earlier
assertion that our knowledge of the world must come from the
world. Berkeley's solution is to deny Locke's original
1. Nrdmann, p. 125.
21.
distinction between primary and secondary qualities and in
doing so be "demolishes the conception of corporeal sub-
1
stance." He asserts that after the elimination of an object's
secondary qualities the further assertion of substance is a
non-essential abstraction. This theory, although it satisfies
the original empirical doctrine, i3 now given a metaphysical
elaboration. If objects exist only insofar as they are per¬
ceived, how is it possible to distinguish between those ob¬
jects which do in fact exist and those which are the produc¬
tion of imagination, dreams or hallucinations? Berkely solves
this problem with a "spiritualistic metaphysics"; "the ideas
which constitute the external world are the activities of
3
spirits." This type of solution places Berkeley outside the
empiricist tradition to some degree. His demolition of cor¬
poreal substance, however, is a logical extension of the
original doctrine.
Brdmann differs from Windelband in that he does not
regard Berkeley as a line or transition stage between Locke
and Hume, He says that Lockfe's inconsistency about substance
was avoided by Hume's scepticism, which "maintained without
any inconsistent exception the principle his predecessor laid
4
down." Hume begins, following Locke's method of analysis,
1. Windelband, p. 469.
2. Windelband, p. 470.
3. Windelband, p. 470.
4. Srdmann, p. 125.
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by asserting that there is no substance in the internal world
(the denial of the self); and further that there is no neces¬
sity in the external world (denial of substance). As a result
of this we can have no real knowledge of either world.
Erdmann's conclusion rests on Hume1s observations that we do
not have any experience of the self or ego in which the ideas
of reflection, pain, pleasure, the will, etc., adhere; nor do
we experience nor can the understanding demonstrate any real
connection, other than habit, or custom, between cause and ef¬
fect. The consequences of the observations and conclusions
are his attacks on natural science in the Treatise and the
Essays, and on psychology in the Treatise. Other manifesta¬
tions or secondary consequences are the "Essay on Suicide,"
which is the natural complement of the inquiries into the
nature of the self; and the Dialogues Concerning Natural Reli¬
gion, whose negative assertions are the result of the conclu¬
sions about the causal connection.
Vv'indelband, on the other hand, regards the connec¬
tion or the logical development of empiricism from Locke
through Berkeley to Hume as being of more importance than does
Erdmann. "The transformation of Locke's doctrine by Berkeley
1
leads further in a direct line to Hume's theory of knowledge,"
In this respect, Hume applies the same empirical analysis to
the self that Berkeley had applied to substance and with equally
1. Windelband, p. 472.
23.
devastating effect. Another minor difference is that Y»'indel-
band twice refers to Hume as the great "English" philosopher,
a remark which probably occasioned some local activity on
Calton Hill, Edinburgh, where Hume is buried. Other than these
two points, Y;indelband*s interpretation of Hume's sources and
conclusions is much the same as Erdmann's.
After outlining these soeptical conclusions of Hume's
theory of knowledge, both Srdmann and Windelband go on to em-
li
phasize that Hume cannot be regarded strictly as a sceptic.
His aim was to "limit the understanding to the sphere where
1
it could accomplish something", and his position was that of
2
the absolutely consistent and honest empiricist. Windelband
adds that Hume had a characteristic supplement for his theory
of knowledge — his doctrine of natural belief. This natural
belief is completely adequate for practical life and is never
perverted by any theoretical reflections. Irdmann says in
this same vein that Hume always emphasized practical as well
as theoretical philosophy.
Both histories treat Hume's moral theory as a sep¬
arate entity and make no mention of any positive or negative
relationship between it and his metaphysical basis. The
prominent doctrines of his moral theory are mentioned, but
because of lack of space no attempt is made at interpretation.
As for the derivation of his moral theory, both histories
1. Hrdmann, p. 130.
2. Windelband, p. 476.
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place him between Hutcheson and Adam Smith. When put in
synoptic form the similarity of these three make it needless
for Windelband and Erdmann to point out influences.
The overall picture we receive from these accounts
of Hume's philosophy is that in the theoretical field his
theory of knowledge is a direct derivation from the empiricist
doctrine formulated by Locke and further developed by Berkeley.
In the moral field he is a member of a group which comes under
the general heading of "English Systems of Morals." This
group is divided into two factions, the rationalists and the
moral sense school. In the former group are Clarke, Cudworth,
Locke and Berkeley, among others. In the latter group are
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Adam Smith and Hume, Thus Hume car¬
ries to a logical conclusion the doctrines of empiricism, but
in moral theory he is not influenced, at least to the same
extent, by Locke and Berkeley. How does this interpretation
differ from the original ones of Reid and Seattle? They have
a wider breadth; natural belief is included as a doctrine,
Hume is not accused of perverting the youth of the nation by
his teaching, and his Interest in moral philosophy is to some
extent recognized. Fundamentally, however, the interpreta¬
tion has not changed. Although we are cautioned against re¬
garding Hume as a sceptic, it is difficult from the foregoing
account to see exactly why he should not be regarded as one.
His reported conclusions seem sceptical enough. But almost
as an afterthought, it is added that he supplemented his theory
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of knowledge with a doctrine of natural belief. It is pecu¬
liar, however, that the systems of both Locke and Berkeley-
required "supplements," yet in both cases there seems to be no
need to caution against regarding them as sceptics. How is it,
we might ask, that Hume's theory of knowledge is so revolu¬
tionary while his moral theory seems to be so commonplace?
Huxley says that "After all, Hume's speculations on moral ques¬
tions are not so remote from those of respectable professors
1
like Hutoheson, or saintly prelates such as Butler." Is this
because there is little or no connection between Hume's specu¬
lative philosophy and moral theory, as Selby-Bigge seems to
2
imply? How is it that a man who destroys the basis for psy¬
chology and morality in Book I goes on to write about a posi¬
tive psychology in Book II and a positive morality in Book
III? A man who emphasized the importance of practical philos¬
ophy Is busy on the speculative side proving practical philos¬
ophy impossible, The conclusions that can be and are drawn
from these paradoxes about Hume himself are peculiar to say
the least* Did he, so to speak, write metaphysics with one
hand and moral theory with the other? Did he not, as many
seem to believe, take his own arguments In the Treatise In all
seriousness? Was there this fundamental lack of unity in
Hume's original and most comprehensive philosophic work?
1, Huxley, p. 197.
2. 3r1tlsh Mora11sts. Edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge M.A., Ox¬
ford, 1897, P. XIX. "But one can not help remarking how
little support his moral theory receives from his specu¬
lative."
Further, after writing the Treatise did he go on to more popu¬
lar fields of literary endeavor as coolly and cynically as he
wrote Books II and III, after writing Book I? When Hume fin¬
ally decided to re-write the Treatise did he cut out the more
unpopular parts to make it more palatable to the public? It
seems that all these implications as to the character, quality
and intent of Hume and his work follow logically from the ori¬
ginal interpretation of the Treatise, and that as long as this
interpretation Is followed there is no real basis for arriving
at any other conclusion. Are these conclusions true? That can
only be deterxained by examining tha biographioal materials
that are available to determine (1) whether Hume can be placed
in the empirical tradition like Locke and Berkeley; and (2)
whether there is any evidence to support the implication that
there is this fundamental paradox, or even worse, hypocrisy,
in his life and works.
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CHAPTER II
FURTHER EVIDENCE ILLUSTRATING THE NEED
FOR RB- INT1SRPR1STATION
As we have seen in the proceeding chapter, tradi¬
tional interpretation up until nineteen hundred implied, if
it did not state, certain basic contradictions mainly concern
the relation of his metaphysical to his moral theory, but a
more detailed study reveals in interpretations of that time
contradictions in his moral theory itself. Thus, although
Hume specifically endorses a moral sense as the basis of mor¬
al preceptions, Leslie Stephens finds sufficient evidence in
Hume's writings on morals to name him as the founder and In¬
deed the clearest expositor of the utilitarian theory of mor¬
als, Aside from these philosophic contradictions, certain
conclusions about Hume's life, character and, most of all, the
intent of his literary work seem to go hand In hand with tradi¬
tional interpretation. There was and Is a tendency to find,
through his works and some of his statements, evidences of a
fundamental flaw in his character, with the result that his
philosophy is not taken to be what he really believed, but to
be displays of critical and sceptical ingeniousness U3ing as
a foundation the presuppositions of Locke's and Berkeley's em¬
piricism, It also seems that he did what no good philosopher
should do, deserting philosophy for the more lucrative fields
of economics, politics and history. In exploiting his literary
talent to suit public tastes he changed his style from that
of writing long works like the Treatise to writing essays, a
mo,re popular medium in the eighteenth century. Finally, it
is asserted, when he did revise the Treatise for re-publica-
*
tion, not only did he cut it up into essays, but he removed
many of the especially radical sections which he thought
iiiighb be misunderstood or offend public taste.
All these Inferences are supported by external evi¬
dence as well as philosophical interpretation, Hume was ex¬
ceedingly disappointed in the reception of his first work and
after its publication seemed to turn immediately to other
fields. Ills political essays were extremely successful, and
it was here and in the writing of history that he gained most
of his eighteenth century fame. In his late years he disowned
his first work, the Treatise, wishing the Issays, together,
with the Inquiries» to be regarded as representing his philos-
<3r
ophic position. In addition there are his own statements
that his criterion of composition was the demands of the pub¬
lic, and that the pursuit of literary fame was the ruling
passion of his life. The view that Hume was a clever dilet¬
tante trying to achieve contemporary fame appears to be well
supported.
First, however, certain misapprehensions concerning
the publication and composition of the Treatise must be cleared
up and then it must be determined whether or not the broad out¬
lines of his literary career follow the .pattern just outlined.
Is Hume an ingenious writer moving from subject to subject
with no oentral and lasting objective to guide his activity?
So far as biographical material Is concerned, one
thing must be kept in mind from the onset. Hume was the sec¬
ond son of on obscure Scottish land owner who died early In
Hume's childhood. Aside from his initial education at the Old
College of Edinburgh, Hume had almost no resources upon which
to draw. All his life, except for a brief engagement as sec¬
retary to a madman and some government posts in his later
years, he depended entirely on his writing for a living. He
did not Ixave the resources of Locke and Lord Shaftesbury nor
a church living as had Berkeley and Butler, He also failed
twice to obtain that traditional support for Scottish men of
letters, a chair of philosophy, and in this way was deprived
of the financial security enjoyed by Hufccheson and Adam Smith.
Hume was the first British author in the field of what we now
call the social sciences to support himself successfully by
his writing. While this fact alone makes him unique in English
literature, it may or may not have affected the nature of his
career. It is certain, however, that it did affect the content
of the advertisements found in his books. Today, we have the
more efficient method of dust jackets, and it is to be hoped
that two hundred years from now authors will not be held res¬
ponsible for the ♦blurbs* on these jackets. Taken in the
1. J.H. Burton, Life and Correspondence of David Hume,
Edinburgh, 1346, Vol. 1,p. 172.
light of his financial necessity, it seems that Hume's concil¬
iatory attitude in the advertisement to the Treatise is the
only one possible for an impoverished and unknown author to
express. It might also explain to some extent the other famous
advertisement in which he disowns the Treatise, a book he had
no plan to re-issue and with which, technically, he was very
dissatisfied. It seems, therefore, a mistake to attach im¬
portance to these advertisements as significant clues to Hume's
attitude toward his philosophy.
Concerning the Treatise itself, one finds on exam¬
ination that it does not quite fit the description given in
most sources, nor does it fit the description Hume himself
gives in his later years. In the first place, it is usually
described as a youthful masterpiece, which to a great extent
misrepresents the book. Hume himself is the principle source
of this misrepresentation, for he/ says in a letter to Gilbert
1
Elliot that the book was begun before h& waa eighteen and
completed before he was twenty-five. This general statement
is repeated several times in his correspondence, and in sub¬
stance he says the same thing in the famous advertisement to
Essays, Moral and Political. Ho matter what motives caused
Hume to speak of the Treatise in this way, we know in point
of fact that he was not speaking the truth. From letters
written at the time we know that he was still working on the
1. J.Y.T. Sreig, The Correspondence of David Hume, Oxford,
1932, Vol. II, p. 153.
Treatise until its last book was published In 1740, and a
simple examination of dates shows that 3ooks I and II were
published when Hume was twenty-eight years old and Book III
when he was twenty-nine or thirty. His letters lead us to
believe that he had at least conceived Its general outline
1
as much as ten years earlier, and as far as is known the en¬
tire period from his eighteenth to his twenty-eighth year,,
except for a few months in Liverpool, was spent in the prepar¬
ation of the Treatise. It seems to be much less a youthful
masterpiece than a sustained philosophic effort, Berkeley and
Descartes published some of their greatest works at an early
age and these works really merit the title of »youthful master¬
pieces,1 for none were the product of ten years work. The
Treatise.in contrast to what most of his critics have consid¬
ered it and what he wished it to be considered, is apparently
the sustained effort of ten of Hume,s most productive years,
and the singlemindedness and persistence of its production
makes the Treatise unique, for a man of any age.
Another misunderstanding concerning the Treatise and
one which explains to some extent Hume1s later attitude to¬
wards it, is due to the circumstances of its reception on
publication. This has been clarified by modern research in
recent years. In his autobiography, Hume says of the Treatise
that it "fell dead born from the press." This statement has
1. The letter to Gilbert Elliot already referred to plu3 the
famous letter to his physician, Grieg, Vol. I, pp. 12-18.
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always been taken to mean that In Hume*s estimation it re¬
ceived no consideration whatever. To counter this claim by
Hame his chroniclers have always quoted the lost two para¬
graphs of the review on the first two volumes of the Treatise
found in "Works of the Learned," June 1739, one of the most
prominent literary journals of the time. Hume referred to
this review as somewhat abusive, and in quoting the last para¬
graphs which likens the Treatise to the juvenile productions
of a young Raphael, his critics have shown him to be a bit un¬
grateful, In recent years, however, research into English and
foreign journals at the time of the Treatise1s publication has
shown that it did receive a good deal of notice in its first
years. In the light of all this new evidence it is well to
re-examine the original statement that it "fell dead born from
the press," Does Hume mean what he seems to mean or is this
another of the lapses of memory from which he appears to have
suffered, especially in relation to the Treatise, in his old
age?
We shall begin with the original review in "Works
of the Learned," the last paragraphs of which seem to contain
no basis for Hume1a claim, This review has two violently
opposed themes and Kemp Smith notes a theory found in the
Quarterly Review for 1B41 that it may have been written by
two different men. The following are typical examples of the
type of criticism that go to make up the review proper. In a
note concerning Hume's statement that we can find nothing
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to be absurd or impossible of which we can form a clear and
distinct idea, the reviewer remarks,
I have resolved this sentence in my mind till I
have quite tired myself but cannot after all find mean¬
ing in it, I do not mention this as a singular in¬
stance of our Author's inscrutability for there are, to
me, innumerable in this work of his; but I could not
Doint out a more short and entire one, whereby the
reader might judge how qualified this writer is to give
us a clear idea of so complex a subject as human nature,
or with what justice he tramples on Mr, Locke and pre¬
tends to restore what he has perverted, 1
Or again concerning Hume's principle that all ideas are de¬
rived from impressions,
I have afore hinted the mighty value of this discovery,
the honor of which is due entirely to our Author, but
it cannot be too often inculcated, I verily think if
it were closely pursued it would lead us to several in¬
estimable 'desiderata' such as 'perpetual motion,' the
'grand elixir,' a 'dissolvement of the stone,* etc, 2
In view of these statements and the fact that Hume is con¬
stantly referred to as the "Genius," it is not difficult to
picture the young Scot storming into the editor's office,
3
sword in hand, (The surprising fact Is that he failed to
run the editor through). What is probably even stranger than
the inclusion of the last paragraph in the review are the re¬
actions of those who have written about Hume to the review.
Huxley's statement that the Treatise was "on the whole
1, Article XXVI, History of the Works of the Learned, for
November 1739» Author unknown, p, 362, (this periodical
was obtained from the University Library, St. Andrews,
the only copy available in Scotland).
2, History of the Works of the Learned, p. 376,
3, G. Ilorne, Letters on Infidelity, by the author of A Letter
to Dr. Adam Smltih, Oxford, "1784, p. 28.
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1
respectfully and appreciatively reviewed'1 shows what Huxley
himself thought of the Treatise or that he had not sufficient¬
ly read the review, aside from the last paragraphs. An equal¬
ly strange reaction to the review is found in Burton's Life
and Correspondence of David Hume. He says that "the paper is
of considerable length and it has throughout a tone of clamor¬
ous jeering and vulgar raillery that forcibly reminds one of
2
the writings of Warburton." He goes on to say, however, that
"it is the work of one who respects the adversary he has taken
arms against, and before leaving the subject, the writer makes
3
manly atonement for his wrath,,." and he then refers to the
oft quoted last paragraphs. It seems that Hume was more in¬
terested in what was said about his book in the review proper
than in the sops thrown to his ego at its conclusion. Gall¬
ing ten years* work "juvenile" seem3 a little gratuitous in
any case. His description of the review to Hutcheson as
"somewhat abusive" can be viewed as a gem of understatement.
"The Works of the Learned" never reviewed, as far as I can
ascertain, the third volume; and so established a tradition
which has lasted a long time.
In the last fev; years another early English comment
on the Treatise has been found, a twenty-four hundred word
letter to "Common Sense; or the Englishman's Journal."*1, This
1. T.H. Huxley, Hume, London, 1902, p. 11,
2. J,II. Burton, ToI7 I, p. 109.
3. Burton, p. 109.
4. Mossner, "First Notice of Hume's Treatise," Journal of the
History of Ideas, Vol, 12, 1951.
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letter was published fifteen months after the appearance of
Volumes I and II and about five months before Volume III was
published. The letter, most unfriendly on a number of points,
strangely enough refutes the Treatise mainly "on the grounds
that it was so completely incomprehensible as to delude the
1
weak-minded into accepting it as high philosophy," The let¬
ter also attacks Hume on points of elementary arithmetic, and
basic Ignorance of scientific method, as well as castigating
his style of exposition. If these criticisms seem strange
today, what must they have seemed to Hume as payment for his
great effort?
Among the criticisms of continental .journals from
2
1739-41, only one can be considered favourable to Hume; and
in the unfavourable reviews the points of criticism are always
the same. The foremost complaint is Hume's manner of expres¬
sion, for at the time of publication the style of the Treatise
attracted more notice than its content. Another characteris¬
tic of these reviews is that in only two cases Is the second
volume reviewed and in only one case is the third volume con¬
sidered. This seems to be a universal reaction to the book.
It now becomes evident that Hume meant in his state¬
ment about the reception of the Treatise and we understand
better his comment that "never was a literary attempt more un¬
fortunate than my Treatise of Human Nature." Small wonder
1. Mossner, p, 293.
2. Also Investigated by Mossner.
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that by the time Beattie and Reid brought out the first even
partially understandable criticisms from twenty to forty years
later, Hume had given up the Treatise as a bad Job which re¬
quired complete revision, Hume aimed at their understanding
and hit their literary prejudices,
HumeTs statements concerning the reception of the
Treatise have been clarified in order to widen the field of
interpretation and to show that evidences must be judged as
far as possible according to the conditions of the times. The
meaning of Hume*a statements is changed by their consideration
in the light of recent research. This same process has been
evident In the interpretation of his historical and political
writings, the philosophic implications of which shall now be
examined,
A surprising fact about Hume's political writing is
that a great deal of it is included in the Treatise, It is
customary to think of the book as a philosophical work and
more usually than not it is believed to consist of a volume
on metaphysics or epistemology, another on psychology and a
1
third on morals. In some commentaries the only factor which
appears to connect these three books is the name of the auth¬
or* It is noteworthy that Book III, so far from being a book
on moral philosophy of the sort expected after reading other
moralists of the eighteenth century such as Hutcheson, Butler
1, C,F, Chapter I.
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or Reid, contains a great many practical applications, mostly
political in nature, A3 Huxley saw it, Hume did not even
1
wait to finish the Treatise before turning aside to politics.
Comments and commentaries on Hume*s political writ¬
ing were as rare in Hume's day as they are now. During the
nineteenth century when the first works on Hume began to ap¬
pear, they were influenced to a great extent by Hume's con¬
clusions, and paid little or no attention to the method or
basis he used for his political analysis. They were much
more interested in whether or not he had been right, A com¬
plicating factor is that 83 Hume grew older, his conclusions
tended to obscure the historical context from which they had
been derived as well as the method by which they were reached.
To have been a Tory in eighteenth century Scotland long be¬
fore the advent of educated masses and expanded electorates ,
and with the evidences of popular religion, the great Scottish
revivals, before your eyes, was quite a different matter than
being a Tory in 1900, The outcome was a remark on Hume's
oolitioal writing which asserted that his political conserva-
2
tism was a shelter from the scepticism of his philosophy.
Recently two short studies of Hume's political writ¬
ing have been published and although they make no claim to
comprehensive treatment, they give the information we require.
1, Hone the leas, Huxley gives a very fair account of Hume's
actual political conclusions,
2, A, Bain, John Stuart Mill, A Criticism with personal recol¬
lections, London, 1882, p, 34.
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In all recent studies of Hume's political work there Is al¬
most complete agreement on the points stressed in these two,
and it is a wholly different picture from the one which would
have been painted in 1900* Hume's conclusions are not prima¬
rily considered, but it is rather the method he used in coming
to these conclusions which interests modern political scien¬
tists. His contributions to political science are further
shown to be logical and legitimate extensions of the philos¬
ophic position of the Treatise. As George Sabine says,
What Hume supplied was a penetrating logical ana¬
lysis, which if accepted, destroyed all the pretensions
of natural law to scientific validity. In addition he
extended this critical result to specific applications
of natural lav; in ethics, religion and politics, 4
In fact the tenor of these sections is to emphasize that it
is impossible to evaluate and understand Hume's political
writing until the basic premises of his philosophy are taken
into consideration. It Is the underlying unity which Sabine
stresses.
Frederick Watkins is also explicit on the unity of
Hume's political and philosophical work.
Before Hume no thoroughgoing attempt had been made
to justify and define the nature of the distinction be¬
tween normative and factual investigations. Hume's
epistemology provided the basis for such a distinction.
By insisting on the necessary difference between 'is'
and 'ought' and by limiting true knov/ledge to the non-
normative determinations of logical relations and matters
of fact, he laid the foundation for the empirical posi¬
tion adopted by most subsequent social scientists, 2
1. George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, London,
1949» P« 504.
2. Hume, Theory of Politics. Edited by Prof. F. Watkins,
Edinburgh, 1951, P. xi.
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It v/ould be difficult, sayg Watkins, to determine whether
political considerations inspired his philosophic position or
philosophical considerations inspired his political position.
In any case, one is such an integral constituent of the other
that the consideration of one is ipso facto the consideration
of the other.
George Catling, A History of the Political Philos¬
ophers is another recent, account of Hume as political philos¬
opher. This book contains some undesirable aspects common to
popular accounts of Hume's life and writing, i.e. half truths
and legends, but it is similar to the two sources just men¬
tioned in that Catlin maintains Hume's political philosophy
to be based on his philosophical position.
From these various sources, then, a different in¬
terpretation arises in respect of the relationship between the
different phases of Hume's work. It is also Interesting to
note that although all of these sources emphasize the con¬
nection between politics and philosophy, none of them are
very explicit as to what Hume's philosophic position really
was. The general impression is, however, that its definitive
aspect was concerned with method, i.e. his philosophic posi¬
tion rested on the methods of scientific investigation.
The situation with respect to the interpretation of
Hume's History of England, appears analogous to that just
examined in his political writing. First, interest was direc¬
ted at its conclusions, and with perhaps much greater justifi-
40,
cation than in the former case. From Hume*a time until 1900,
the tendency was to think of history as history: to have the
general opinion that history, no matter who the author, should
be the same if correctly written. The main difference in *
histories was a matter of sources, given the same sources and
equal research ability, history would write itself. For this
idealistic view of history Hume's work had many shortcomings
and has been periodically and systematically orlticised. The
earliest interest which centered upon the way in which the
History was written, the sources which influenced it and its
value as a historical text, has its origin in Feuter*s work
published in 1911. Since then a small but steady stream of
articles and books containing sections about Hume the histori¬
an, have appeared. In the beginning comment was exceedingly
critical, but as the study of the history of history grows,
the treatment of Hume has beoome more and more liberal.
This has been the result of two factors, a more detailed
*
. >
study of the History, and a greater comprehension of the prob¬
lems faced by eighteenth century historians. The first cri¬
ticisms concentrated mainly on three points: (1} that Hume
copied his History from Voltaire, (2) that it was written with
a violent Tory prejudice and (3) that Hume neither knew how to
use nor did he accurately check his source material. The
critics were prepared to praise only his style. Most of these




charges have been dropped as either being not founded In fact
or as unimportant. An example of a treatment of Hume's
History which still follows the general line started by Feuter
1 't¬
is that of J.B. Black, His greatest deviation, however, is
that he refutes the theory that Hume copied his History from
Voltaire, Apart from being, for ohronologioal reasons, highly
improbable, it is from the nature of the History and Hume's
other work also very doubtful. It is not, says Black, the
connection between Voltaire's History and Hume's History that
should be examined, but the connection between his History
and his philosophy* Even more than in the case of Voltaire
his outlook and method as a historian were determined for him
by his speculative ideas. His philosophy stands to his his¬
tory in the relation of a 'prolegomenon' and both together
constitute an organic unit. Instead, therefore, of searching
for traces of borrowing from Voltaire it would be more profit¬
able and practicable to investigate the extent to which Hume
2
the philosopher guided Hume the historian. In spite of this
approach to Hume's history, Black finds support for almost
all the allegations of former critios in addition to some new
ones of his own. It can only be the Influence of Hume's
philosophy which makes the History so Inferior. An outline
of Black's summation of Hume's philosophy and the inferences
1. J.B, Black, The Art of History, London, 1926*
2. Black, p. 79.
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lie draws from it may be set out as follows: "3y common consent
the core of Hume's metaohysics is to be found in his theory
1
of causation" which has its roots in a belief in the uniform¬
ity of nature, and its practical application in his History.
This implies two suppositions which Hume accepts. "One, that
the mind of man is the scene of a uniform play of motive; and
two, that the motives of men in the mass are quantitatively
2
and qualitatively the same for all times and all countries."
This leads Hume to the setting up of an 'historical man' in
the same fashion as later an 'economic man' was set up. The
assumption of the uniformity of human nature results, in the
main, in the over-simplification of history: an inability to
recognize or deal with extraordinary motives. Two examples of
this failure to deal with out-of-the-ordinary cases are his
treatment of Joan of Arc and Martin Luther. In accordance
with Hume's philosophical theory "the universal is emphasized,
the local and particular are suppressed, and all sense of per-
3
speotive Is obliterated." Joan of Arc and Luther are shown
to be quite ordinary people who by accident of place, but
mainly of temperament, come into prominence. Hume fails to
show them as peculiar products of their age and environment.
Black's account of the connection between Hume's
philosophical work and his History is faulty in two respects.
First, it is doubtful that Hume, either consciously or un-
1. Black, p. 94.
2. Black, p. 95.
3. Black, p. 100.
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consciously, set up anything so artificial as an historical
man, for it would seem that a person who realized that a well
established myth like the sooial contract theory was nothing
more than a theoretical tool, would also have realized the
same would hold true for a "normal historical man." The more
fundamental criticism underlying Black's main attack on Hume's
historical method, is in fact a criticism of historical method
itself. The writing of history, as Hume saw, depends on oaus-
al connection. The historian is one who traces this causal
connection; he is not merely a chronicler of events which mean
nothing in themselves. If there were not systems set up to
account for these events, writing of history would be to a
great extent pointless, and this is just as true of human
actions as of natural happenings. If mhistorian is forced
to report that a human action was utterly inexplicable, we
and the historian can only assume that his system of explana¬
tion and/or historical data are incomplete. What is the dif¬
ference between modern historical accounts of Martin Luther
and that of Hume? Is it that they assume human actions to
be inexplicable, extraordinary and beyond the causal link?
No, the only difference found is that of technique and detail
of research, for the theory behind the two accounts will be
exactly the same, the attempted objective reporting of events
1
in a causal sequence.
1, On this point see page 143, Vol. 3, Hume's History;
also page 288, Vol, 8,
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One thing to note about Black's account is thst the
interpretation of Hume's philosophy is traditional. Perhaps
this induces Black to look in the wrong place for Hume's pre¬
suppositions.
Another account of Hume's History that has recently
1
appeared is that of Mosaner. Although he begins at the same
point as Black, he comes to quite different conclusions,
Mossner finds that the most critical comments on the History
spring from two sources: one was the failure to apply histori¬
cal method to the writing of history and the second was the
failure to consider Hume's work as a unit, that is, construc¬
ting a dichotomy between Hume the historian and Hume the phi¬
losopher. "The two Humes cannot properly be separated; and
it is this forced separation, this distinction without a dif-
2
ference, that affords a primary cause of confusion," Mossner,
however, is much more careful than Black in coming to any
conclusion concerning the central aspect of Hume's philosophy.
There Is still a considerable doubt as to ^ust what the
real signification of Hume's philosophy i3. The situ¬
ation Is even more complicated when the works of Hume
are not considered narrowly metaphysically. Yet so far
as Hume the Historian is concerned one important truth
may be placed beyond question. Hume is not a rational¬
ist historian, that Is, If the term is taken in its
ordinary philosophical significance.,.. The philosopher
who refused to place his trust in reason ... who attack¬
ed metaphysical necessity in the causal relationship,
1. Ernest C. Mossner, An Apology for David Hume. Historian,
Publications of the Modern Language Association"of
America, Vol. 56.
2, Ernest C, Mossner, p. 659*
and who scoffed at the intsllectualism of the social con¬
tract, la not by any legerdemain of nomenclature to be
labelled a rationalist philosopher, nor when he is writ¬
ing history a rationalist historian.... He consistently
disclaims all allegiance to the a priori or to a histori¬
cal dialectic of any kind. -*■
This also excludes such corruptions as the 'historical man*
and the tendency to reduce human actions to a norm through a
naive assumption of the uniformity of nature. What explana¬
tion of this mistake can be offered, if it is as Mosaner
claims, a mistake? The most obvious difference is the unity
each respectively finds in his philosophy. Perhaps Black,
seeking the unity of Hume*3 philosophy and history in one of
the more obvious sceptical conclusions which traditional inter¬
pretation has attributed to him, has missed "the real signifi¬
cation" of which Mossner speaks. The positive conclusions of
Mossner about the unity of Hume's philosophy and his history
again emphasize that it is mainly one of method. This method
was experimental. It was indeed the method, so recent in
Hume's time, that Descartes and Newton have handed down to us.
The History was unique in it3 time in that its purpose was not
to support any particular faction or interest. This ideal has
become the criterion of the modern historian; to explain the
present in terms of the past. As philosophy was part of that
past, the historian must be concerned with it, and as the
study of philosophy was for Hume the study of human nature, so
the data which went to make up this study could not be separated
1. Mossner, p. 664.
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from history.
The same materials differently organized afford the
basis for all of Hume's writing ... Hume did not turn to
history, as so often indicated, because he was blocked
in philosophy through scepticism; he never really desert¬
ed philosophy, In turning to history, he was not leaving
philosophy, but merely enlarging the empirical data over
the conclusions, *
This gives a good idea of the direction modern re¬
search has taken and the conclusions at which it has arrived.
Although there has been no agreement as to the exact nature of
the unity of Hume's work, the search for this unity has been
constant, Research, on the other hand, is to a great extent
incomplete. There Is no comprehensive study of his political
or economic writing and the sources available in these fields,
as well as those concerning his History, can only be regarded
as introductions to the complete studies of the future, While
the factors just discussed could probably be regarded as suf¬
ficient basis for the contention that his work must be regard¬
ed as a unity, it is proposed that this evidence be supplement¬
ed by certain biographical evidence. The evidence, of varied
importance, will give some Idea of the age (and its Influence)
in which Hume lived.
The first noteworthy fact about Hume's work and life,
in its pattern, variety and breadth, is that for his time it
was unique only In brilliance. In fact if one decides that
Hume deserted philosophy one also has to admit that almost all
1. Mossner, p. 666.
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of his Scottish contemporaries did likewise. A cursory ex¬
amination will show this. Francis Hutcheson deserted philos¬
ophy for the oomplete reformation of teaching at the Univer¬
sity of Glasgow. This reformation included teaching in science
and divinity as well as philosophy. The measure of his des¬
ertion of philosophy is the comparison of the philosophical
works published after his death with those he wrote before
becoming the head of the progressive faction at Glasgow. An¬
other one of Hume's personal friends whose desertion of phi¬
losophy has almost obscured the fact that he wrote about it at
all, Is Adam Smith. The amount of time Smith spent on his
Theory of Moral Sentiments, his comparative youth at the time
of its publication, and the lack of ceremony with vhieh he
went on to other fields of subjects almost parallels Hume's
earlier performance. In the eighteenth century the philoso¬
pher who concentrated solely on philosophy is the exception
rather than the rule. The point is, however, that Huteheson,
Lord Kames, Hume and Adam Smith all wrote with equal author-
1
ity if not with equal success on a variety of subjects. It
seems obvious that all did not give up philosophy for some
more lucrative field or because they were thwarted by scepti¬
cism. It seems inconsistent to judge Hume in a way that he
would not have been judged by his contemporaries.
Two other factors may be mentioned together with
1. Illustrations of this are to be found in Graham's
Scottish Men of Letters.
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the last instance, which can be regarded as symtomatic of the
general intellectual milieu of the early eighteenth century.
First is the close proximity of eighteenth century Scottish
universities to medieval educational practices. The most
striking difference noticed when looking back on these times
is the system of regents which dominated Scottish universities.
By this system each regent took a certain group of students
through their complete college curriculum.
Very early in the history of Scottish Universities
a system — of which there is no direct trace in the
history of any other university — established itself,
by which one regent attended to the entire instruction
of all the students who matriculated in a single year
through the whole of their four years' curriculum, 1
Each regent taught every course offered by the university.
The system, just modified in Hume's time, exerted considerable
Influence on the thinking of members of the Scottish universi¬
ties. The tradition of intellectual specialization was un¬
known in the first half of the eighteenth century in Scotland.
It was only as individual fields appeared and broadened, a
2
process in which Hume, Hutcheson and Adam Smith played a
vital part, that in the interests of efficiency,specialization
was introduced.
The second factor often overlooked in accounts of
this period, is the important role played by the Church of
S
1. Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the
Middle Ages, Vol, II, Oxford, 1936, p. 321,
2. The University of Edinburgh abolished the regent system
in 1708;so Hume was not actually personally acquainted
with it.
Scotland. The general Impression received, especially from
accounts of Hume's life, is that eighteenth century Scottish
Calvinism was much more of a hindrance than a spur to literary
effort. This is far from true, Although in this period of
the great revivals the darker aspects of Calvinism may have
captured the minds of the uneducated masses, its effect on
individuals who came from the educated minority such as
Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith, must have been extremely sti¬
mulating, The central theme of these three men is critical
analysis applied to the fields In which they worked. There
is reason to believe that the habit, if not the application,
of it is derived from their religious training. A good ex¬
ample of the intellectualism at this time was the now much
deteriorated Scottish Sunday, In the eighteenth century it
was an austere day during which one went to church twice, ate
very little, and during the rest of the day applied oneself
very seriously to religious problems. Now, what were these
problems? Each Sunday at 11:00 the minister selected a pass¬
age from the scripture as his theme and constructed the day's
lesson upon It, At the 6:30 sermon he enlarged further on
this theme from his thoughts and from notes taken during the
afternoon. The congregation discussed, during the afternoon
at home, the sermon they had just heard. In the evening fol¬
lowing the second sermon, there was another discussion. These
discussions largely concerned the orthodoxy of the minister's
enlargement on his central theme. They were not pious 'amens'
and were not expected to be. They v/ere critical evaluations
of the sermon from the point of view of orthodox Calvinist
dogma. This was a natural school for young Scots and it was
only a matter of time until this habit of mind was applied
to philosophy, economics, politics and finally (or firstly)
to the dogma itself. The intellectual level of the clergy in
Scotland is said to have been very low, but it must be remem¬
bered that this was a period of reform in the church, and its
critics are much more in evidence than its apologists. Cer¬
tainly Hume, neither in his youth nor in his maturity, looked
down on certain members of the Scottish clergy. There is evi¬
dence to show that in his youth he was much impressed by the
church, but there is no evidence to support the oft made as¬
sumption that Hume turned to his religious scepticism at an
early age or without emotional struggle. In later life, he,
as well as Hutcheson and Smith, found the greater part of
their friends and colleagues among this clergy. The church in
its own way shaped the prodigious amount of literature pro¬
duced in Scotland during the golden age of Scottish letters.
The third factor which might account to some extent
for the initial efforts of Hume and his friends in the fields
of morals and politics was the spirit of reform abroad in
Scotland at this time. The reform of the clergy has just been
mentioned. At the same time there was a great interest in the
practices and aims of the universities. It was this spirit
which caused the change from the system of regents to the
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profeasiorial system, and the teaching of classes in the
vernacular, two changes v/hich systematized and liberalized
Scottish education in every way. Th8 other result of this re¬
form was the turning of Scottish attention from the study of
medieval metaphysics to the more practical study of politics,
economics and natural science. This is illustrated by the
following passage:
The Professors of Philosophy with the concurrence
of the other masters have unanimously agreed to employ
much less time as has been usually done in the univer¬
sities, in the logic and metaphysick of the schoolmen,
which seem contrived to make men subtle disputants —
a profession justly of less value in this age than it
has been in some proceeding ones; and to employ them¬
selves chiefly in teaching those parts of Philosophy
which may qualify men for the more useful and import¬
ant offices of society. *
Hashdall says this represents the spirit of Held*a common
sense philosophy, but it more nearly represents the practice
of men like Hume and Smith, They wrote what is today strict¬
ly speaking, philosophy, but they spent the greater part of
their time on "those parts of philosophy which xaay qualify
men for the more useful and important offices of society."
Here,too,we have something of what Hume must have meant when
he said that the function of his History was to "enlighten
and instruct."
The fourth and most important influence which must
be taken into account in any study of literature written at
1, Quoted from documents of Aberdeen University, p. 177,
by Hashdall, p. 322, _
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this time is the way in which knowledge had developed from
the original basis of Cartesian philosophy, Descartes, with
his dualism, had freed natural science from the dictates of
medieval theology and had enabled it to proceed along the
lines of modern methodology. All those studies dealing with
mind, however, were still subject to theological control.
This is not to say that there wars no attempts to use scienti¬
fic method, or to construct systems of moral mechanics a la
Newton in these fields, In fact, one of the characteristics
of the period i3 the wreckage of such attempts. It Is a cen¬
tral feature in the work of Locke, Clarke and Berkeley, In
attempting to transfer scientific method directly to mental
phenomena they instituted as great a chaos as the one which
they thought they were supplanting.
In 1725, when Hume entered the field of philosophy,
it included all subjects except natural science. As yet there
was not even history as we conceive it today. History was a
partisan subjeot written frankly to support points of view,
not to achieve objective evaluation. While attempts had been
made to transfer scientific method to these fields, no evalu¬
ation of this method or its meaning, and no understanding of
what its uses implied had been achieved. It was not until the
raid-eighteenth century that Scottish intellectuals, perhaps
motivated by some of the influences just mentioned, began in¬
vestigation along modern lines in the social sciences. When
they began their studies they expected philosophy to develop
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in much the same way as science had up to that time. It was
only later experience which showed that while the common bond
between the different fields of natural science is the formu¬
lation of quantitative results, there is no such bond in the
social sciences. As for Hume and his contemporaries, they
probably would not have known what was meant had they been
told that what they wrote was not philosophy. In studying
them it is sometimes forgotten that the distinctions we make
today between the social sciences did not exist for them.
Hume's History, if we accept Mossner*s point of view, was an
attempt to bring history into the realm of philosophy out of
the field of propaganda, and, in the same manner, a study of
his political writing which ignores its philosophical basis
also ignores the spirit of the times in which it was written.
We have seen that the Treatise forms a much more
integral part of Hume's literary career than either h© or many
of his critics would have us believe. We have also seen that
the demand for a unity of interpretation is not only confined
to his philosophical works but is demanded by modern critics
of his historical and political writing. In this chapter
some general sociological lines upon which this unity might
ultimately be based have also been suggested. We have also
seen that the broad outlines of Hume's career do not follow





Chapter I was concerned with traditional interpre¬
tation of flume's philosophical works as represented by vari¬
ous general references published before 1900, and some of the
difficulties to which this Interpretation gives rise were
illustrated. The second chapter covered a more inclusive
field and indicated the primary misconceptions which tend to
obscure the consideration of Hume's historical and political
writing. Again there was demonstrated the importance of the
consideration of his work as a unity, with emphasis on the
fact that modern study in these fields is explicit in its in¬
sistence that this unity find its basis In his philosophical
outlook.
The interpretation found in general sources of 1900
expresses to a very great extent views found in similar
sources today. It is probably also comparable to the philos¬
ophy taught in most present day elementary classes. (Per¬
haps there is more to be said for the teachers, in point of
view of simplicity and ease of reference, than for those who
compile our histories of philosophy.) In general it can be
said that elementary students In philosophy receive much the
same idea of Hume as that entertained by the eighteenth century
philosopher Thomas Held, There Is, however, another level at
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which study proceeds in philosophy, and that is the technical
research constantly being carried out by professional philos¬
ophers. This research my be termed technical as, in its
original form, it seldom reaches the level of the greater
majority of philosophy students and is principally intended
for other professional philosophers. Perhaps it is an exag¬
geration to say that the results never reach general texts,
but it can be said that progress from one level to the other
is extremely slow. In turning now to the second level we
find a situation that is not indicated by so much as a ripple
on the face of the first.
The interpretation of Hume's philosophy on the tech¬
nical level was accurately reflected by that on the general
level until 1903, but to understand the changes which took
place at that time it will be necessary to examine in some
detail traditional interpretation on the technical level.
The most important study of Hume's philosophy written in Eng¬
lish during the nineteenth century was Thomas H. Green's in-
1
troductions to the Treatise, first published in 1875 in an
edition of Hume's philosophical works. These introductions
are important for a variety of reasons. They represent the
first attempt at a critical survey of the Treatise as a unit.
The general point of view of this attempt is the same as that
of Beattie and Held, but the general method of criticism bears
1, Green, Works of Thomas Hill Green, Edited by R.L. Nettle
ship, London, Longmans, 1885.
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little resemblance to these earlier critics. The basic
criticism of Reid, is for instance, that
... the division of our notions into ideas of sensation
and ideas of reflection is contrary to all rules of
logic; because the second member includes the first.
For can we form any clear and just notion of our sensa¬
tions any other way than by reflection? 1
Green's criticism, however, refined and sharpened by a century
of developing idealism is primarily concerned with demonstrat¬
ing the impossibility of constructing a theory of primitive
consciousness. Another reason why his arguments have proved
important is that, in direct reaction to his view, a new in¬
terpretation arises. The source of this new interpretation
is not found in the empiricist school of philosophy which has,
surprisingly enough, always seemed to accept Green's general
2
characterization of Hume's philosophy, but stems from the
ranks of the idealists themselves. That a reaction to Green's
views should appear is not surprising, as this study which
seeks to destroy the philosophy of Hume root and branoh, even
to the point of discouraging the study of it, and spends no
little part of its time tracing Its supposed defects to faults
in the writer's character, was perforce included with every
1. Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Prin¬
ciples of Common Sense, London, 1764. P. 530,
2, An interesting example of this attitude, although he
did not have the advantage of being acquainted with
Green's criticism, is that of Mill, In spite of dis¬
agreeing so fundamentally about philosophy In general,
their respective opinions of Hume's personality and the
general Import of his philosophy were the same.
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copy of Hume's works available for well over twenty years.
Whereas the long and detailed account might have been very
suitable for publication as an article or book, it must rank
as one of the most unfortunate introductions to any author's
philosophy ever written.
Beginning his account of Book I of the Treatise,
Green says that Hume's chief characteristic lies in his more
rigorous and logical application of Locke's principles to the
problems of philosophy. Both Hume and Locke were subjective
idealists, in that both of their philosophies ultimately rest
on the faith that the world, or existence, can be explained
by intellectual activity. Because of their similarity in
this respect and because of their chronological as well as
certain logical relationships, Green devotes almost the first
half of his introduction to an examination of Locke's theory
of knowledge. The outcome of this examination of the theory
of "primitive consciousness" is the assertion that Locke
holds the contradicting doctrines that (a) simple sense data
given the mind are taken as wholly constituting the real; yet
(b) what is imposed or 'superinduced* by the mind or the
forms which lend sense data intelligibility is also taken as
real. That means, for Green, that the theory of sense data
presupposes that which the mind is said to impose or superin¬
duce. Hume's relationship to this dilemma is that he attempts
to follow through one of the opposing doctrines with much
greater consistency and vigor than Locke applied to either.
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He accepts the thesis that simple sense data wholly consti¬
tute the real "... and [tries] to clear the real, whether
under the designation of mind or its object, of all that
could not be reckoned as given in feelings which occur to us
1
* whether we will or no'The process by which Hume attempts
this clarification of the real is, according to Green, a
simple one when once seen in its true colours. It depends
2
principally on the faulty and misleading use of language.
This language takes for granted popular conceptions which it
later shows to be meaningless. It Is an
... account of our primitive consciousness which
derives its plausibility from availing itself of the con¬
ceptions of cause and substance [which] is the basis of
the argument which reduces these conceptions to words
misunderstood. 3
The explanation always assumes the relation which it seeks to
reduce to "propensities to feign" or to feeling. For Hume,
the problem, stated simply, is to reduce if possible all
Ideas of relation, i.e. cause and effect, substance and attri¬
bute, and identity — to simple feeling; or if that is impos¬
sible, to a tendency to suppose we have ideas which we really
do not have. The process which transforms sense data into
ideas of relation is according to Green, Hume's doctrine of
the association of ideas, "The vital nerve of Hume's philos¬
ophy," it is
1. Green, p. 132.
2. It is curious that the philosopher so often quoted In the
works of the logical analysts Is himself accused of the
misleading use of language by an idealist.
3. Green, p. 132,
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.., a sort of process of spontaneous generation by which
impressions of sensation issue in such impressions of
reflection as will account not indeed for there being —
for there really are not — but for there seeming to be
these formal conceptions which Locke, to the embarrass¬
ment of his philosophy, had treated at once as real and
creations of the mind, 1
At this point we can see the major assumptions,
aside from his own characteristic philosophical position,
which determine Green's view of Hume's philosophy, (1) It is
a direct continuation of the philosophy of Locke and is influ¬
enced to no significant extent by any other philosopher, (2)
Hume is basically dishonest in his philosophic approach, seek¬
ing only a position from which he could Jeer at the tradition¬
al philosophers and theologians. In this respect he is pic¬
tured by Green as being driven from one damaging admission
to another, but always having a facile explanation to extri¬
cate himself from every difficulty, (3) Hume, as were his
immediate predecessors, is a subjective idealist, a philos¬
ophic position typical of his period. And (4) the doctrine
of association Is not merely a description of the observable
ways in which ideas are associated but a process of spontan¬
eous generation. After accepting these assumptions, the con¬
stant and consistent method of criticism is to throw Hume
back on what Green considers to be his first principles,
Each time Hume admits any formal conception to consciousness,
Green asks from what impression of sensation it stems. How
1, Green, p. 164«
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can we be conscious of that which endures in consciousness if
indeed ail our perceptions are momentary and remain with us
only as decayed perceptions? In this way Green shows that a
theory which explains thought by means of conceptions happen¬
ing in a sequence of psychical events, always owes any sem¬
blance of its success to the fact that, by interpreting the
earlier consciousness in terms of the later, 3t substitutes
the latter for the former. That he demonstrates the futility
of this type of theory cannot be denied, but that Hume's
philosophy was of this type has been very much in dispute.
Green, who notes that aside from Locke,Berkeley is
the only other influence on Hume's theory of knowledge, in
this connection also observes that Berkeley's motive for elab¬
orating Locke's philosophy was to rid it of its materialistic
basis. He succeeded but cut the ground from under his own
spiritualism in the process. This is for Green a classic
example of the use of logical reasoning based on false prem¬
ises resulting in fiasco for the user. Berkeley removed
materialism by reducing "simple ideas to their simplicity *■**
showing the Illegitimacy of the assumption that they report
1
qualities of matter which is itself a complex idea." The im¬
plications of this position according to Green, are Berkeley's
principle contribution to Hume's philosophy. Hume sets aside
assumptions about spirit which Berkeley himself implicitly
1. Green, p. 133.
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disproved.
We shall not consider in detail Green's specific
criticism of Book I. It is mainly verbal in form, taking
advantage of Hume's loose terminology and thus obscures the
import of his arguments. While it may be valuable to conduct
a detailed examination of sentences taken from their context,
one instance is sufficient to demonstrate the point in ques¬
tion. Repetition of this type of argument fails to damn
further Hume's philosophical work, and in the end reflects on
the criticism itself. The real value of Green's treatment
lies in its reflection of the positive idealist answers to
the problems which Hume raised. That there is a great deal
of value in the Oxford refutation of empiricism can not be
ignored, but its application in this case exhibits the arro¬
gance and narrow mindedness that has been the basis of more
than one reaction.
Green assumes much the same position in his criti¬
cism of Books II and III of the Treatise as that from which
he considered Book I. The position here is much less suitable
for his purpose than it was in the consideration of the theory
of knowledge. Green treats early and mid-eighteenth century
moral philosophy as being dominated by Locke almost as much
as were other philosophical fields of the period. Locke's
domination, in this case, is more difficult to establish than
it was In the former instance. Primarily, Locke devotes only
parts of two chapters to moral theory and these portions have
commonly been regarded as the weakest and most Inconclusive
aspects of his philosophy. Nonetheless, Green devotes con¬
siderable space to extracting a view from Locke's treatment
of morals which corresponds or is directly comparable to the
general position he found in Locke's theory of knowledge.
His correlative view extracted from Locke by Green, begins by
stating that all desire is for pleasure and that the strongest
desire, in every case, determines our action. Since, however,
the only measure for the strength of desire is its effect on
our actions, this definition is circular. The real problem
as Green sees It, lies in Locke's faulty analysis of the
nature of desire. He points out that it is possible to div¬
ide desires into two classes, first, those bodily appetites
we have In common with the beasts and which, if any desires
can, Influence us as remembered pleasure. Second, those other
desires which distinguish us as human beings and are determin¬
ed only through reference to the self. The question arises
whether Locke oan, on the basis of his theory of knowledge,
recognize this second type of desire? The answer, says Green,
is no. The combination of simple feeling, if this were pos¬
sible and even if it could account for the first type of
desire, could never account for self consciousness,and so for
this second class of desire. This fault, says Green, provides
no obstacle for Locke, since in this field as in the theory of
knowledge he exhibits the logical unscrupulousness which is
one of the central aspects of his philosophy.
63
Just as he is ready on occasion to treat any con¬
ceived object that determines sense as if it were itself
a sensation so is he ready to treat any object that
determines desire, without reference to the work of
thought in its construction, as if it were itself the
feeling of pleasure or of uneasiness removed, which
arises on the satisfaction of the desire. 1
This confusion between desire as remembered pleasure and desire
as the object of self-consciousness is disguised by the equi¬
vocation of both under the name of happiness in general. Green
shows this term to be as lacking in objective content in
Locke's philosophy as it was in the philosophy of Green's con¬
temporaries, the utilitarians. Thi3 term, considering the
theoretical basis upon which Locke's theory rested, could be
given no objective content. Locke's further elaborations of
his moral theory are, according to Green, merely assumptions;
they describe the laws of the state and the laws of God to
some extent, but fail to touch on the problem of their deriva¬
tion or the obligation which is the basis of their authority.
Hume accepts none of these latter assumptions.
Hume's relation to Locke's moral philosophy is that,
as always with Locke's philosophy, he sees its inherent con¬
tradictions and strives to resolve them. His specific problem
in this case, is to account for all the moral objects which
appear to be other than appetite proper, or remembered pleas¬
ure.
Apart from the sparseness of Locke's writings on
1, Green, p. 308.
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morals and their laclc of logical cohesion, Green is faced
with two further difficulties: to establish Locke as the dom¬
inant figure in moral philosophy at this period, and to af¬
filiate Hume directly with Locke, The latter problem of af¬
filiation is complicated by logical as well as chronological
problems not enoountered in the theory of knowledge. In that
case, aside from Berkeley whose contribution is regarded by
Green as of a largely negative character, Hume's philosophy
is chronologically consequent to that of Locke, The corres¬
ponding period in moral philosophy had seen no such lapse in
activity, however. In fact, by far the greater portion of
philosophy written between the publication of Locke's Essay
and Hume's Treatise had been of a moral nature. This is not
to suggest that by mere volume the philosophy of Locke had
been superseded, but Green's task is to show that this activ¬
ity not only proceeded on Lockian lines, but also that it
represents no significant advance from the Lockian position.
The general situation in moral philosophy, at the
time Hume wrote the Treatise is represented by Green as being
disputed between the doctrines of Hobbes on the one hand, and
those of Shaftesbury on the other, A third, but less import¬
ant group was represented by Clarke and his followers. The
two major factions, (and we will confine our discussion, as
does Green, to these two), were on all fours in respect to
the theory of knowledge. Reason was conceived by each as a
faculty which oombined simple ideas into more complex ones,
and so, there being no method of deriving self-consciousness
from such a system, they could admit only remembered pleasure
as constituting desire. Hobbes's system, however, had the
relative consistency of an explicit reduction to appetite
proper of all those motives which Locke later took for grant¬
ed, In the course of this reduction, however, he overstated
his case and misdescribed a large class of desires, in fact,
all those which distinguish us, in Green's eyes, as human
beings, Shaftesbury, on the other hand, attacks Hobbes at
the point of the over-extension of his theory, and also con¬
tradicts Locke's equivocation in identifying the good with
pleasure and the morally good with pleasure of a certain kind.
Shaftesbury asserts that the moral character of an act is not
derived from the pleasure it affords, but rather from the
nature of the affection whence the act proceeds. The nature
of this affection in turn is not derived from the pleasure it
affords but from its relation to the "public system" or, which
is the same, to society in general. The "public system" and
the "private system," or the good of the individual, are
placed in opposition. Actions which tend toward the good of
the public system, or rather done with the good of the pub¬
lic system in view, are moral; and those done with the good
of the private system in view are immoral. At least this is
the distinction -which must be maintained, according to Green,
if there is to be any valid distinction whatever. Shaftesbury,
however, does not find these classes of actions mutually
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exclusive,and Green says the remainder of his philosophy is a
confusion of unanalyzed concepts, having at their roots the
faulty epistemology of Locke, The success of Shaftesbury's
philosophy in ethics is similar to that of Berkeley's epi¬
stemology, Its negative aspeots stand while the failure to
be thorough in application undermines the possibility of any
poaitive conclusion.
Green then turns to Butler and Hutcheson, whom he
says do not advance beyond Locke in epistemology nor beyond
Shaftesbury In morals. His main point here Is that, on the
basis of Lockian epistemological doctrine, there can be no
altruism. For these philosophers, altruism, or whatever it
is named, is merely a synonym for pleasure of a particular
sort; and so desire, in a Lookian system which excludes the
1
possibility of self-consciousness, is by nature egoistic.
Hence, although these philosophers demonstrate that all desire
is in a 3ense disinterested, i.e. terminates in its object,
this fails to exclude the view that their motivation is remem¬
bered pleasure.
Thus, on the eve of the publication of the Treatise,
two questions were in violent dispute: what is the source of
1, It is difficult to see how Green arrives at this position.
If these philosophers have excluded the possibility of
semiconsciousness, how does even remembered pleasure con¬
stitute the ground of motivation? How in fact can this
desire be by nature anything at all? Surely egoistic
desire implies the existence of an ego. As in the first
introduction much of the criticism seems to be ad hoc.
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our moral judgements and the motivation of moral actions, and
in what manner are the laws of the state and society which
govern us derived? Two prinoiple theories were advocated,
but each has serious flaws. The selfish or Hobbesian view
has the merit of Internal consistency, but misdescrlbes human
actions. The seoond theory successfully criticizes the defi¬
ciencies of the first, but the philosophies of Butler, Hutch-
eson, and Shaftesbury become chaotic in their positive as¬
pects. It is difficult to determine from Green the exact
position of Locke in relation to the broad picture. In some
sense his views are derived from Hobbes and yet they also con¬
tribute to the basis of the theories of Butler, Hutcheson and
Shaftesbury,
Initially there are two criticisms of Green's ac¬
count of moral philosophy between Locke and Hume which may
help to clarify some of the difficulties later philosophers
have encountered concerning his treatment of Hume's philos¬
ophy. One of the questions that arises is the relation of
the philosophy of Hbbbes to that of Locke, Green only men¬
tions this problem to say that their ethical doctrines are
very similar. Surveying the moral philosophy of the period,
both hedonistic and non-hedonistic, we find it to be almost a
continuous polemic against Hobbes and his follower Mandevllle.
Very seldom, however, does one find any mention of Locke,
since his only prominent connection was with Clarke and his
mathematical philosophy. Clarke's philosophy, which was
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derived from almost a chance remark of Locke's is dismissed
1
by Green as having no practical application in morals* Con¬
sidering the amount of controversy raging during this period
we find Locke's position in moral philosophy, both in his own
writings and in those references of his contemporaries, to be
very indistinct. In relation to Green's account of early
eighteenth century moral philosophy there are two conclusions.
(1) Green has over-emphasized the importance of Locke, or (2)
these eighteenth century moralists failed to recognize the es¬
sence of their predicament which Locke represented, and they
considered, fallaciously, that the issues had already been
defined by Hobbes. The former conclusion seems more likely.
Green's interests lie in the direct linkage of Hume to Locke
so as to complete an analogical position for which he has
laid the foundation in epistemology, rather than in giving a
description of a very complex period. He is also more con¬
cerned with showing the sad state of the early eighteenth
century position than in explaining its derivation and its
laudable aspects. In this sense, Green's representation of
the period immediately previous to the publication of the
Treatise is an abstraction, This may, to some extent, be the
factor which leads him to interpret Hume's moral philosophy
in such a way that the charge of misinterpretation was leveled
from many quarters.
1, An estimation with which both Hume and Hutcheaon agree.
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Another comment which will be of greater importance
a3 our study proceeds, concerns Green's remarks on Hutcheson.
Green uses as reference the posthumous work published ten
years after Hutcheson's death in 1747» which he says is merely
a more systematic restatement of the material to be found in
Hutcheson*s earlier works* This view has been questioned by
W.R, Soott in his biography of Hutcheson where he calls it a
1
"confused work." Scott's view has been supported by the fact
that later studies dealing with Hutcheson and the period have
2
tended to ignore the posthumous work altogether. Hutcheson's
influence on Hume is noted by Green in a footnote, but he
fails to specify in any way what this influence was. We can
only conclude that Green considered it of very minor importance.
As in Introduction I, we find Green committed to
several general positions before his account of Hume's moral
theory begins, (1) Locke represents the definitive as well
as the typical moralist of this period. (2) The altruism of
Butler and Hutcheson is Locke's problem of motivation, other
than remembered pleasure, re-stated in a manner which is no
advance on Locke's own statement of it. (3) Hume's moral
philosophy is, like his epistemology, the logical consequence
of Locke's and his method is to set about the resolution of
contradictions found in that philosophy.
1, W.R. Scott, Francis Hutcheaon. His Life, Teaching and
Position in Philosophy, Cambridge, 1<?06.
2. For example, D. Baiches Raphael, The Moral Sense, and R.
Kydd, Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise.
Internal criticism of Book II rests on two points;
that it is not consistent with Book I, and that Hume does not
consistently maintain the thesis which he adopts* The first
criticism concerns Hume's use of the word "object" in relation
to the direct passions, and the assumption that Hume seems to
make in Book II of the existence of a continuant self. In
neither instance does Hume have the theoretical right to speak
in this fashion. The subject, or in this case the passion- -
object relationship is only possible for a conscious being; or
in Green1s terms, it could only be the product of reason.
Thus in assuming the subject-object relationship in this pri¬
mary instance of impressions of reflection, he lays the basis
for that second class of impressions of reflections by which
he must account for morality, and gives thought a role of
which he had deprived it In the proceeding Book, This second
class of impressions of reflection from which Eume must "ac¬
count for morality," are the indirect passions whose appear¬
ance he attempts to explain through his complicated and care¬
fully worked out theory of the double association of impres¬
sions and ideas. This theory as described by Green, is the
way in which
,,, a special sort of pleasure excited by another special
sort of pleasure, and the distinction of the two sorts
from each other depends on the character which each
derives from an idea — one from the idea of the self,
the other from the idea of 'some quality in a subject.' 1
1, Green, p, 336,
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which is unspecified except that it is also capable of associ¬
ation with the self. This theory, as stated, is criticized
on two grounds; Due to the sensational nature of Hume's
theory of experience, the passions which he tries to "account
for" with this method cannot be characterised by any of the
distinctions drawn in the theory. They remain distinguished
as only special kinds of pleasure and pain, and "special" in
/
no separate or distinct way. Secondly, the "subterfuges" which
Hume offers as characterizing the indirect passions are in the
one case naive, and in the other plain assumption. The in¬
direct passions derive their special nature from two sources,
their natural constitution and their relation to the idea of
the self. Green calls the first of these sources a crude
physiological analogy, and the second he criticizes on the
ground that Hume had no theoretical right to suppose we could
experience any such idea. This raises the whole question of
Hume's treatment of the self in Books II and III, and the seem¬
ing reversal of the sceptical position for which he is so
famous in Book I. Green's explanation of Hume's procedure in
this case is to attribute it to a bald and inconsistent at¬
tempt to give characterization to the indirect passions. It
is extremely easy, after the method Hume himself has provided
in Book I. As for the organic analogy, both Hume and Locke
have been shown by Green to accept this as the solution to
any problem which arises.
This has illustrated the criticism of inconsistency
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whioh Green brings to bear on Book II of the Treatise. The
other main objection he advances is that although Hume, as
he must, excludes all motives whioh imply any other basis
than pleasure and pain, he almost immediately breaks this rule
and admits the excluded kind of motive. Hume does this ex¬
plicitly in two different sections of Book II. Green says
that these "aberrations" on Hume's part, which, incidentally,
are fatal to the larger theory as a whole, are a result of a
squeamishness on his part to equate the moral passions with
those of "avarice or ambition." This identification "...
might have revolted even the 'common sense' of the eighteenth
1
century." In other words, any reference to this kind of
motive is foreign to Hume's theory, and can only be accounted
for by inconsistency or personal dishonesty.
This is the essence of Green's criticism of the
moral sections of the Treatise, for he considers that in Book
II Hume formulates the doctrines upon whioh Book III rests.
It is the assumption of pleasures determined by
objects only possible for reason, made in the Treatise
on the passions that prepare the way for the rejection
of reason, as supplying either moral motives or moral
standard, made in the Treatise on morals.
What does supply the moral motive and moral standard in Book
III of the Treatise? If the moral motive can only be pleasure,
how is moral good differentiated from any other sort of
1. Green, p. 347.
2, Green, p. 332,
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pleasure? Green answers for Hume by saying that it can only
be pleasure excited in a particular way, that It consists in
the "satisfaction produced to the spectator of an act or
charaoter by the mere view of It?; or again, In the words of
Locke as quoted by Green, "the usual likes and dislikes of
society." As for the question of the obligation of moral
lav;, Green believes Hume can only answer it in one way ...
"[One obeys} it to avoid either a legal penalty or that pain
of shame which would arise upon the communication through
sympathy as a contrary act would excite on others on the sur-
1
vey." We see what the nature of the laws of the state and
of society must be; the laws of God, not being reconcilable
to the pleasure principle, are simply discarded. Moral law
must be artificial, in what sense Green cannot determine, but
"the expression of [the theory] bears the marks of descent
2
from Hobbes," so it is in this sense that we must take it.
Thus, as a final measure of contradiction in his philosophy,
we find Hume supporting in general the moral theory of which
he had been so explicit in his criticism.
As he believes that a criticism of Book II is per
se a criticism of Book III, Green does not go into detail in
his consideration of Book III, With this extenuating circum¬
stance he continues a tradition already a hundred and fifty
years old.
1. Green, p. 366.
2. Green, p. 364.
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The first sign of reaction (in English) to this in¬
terpretation oarae in 1903 with the appearance of an article
in the Philosophical Review by E.3. Mc^ilvary. The article
"Altruism in Hume's Treatise," la of very limited scope and
applies only to Book II and certain sections of Book III of
the Treatise. MoGilvary contends that Hume's moral philosophy
is misinterpreted by Green and Selby-Bigge to such an extent
that its meaning is radically changed.
McGilvary's first point of difference is the defini¬
tion of altruism and egoism. It is useless to discuss Hume's
1
moral theory until some workable distinction is drawn, Mc¬
Gilvary suggests that the selfish or unselfish distinction be
differentiated through the end of the action: "the result of
2
the action so far as it is foreseen and desired by the agent."
The question of desire, however, only enters into our investi¬
gation as a mechanism having no effect on the object itself.
In this respect too, McGilvary warns of another pitfall. The
greater number of English philosophers who have used associ¬
ations! methods have used them to reduce apparently benevolent
actions to egoistic motives. The mistake is to assume that
association inevitably means that sort of reduction. The ul¬
timate reference lies not in the association itself but in
the object to which it leads, McGilvary held that Hume em-
1, McGilvary can see no reason why the moralist of this
period should be prohibited from speaking of it,
2, 1,3, McGilvary, "Altruism In Hume's Treatise," Philos¬
ophical Review, 1903» p. 273.
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ployed association "to explain certain altruistic emotions
1
without explaining them away," against the prevailing opini¬
on that in the Treatise all actions were represented as ego¬
istic, This new position in fact does prosent primary diffi¬
culties because, as we have seen,both Green and Selby-3igge
quote passages which seem to uphold their position explicitly.
They also maintain that in those passages where Hume seams to
have the view that there are altruistic passions, he is devi¬
ating from the true intent and logical development of his
theory. McSilvary's position is roughly the opposite. The
true meaning and intent of the Treatise are represented by his
altruistic statements while the seemingly conflicting data is
held to be non-contextual quotation on the part of Selby-Blgge
and Green,or 'careless obiter dicta1 on the part of Hume, In
support of this view he proposes first to examine the general
drift of Hume's psychology, and then the passages in which he
applies this psychology to love, sympathy and benevolence.
The conclusions of the first part of hi3 examination
are that Hume, in Book II, never tries to define the nature
of a passion or reduce it to a lower term, but merely states
the law of its occurrencej and that Hume recognizes, both
early and late in Book II, the existence of passions not found¬
ed on pleasure and pain. In not attempting to define the
nature of the passions but only their origin, Hume makes little
1. McGilvary, p. 273.
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of the passions not founded on pleasure and pain in the same
way that he makes little of the direct passions founded on
pleasure and pain. Of passions which arise instinctively
nothing much can be said, and as Hume does not consider that
they can be accounted for by his theory of association, he
merely mentions their existence. Since he considers that the
origins of pride and humility, love and hate, can be explain¬
ed by this theory, the greater part of Book II is taken up in
1 t ■ h
/ . ; A'f i, •
the application and amplification of the theory in this res¬
pect. The mistake is to assume that the amount of time and
energy expended on a passion is the criterion of its import¬
ance. This is illustrated in the course of Book III where,
when Hume assesses the relative importance of the various pas¬
sions in life, benevolence assumes the major role while pride
is of minor importance. Also,In this connection it is profit¬
able to examine v/hat Hume meant by "passions founded on pleas¬
ure and pain." McGilvary asserts that Hume did not mean
remembered pleasure but meant present pleasure. Hume's doc-
•/./a
trine in this resoect was that "pleasure functions dynamically
1
not teleologically," It is not all remembered pleasure v/hich
can move to action, in fact it Is only that which is enlivened
by belief to the extent that it approximates present pleasure
which can move to action. Thus, remembered pleasure, far from
being the only possible rational end in Hume's doctrine, acts,
1. McGilvary, p. 282.
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rather, as an instigation.
McG-ilvary finds only one possible conclusion in his
examination of Hume's application of association to specific
passions. As the application concerns only the mechanism or
place in sequence in which they appear, it can have no impli¬
cations as to the object of these passions. These objects,
for Hume, are given to the passions naturally, except in the
case of sympathy. Thus when McG-ilvary examines the doctrine
of the double association of ideas and impressions, where ap¬
plied to love or pity, he finds that it only works in virtue
of these passions being originally altruistic in nature. It
is the original characteristics of love that enables its rela¬
tions to be shown through association,
... and one of these original characteristics is the
fact that love 'is always directed to some sensible
being external to us' ... the original and invariable
altruism of love is presupposed by Hume's associational
explanation. 1
The mistake often made, MeGilvary states, is that Hume's ex¬
planation in Book I concerning the ideas of the understanding
which do not seem to correspond to any previously experienced
sensation, is sometimes misunderstood. In the case of second¬
ary or reflective impressions (nothing can be said of sensa¬
tion itself) certain relations obtain between them and the sen¬
sations which preceed them. If these relations can be found
to be always present in certain cases, and this is the view
1. McQilvary, p. 291.
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which is held in Book I, then "they can be accepted ... as
explanations for the appearance of the reflective impressions
1
in these cases." Hence Hume shows no interest in the direct
passions not founded on pleasure and pain and very little in¬
terest in the direct passions as a whole, as they are in a
sense immediate and no ascertainable relations preceed them.
Again Mc^ilvary emphasized that, in respect to the indirect
passions, it is the sequence of their appearance which inter¬
ests Hume, not their ultimate nature.
This article by McGilvary is a new appreciation and
reorientation of Book II of the Treatise. Hume, it is claimed,
is not forced by psychological or epistemological presupposi¬
tions to exclude all motives except those of remembered
pleasure from his moral theory. The seemingly contradictory
statements of Book II are resolved into a coherent system,
having as their theme a new doctrine of association. How does
this new interpretation affect the attempt to consider Hume's
philosophy as a whole? As we have seen, the only significant
attempt found the conclusions of his episteraology to be a
complete scepticism. Green found Hume, as it were, "flounder¬
ing in the wastes of subjective idealism",and as a result
represented the moral philosophy of Hume as differing in no
significant way from that of Hobbes. Hence, if the article
by McGilvary represents a tenable position it throws some
1. McGilvary, p. 285.
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doubt not only on G£Qen*s interpretation of Books II and III
but also on hia treatment of Book I.
The appearance of a view was soon forthcoming which
followed and enlarged the inferences found in McGilvary's
article. In "Mind" during 1905 was published the most im¬
portant and influential study of Hume's philosophy to appear
until 1941. It is not too much to say that the Influence of
this new interpretation can be seen in almost all the techni¬
cal work done on that philosophy during the next thirty-six
years. The article, printed in two sections, vras "The Natur¬
alism of Hume" by Norman Kemp Smith. In this article Kemp
Smith makes no attempt to trace the influences on Hume but
tries to determine the central theme of his philosophy. The
attempt is motivated by a dissatisfaction with the Green and
Selby-Blgge representation of it as a system of complete
scepticism, Kemp Smith's opposing position is that Green, in
ignoring the positive aspects of Hume's philosophy, has missed
a great deal of the point, if not what is characteristic of
that philosophy.
Kemp Smith contends that Hume's philosophy is based
on a new and revolutionary concept of knowledge not found in
1
the philosophy of his predecessors. The new conception of
knowledge is that reason is purely practical in Its applica¬
tion and ultimately rests on theoretically unjustifiable
1. The conception is in many ways analogous to the views
held by Kant.
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tendencies or instincts of human nature. "The function of
knowledge is not to supply a metaphysic but only to afford us
1
guidance in practical life." Thus Hume denies neither the
existence of the external world nor the necessity of the rela¬
tion of cause and effect, but recognizes them as natural be¬
liefs, or "the outcome of ultimate propensities which consti-
2
tute our human nature." They can be shown to be "as wonder¬
fully adapted to the calls things make upon us as any of the
3
animal instincts," but our mistake is to regard them as the
"conclusions of supposed Inferences, [as then] they will be
found to rest on a mass of contradictions and of theoretical-
4
ly unjustifiable assumptions," Thus Hume's philosophy rests
not on the assumption that everything can be explained, as
Green maintained, but rather on a conviction that the great
measure of human experience is for us ultimate, and cannot be
explained. His treatment of experience is not a development
of the philosophy of Berkeley and Locke showing the inability
of their principles to account for experience. For the great¬
er part it is a criticism of their philosophy, which he be¬
lieved was bound to fail because of their view of reason, The
positive aspect of Hume's philosophy, and It is this aspect
which constitutes its unity and continuity, is "the establish¬
ment of a purely naturalistic conception.of human nature by the
1. Kemp Smith, "The Naturalism of Hume," Mind, 1903, p. 155.
2. Kemp Smith, p. 155.
3. Kemp Smith, p. 155.
4. Kemp Smith, p. 155,
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1
thorough subordination of reason to feeling and instinct,"
The natural beliefs are analogous to our moral and aesthetic
judgments in that they cannot be rationally justified, and
although this is true, they can be shown to be "natural, in¬
evitable, and indispensable" in practical life,
Kemp Smith proposes to support his assessment of
Hume's central position by an examination of main arguments in
Treatise and the Hnqulrles. The sensationalist basis of
Hume's philosophy, its second most definitive doctrine, must
not, however, be overlooked. It has hitherto received a dispro¬
portionate amount of notice. And in beginning an examination
of Hume's philosophy one must also remember the two functional
meanings he attaches to the term reason. The first is that of
demonstrative reason, or all those forms of knowledge which
have their basis in the law of non-contradiction. According
to Hume, analytic reason can be differentiated from synthetic
reason in that the former concerns only relations between ideas,
Kemp Smith agrees with Green that this is one of the greatest
defects of Hume's philosophy, as it is impossible to make a
strict dichotomy between the two. The same problems are In¬
volved in our consciousness of each, Thi3 is a factor which
Hume virtually admits in his later discussions of the philos¬
ophic and natural relations. The second meaning of "reason"
in Hume's philosophy is that of synthetic reason, which assumes
1, F^emp Smith, p. 150.
82
such an importance at times that he writes as if it were the
only type of reason we possess. It is "nothing but a wonder¬
ful and intelligible instinct of the soul" or in other words,
When we seek by means of inference to extend our
knowledge of real existence we make use of certain
non-rational principles which can only be explained as
blind instinctive propensities of the human soul, 1
Reason, rather than being placed above these instinctive pro¬
pensities which it uses in Its activities, is their equal or
supplement. Not the test of the natural beliefs, it works in
conjunction with them, and although it justifies itself in
its practioal uses it ean furnish no standard to which objec¬
tive reality must conform. These are limiting restrictions
which fail to define reason in its positive sense, and we find
no real definition in this respect until the moral seotions
of the Treatise are reached.
In Book I, however, Hume did not assert the non-
-existence of rational necessity, but, rather, by postulating
it "in a form [for] which he could not really account he seeks
to show that owing to the constitution of our experience it
2
cannot be attained in any of our knowledge of matter of fact."
He points out that although a number of fundamental assump¬
tions play indispensable roles In our practical life, they
cannot be demonstrated or otherwise theoretically justified.
Thus the vulgar, if any explanation is demanded of them,
1. Kemp Smith, p. 157.
2, Kemp Smith, p. 158.
maintain through dogmatism the permanent existence of objects,
even though these objects are apprehended at different times
and places, having only resemblance as their connecting rela¬
tion. The other error into which we fall is the assertion of
a necessary relationship between cause and effect, when ana¬
lytically all that can be demonstrated is mere succession in
time. Why, asks Hume, do we assert such obvious contradic¬
tions? His answer, as Kemp Smith shows, is "blind powerful
instinct," and the greater part of Book I is taken up with the
demonstration of the futility of other explanations.
Hume*a associational explanation of our error in
ascribing permanent existence to either the self or external
objects (they both rest on the same natural belief) is that
gradual change leaves a feeling of sameness in the mind. It
is, furthermore, an instinct of the mind to spread itself
over external objects and ascribe to them any feeling which
they occasion. Thus, the feeling of sameness or identity is
annexed to perceived objects or, in the case of the self, to
that "bundle of impressions of which we have an intimate im¬
pression." The explanation for the other natural belief, the
belief in the necessity of causal connection, is already par¬
tially familiar. The interesting aspect at this point is the
role played by feeling in the explanation. We make another
assumption in addition to the feeling of necessity which Is
the basis of the belief. In all specific cases of causal in¬
ference v/e assume that the future will resemble the past.
Neither the feeling nor the assumption, says Hume, can be
justified by any appeal to experience, as that type of proof
would in this oase merely assume the principles which we are
attempting to prove. Since it cannot be demonstrated in this
manner, the only other alternative for Hume is to attribute
the feeling and the assumption to "the outcome of some unreas¬
oning propensity." The propensity is habit or custom. Kemp Smith
makes it clear, as McGilvary had insisted in Hume's theory of
double association, that in grounding the assumption in custom
or habit Hume does not pretend to give the ultimate reason
for such a propensity, but merely indicates it as an observ¬
able principle of human nature. Furthermore, Hume says it
would be sufficient if the investigation were stopped at this
point, taking custom as one of the propensities conditioning
belief. It is possible to carry the investigation one step
farther. In the case of our certainty about particular in¬
stances of causal inference {for example, fire and heat) we
could without logical contradiction imagine that cold instead
of heat would be the result of fire. The contradiction arises
in the way we conceive or "feel" the two inferences, and
Hume's explanation of this is as follows: An impression such
as fire, or for that matter any impression, is always attend¬
ed by the greatest degree of belief. As it is an instinct
of the mind to "spread Itself over" external objects and as¬
cribe to them any feeling which they occasion, the idea of
heat, which arises through custom, follows naturally the
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Impression of fire; and some of the belief which the impres¬
sion of fire occasions is ascribed, through instinct, to the
idea of heat. An explanation in this abbreviated form may
seem crude, but the philosophical position to which it leads
is important. Inference, instead of being based upon and pre¬
supposing the relation of cause and effect, is one with it.
"It is nothing but the custom-bred transition from an impres-
1
sion to an enlivened idea," Thus belief, not resting on in¬
sight or not depending for its validity on rational activity,
is removed from the danger of being disproved by our scepti¬
cal doubts, Hume's general position is that nature does not
leave these conceptions, which are so indispenslble to the
conduct of our every day lives, to as weak and variable a
faculty as human reason.
It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of
nature to secure so necessary an act of mind, by some
instinct or mechanical tendency which may be infallible
in its operation, may discover Itself at the first ap¬
pearance of life and thought ... and may be Independent
of all the laboured deductions of the understanding. 2
This gives some idea of the way in which Hume ac¬
counts for the causes which make the doctrine fall into these
two contradictions. This is not, however, the end of our
trouble with the natural beliefs. Although they are inevi¬
table, (only at very specifid times can we free ourselves from
them and doubt them) they themselves lead us into contradiction.
1. Kemp Smith, p. 164.
2. Hume's Treatise. S.B, Edition, p. 55.
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It is here also that we find a statement of Hume's second
meaning of the term "reason." It is obvious that If we affirm
the supposition of the existence of the external world we con¬
tradict all the consequences of our belief in the necessary
causal connection and this, Hume thinks, forms the basis for
the conflict so prevalent in Cartesian philosophy between
reason and instinct. Reason is not opposed to or separate
from our natural beliefs and It is because we must follow these
beliefs that the seeming conflict arises. Reason in the second
sense, or the "understanding",is "the imagination acting ac¬
cording to its most general and established habits or in-
1
3tincts." Reason is generalized natural belief. However,
says Kemp Smith, although ...
Hume In describing the understanding as nothing
but the imagination acting according to its most gen¬
eral and established habits, certainly means to empha¬
size that it is in essence instinctive and contains no
objective standard to which reality must conform, he
must not be taken as implying that it is therefore
identical with Imagination in the ordinary sense, and
is a souroe of arbitrary fictions. The imagination
Caccording to Hume] constitutes the deepest trait in
our human nature, and fulfills the same function as
Kant's faculty of understanding: it creates the order
of nature out of the detached impressions of sense. 2
The natural beliefs cause us to fall into error In
two ways. When generalized they contradict each other and the
conception of cause, being instinctive, is unlimited in Its
pretentions and leads us to demand a sufficient cause for all
1. Kemp Smith, p. 166.
2. Kemp Smith, p. 167. (In footnote)
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things in apite of the fact that we have no idea of what a
sufficient cause would be, In seeking a sufficient cause for
all things reason must justify its own demands, and since
natural beliefs rest on blind instinct this justification can
never be attained, "The demand for a sufficient cause is it¬
self Insufficiently caused and In thus insisting on Itself it
finally brings to light its surely practical function and its
i
non-rational basis,"
This illustrates the basis of Hume's criticism of
J
the metaphysics of Berkeley and Locke, In the case substance
these philosophers, when they observe the contradictions
found in our conceptions of the self and the external world,
seek to justify them rationally and rid them of their contra¬
dictions by the construction of the fiction of substance.
This "philosophical theory" Is not supported by evidence, as
a hypothetical theory must be, for a practical theory does
not require that sort of justification. The ultimate function
of the "philosophical theory" is to disguise the problems ap¬
parent In the generalization of these two conceptions by
popular or "vulgar" theories, and the problems found there
only crop out In a more insidious form later, Hume's criti¬
cism of both Locke and Berkeley demonstrates this,and the con¬
clusion is that no practical purpose has been achieved.
By this means {the feigning of occult substances]
these philosophers set themselves at ease and arrive at
1. Kemp Smith, p. 168.
last, by illusion, at the same indifference which the
people attain by their stupidity and true philosophers
by their moderate scepticism* i
Here we have the two sides of Hume*a rejection of
the metaphysics of Locke and Berkeley. On the one hand they
are shown to be of no practical value in solving the problems
raised by experience and on the other they are shown to be as
irrational as the beliefs they are meant to supplement. What
are the conclusions at which Hume arrives concerning meta¬
physical speculation in general? The answer Kemp Smith gives
is that these conclusions differ in various aspects of his
philosophy, and the most sceptical ones are found in the first
section of Book I of the Treatise. Reason can only be employ¬
ed in practical life, or in the ordinary course of experienced
events. "Nothing else can be appealed to in the field or in
the senate ... the more sublime topics are to be left to the
embellishment of poets and orators, or to the arts of priests
2
and politicians." Philosophers will never be tempted to go
beyond common life once they have well in view the narrowness
and inaccuracy of the means they employ in their speculations.
This is really a much more sceptical position than his philos¬
ophy demands and also a much more sceptical position than Hume
takes in the rest of his philosophical work. By showing that
synthetic reason is on a level with or analogous to natural
belief, Hume has also shown synthetic reason to be necessary
1. Hume, Treatise, S.B. Edition, p. 224.
2. Hume, Enquiries, S.B. Edition, p. 162.
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and indispensable in the same way as the natural beliefs. If
we reject natural belief in favour of reason, we are merely
rejecting a belief in the independent existence of our impres¬
sions for a belief in their causal interdependence. Yet to
reject all application of the principles of synthetic reason
beyond the experienced train of events is also contradictory,
as it is only reason that discovers the contradictions latent
in our beliefs and it is only in this way that we can ascer¬
tain their true value. A more consistent conclusion, Kemp.Smith
says, and one he finds substantiated In Hume's moral philos¬
ophy, is that
... though reason cannot take the place of natural be¬
lief, still .less overthrow it, its generalizing powers
are yet necessary for its interpretation and control.
Only through the use of our natural beliefs as uni¬
versal synthetic principles can we discover their lim¬
ited range and merely practical worth, 1
Considering Green's characterization of Hume as a
subjective Idealist it now becomes more apparent that in
Hume's use of the words 'illusion' and 'tendencies to feign*
he was applying them only to popular or vulgar notions of
identity and causation. His criticism of the philosophical
theories is not on the ground of their falsity but on the
grounds that they can never be demonstrated. In his opinion
this is all that is needed to "turn the scales in favour of
the natural beliefs." The attempt to systematize the natural
beliefs Inevitably leads to a sceptical disbelief in them, for
1. Kemp Smith, p. 169.
in the particular instances of their appearance they always
remain theoretically false. Hven in his own mind the doubt
of their validity cannot be banished; and this is, for Hume,
only an illustration of the inevitable confusion to which the
questioning of these ultimate beliefs leads. It does not mat¬
ter whether we reason "in opposition or conformity"; an hour's
return to practical life will convince us that there is both an
external and an internal world.
In his treatment of Hume's moral theory, which he
finds to be a natural and logical extension of the principles
found in the theory of knowledge, Kemp Smith says that reason
{being the slave of the passions) is no less the rule. He
also agrees explicitly with MoGllvary's examination of the
Treatise, and a large part of the article is occupied with re¬
stating the central conclusions of that work, i.e. that Hume
recognized passions not founded on pleasure and pain, and that
Green has misinterpreted the phrase, 'founded on pleasure and
pain,' in that the object of desire is not pleasure. The
central point Kemp Smith wishes to make is that, in the same
way as the natural beliefs constitute the grounds of inference,
reason in morals is dependent on the natural passions. In the
first part of Hume's explanation of the passions, reason is
almost excluded. It Is concerning the passions, which Hume
considers the foundations of human nature, that his familiar
arguments against reason as the sufficient cause of action are
developed. The passions being original modifications of
existence cannot be either instigated or retarded by reason.
Strictly speaking there is no such thing as the conflict be¬
tween reason and passion, as a passion can only be unreason¬
able when "it is founded on the supposition of the existence
of objects which really do not exist," or when we chose means
insufficient for the gratification of any passion. And in
these cases the passion "at once yields to reason" as soon as
the mistake is noted. We fall into the confusion of mistaking
moral judgments for rational judgments because the preliminary
processes in each are analogous. The difference arises, how¬
ever, in the conclusion of the process. Although In moral
judgments all the relations are collected and presented to
the mind as they are in judgments of the understanding, the
mind reaches no new Inferential conclusion from the survey of
the various relations, but annexes the idea of blame or appro¬
bation to these relations. The mind colours the situation
with its own judgments and these judgments, not being grounded
in reason, must be ascribed to ultimate propensities of our
human nature.
Thus far Hume seems to have excluded reason from any
part in the determination of the ends of moral action. It is
in connection with the determination of the ends of the arti¬
ficial virtues that reason assumes its role in moral judgments.
Although the ultimate ends of human aotions cannot be account¬
ed for by reason there is a class of virtues whose immediate
ends, because of the complexity of human society, cannot be
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accounted for in any other way. The most important of these
is justice, and justice is founded on utility or self-interest.
Judgments concerning these two principles can only be the re¬
sult of the action of reason. Yet, although the virtues rest
on these principles, that is not the reason why they are
specifically moral in character. The moral approval rests on
the sympathetic affection whose object, the good of society,
is naturally appealing. Here we have the key to Hume*s atti¬
tude toward the function of reason in morals, "Through the
instinctive activities of reason nature adapts the other in¬
stincts of man to the complex requirements of social exlst-
1
ence," Thus Hume's theory of Instinct and reason can be
traced through his entire philosophy, and although his doc¬
trine of subjective mental states is equally important, it is
Impossible to evaluate or criticize that philosophy until his
complementary doctrines of natural belief are recognized.
These articles by Kemp Smith and McGilvary give in¬
sight into the direction which the main stream of study of
Hume's philosophy takes in the following forty years. The
next chapter will trace and summarize this work, concentrating
on its legitimate culmination in Kemp Smith's comprehensive
study first published in 1941.




The forty years which followed Kemp Smith's and
McGilvary's articles were a time of steady if not spectacular
interest in the philosophy of Hume. Technical studies appear¬
ed with regularity and by far the greater number of these stud¬
ies tended to support the interpretation originated at the
turn of the century by Kemp Smith and McGilvary. Edna A.
Shearer published a thesis in 1915 showing that Hume's moral
sense was a central and integral part of his moral philosophy.
Her main objective was to determine whether or not Hume could
be described as a utilitarian in the sense that most commenta¬
tors have attributed that philosophy to him. In showing that
the doctrine of a moral sense played an important role in his
moral theory, Shearer demonstrated Hume's affiliation with
Hutcheson and correspondingly illustrated the differences be¬
tween his moral philosophy and that of its supposed progeny,
the utilitarians. In this study, too, the main interest is
in the function of reason in morals, seemingly the key to
Hume's philosophy.
In Mind, 1921, came F.C. Sharp's article "Hume's
Ethical Theory and its Critics," ?/hich was again an attack on
T.H. Green and other critics who had interpreted Hume's moral
work as expressing some sort of egoistic hedonism. This art¬
icle was especially designed for students of the history of
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ethics and stated Hume's basic position on the central ques¬
tions of ethics, previously obscured in faulty interpretation.
A work which has much in common with Kemp Smith's
original articles, but does not go far beyond them, is C.W.
Mendel'a Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume. Hendel's
main contributions lie within the technical processes by which
he supports Kemp Smith's conclusions. Here he makes three
notable advances: (1) he emphasizes the need for objective
consideration of Hume's biography in the historical interpre¬
tation of his philosophy, (2) he recognizes that much which
seems to be left out of the Enquiries, as compared to the
Treatise, can be found in the Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion. The Treatise can be treated as one expression of
Hume's philosophy, and so also can the Enquiries, together
with the Dialogues, be regarded as another more mature and con¬
sidered expression of his views, and, (3) Hendel is the first
of Hume's interpreters in English to consider the many German
commentaries. The general effect of the Studies is to widen
and deepen the context in which we view Hume's philosophy.
H. Miller emphasizes, in the Philosophical Review
in 1929» the importance of the naturalistic foundations of
Hume's philosophy, and also traces the influence of Newton
on Hume, Miller maintains that Berkeley and Locke's influ¬
ence account for the more obvious confusions in Hume's
philosophy over the application of scientific or inductive
method to subjects under the general classification of
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mind. Locke in particular wishes to extend the empirical
method to matters of mind, but on the other hand entertains
a metaphysical foundation, the concept of substance, which
can only be maintained on a dualist basis. Such influence
can be seen, says Miller, by Hume,s attempt to found a univer¬
sal science. As it has been pointed out at the conclusion of
Chapter II, this was a familiar phenomenon during the early
eighteenth century, and although it was usually associated
with rationalistic philosophers of the time, Locke and Hume
are not free from it. For Hume, however, this idealistic epi-
stemology is the camouflage for metaphysical naturalism which
is pervasive in the whole thought of the man, and the basis of
1
his constructive work. This metaphysical naturalism requires
a further distinction in the application of the outlook and
method of physics to human behaviour, and although Hume never
clearly states the distinction it is illustrated by his work.
The distinction is that the various scientific fields develop
in their characteristic modes. Thus,
This metaphysics envisaged a world made up of in¬
dependent substances and original powers engaged in real
causal action. Among these substances and powers ...
we must number the minds and faculties of men. 2
Technical interest in Hume continues, and in 1930
there was published an examination of the backgrounds to Hume's
empiricism by Mary S. Kypers• In 1932 two long studies by
1. H, Miller, "The Naturalism of Hume," Philosophical Review,
1929, Vol. p. 181.
2, Miller, p. 181.
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John Laird and B.M, Laing appeared, hut they seemed to add
singularly little to the general picture. In 1935, an exami¬
nation of the different types of scepticism to he found dis¬
cussed in Hume* s work isolated no less than six types and
raised the question as to which kind of scepticism it was
1
that Hume advocated. One of the last important contributions
to specialized work in Hume's philosophy before 1941 came in
1937 with Constance ffeund's detailed study of Book I of the
Treatise. Maund considers Book I primarily as a work in epi-
stemology, an examination of the relation of cognition and its
objects. This view of Book I of the Treetlae clears up a
great many of the difficulties of interpretation whieh have
plagued commentaries on it. An example la the misconception
that Hurae denied the possibility that abstract ideas are the
objects of cognition. Viewed epistemologieally it becomes
evident that Hume was intent on denying that abstract ideas
are abstract images. At times, however, Hume overstates his
position and it appears that he does deny the possibility
that abstract ideas are the objects of cognition. His posi¬
tion, correctly understood, is one of analysis, and in this
way he is never conoerned with the denial that we experience
any idea which we believe we do. The analytical argument
Hume presents simply denies that abstract ideas are of the
kind which ordinary experience and philosophers suggest. A
1. P. Stanley, "The Scepticisms of David Hume," Journal of
Philosophy. 1935.
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denial that abstract ideas can be known would be nonsense on
Hume's basis, as so many philosophers have gone to suoh pains
to point out. That Hume was as well aware of this as were his
1
critics, becomes apparent in Maund's study. The proceeding
example has been noted to show that this important work sup¬
ports and reinforces the tendency which we have been tracing
in modern technical study of Hume's philosophy, and Maund says
in the preface of her book,
..,1 must confess that in attempting to understand Hume
I have come to disagree strongly with the view of his
early critics, which is still widely current, that Hume
has nothing of importance to contribute to philosophy
and that his own claim to fame as a philosopher lies In
the fact that he developed the false premises of his
predecessors to their logical conclusion. 2
"The Permanent Significance of Hume's Philosophy";
how different is the content which H,H, Prioe gives to this
lecture from that which would have been given by his Oxford
predecessor, T.H. Green. For Green it could only have been
that Hume shows once and for all the futility of the empiri¬
cist approach to human knowledge. But Price says, sixty-five
years later, "... Hume'3 contribution to Empiricist philos¬
ophy is worthy of careful and sympathetic study, and never
3
more so than today."
In this lecture Price confines himself to the dis¬
cussion of Hume's analysis of cause and effect and induction.
1. C. Maund, Hume's Theory of Knowledge. A Critical Examina¬
tion. MacMTllan & Co. Ltd,, London, 1937, p. 166.
2. Maund, p. 5,
3. H.H, Price, "The Permanent Significance of Hume's Philos-
ophy," Philosophy. 1940, Vol. 15, p. 10.
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His remarks form a valuable introduction to Kemp Smith1s book
on Hume which appeared the following year. Since much of
Price*s treatment, however, is similar to the work of Ramsey,
Braithwalte, and Hobart to be discussed in Chapter V, we will
not go into any detail now. It is interesting, nonetheless,
to note the points Price emphasizes. He makes clear that Hume
does not wish to deny the necessary connection between cause
and effect. "In short, he [Hume] Is not abolishing necessary
1
connection, he is analysing it," In his analysis Hume tries
to get at the nature of the "felt connection" between cause
and effect. The term "felt connection" becomes very important
for Kemp Smith, but, as we shall see, he calls it a form of
"natural belief," Another interesting point, which will as¬
sume more Importance in the light of Priced work to be dis-
2
cussed in Chapter VI, is his substitution of an expressive
theory" of causal language for what he terms Huiae*s "biologi¬
cal theory."
It Is not Price's main purpose to modify Hume's
3
theories, but rather to point out their importance in con¬
temporary philosophy. He shows that It is not the negative
Implications of these theories which are so important but the
positive implications, and in the case of Induction and caus¬
ation, "Hume ,,, has not said the last word... His work is,
1. Price, p, 18,
2. Price*s~theory of the external world will be discussed.
3. We discuss positivist modifications of Hume*s theories In
Chapters V and VI,
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and will remain, the inevitable starting point for all further
1
investigation of these subjects." This is the most sweeping
and forcefull expression of the new interpretation of Hume yet
encountered.
The short resume above has not been meant to be a
comprehensive survey, but has been designed to illustrate a
2
general trend. The only consistent exceptions have been gen¬
eral or text book works on Hume which fail to give any indica¬
tion of current dissatisfaction with traditional interpretation
In general. On the technical level these studies fail to over¬
turn the traditional viewpoint as a whole because of their
desultory nature; their attacks on specific aspects, however,
are carried home with great consistency and, in most cases,
substantiate their opinions. Over the entire period, the ori¬
ginal articles by Kemp Smith remain the most comprehensive.
Although subsequent research covers inconsistencies not treat¬
ed by him, there is no general systematized advancement of the
view. What traditional interpretation loses by its logical
inconsistencies, historical distortions, and downright petty
personal implications, it regains through its unity and the
inertia which attend established traditions. The obvious need
in 1939 was for a work on Hume's philosophy which could gather
together the strands of the previous forty years into a phi¬
losophical, historical and biographical unity,
1. Price, p. 37.
2. Other important works are discussed in Chapters Y, VI and
VII.
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Towards the end of the period there was a work Hear¬
ing completion which seems to answer this need. In 1941 "The
Philosophy of David Hume" by Kemp Smith was published. If ac¬
cepted, this work and its conclusions, by a man who had al¬
ready done so much in the development of the view we have
traced, call for an almost complete reorientation of our view
of Hume's philosophy. The new study of Hume not only deals
adequately with research done during the previous forty years,
but enlarges and transcends all previous study. Any subse¬
quent study of Hume's philosophy which fails to take Into ac¬
count either affirmatively or negatively the theories herein
expressed has no claim to comprehensiveness.
The new and revolutionary nature of this book is
found at three levels. The first and in the long run most
important level has already been illustrated in Kemp Smith's
original article: it is impossible to evaluate the meaning and
outcome of Hume's philosophy until its naturalistic founda¬
tions are taken into account. Kemp Smith's other theories are
grouped around this theme in such a way that the rejection of
any part of the complete theory is very difficult indeed. The
second level is formed by the advancement of a theory concern¬
ing the influences on Hume's philosophy, and the third level
by another theory concerning the actual composition of the
Treatise itself. These three theories are never exclusive and
the acceptance of each rests upon the acceptance of the total
view. Historical data are presented to support all three
contentions. Only an outline of the work will be presented
in the remainder of this chapter, but as it is undoubtedly
the premier work in the field, it will be a fitting climax to
our survey of the interpretation of Hume's philosophy, and
will give us the proper perspective from which to view the
positivist and analytical school's appeal to Hume.
Kemp Smith points out that critics have always repre¬
sented Hume's philosophy as the extension of Locke's theory
of ideas to its logical conclusion, having as a consequence
the sceptical doctrines already examined. What they did not
emphasise was that both Locke and Berkeley had supplements to
the theory of ideas by means of which they accounted for ex¬
perience not assimilated to that theory. Kemp Smith contends
that Hume as well had a characteristic supplement to this
theory, and that the point of much of the soeptioal writing
in his philosophy is to illustrate the necessity for his own
particular supplement. No trace of this characteristic sup¬
plement is found in the philosophy of Berkeley and Locke, who
up until now, have been recognized as the only significant
influences on Hume. Kemp Smith turns to a logical source in
his search for previous traces of the doctrines which he con¬
siders 30 central in Hume's philosophy. We have already
noted that T.H. Green mentions the influence of Francis
Hutcheson on Hume's moral philosophy, but fails to specify in
any way what this influence was. Later Shearer, by her examin¬
ation of the importance of the moral sense in Hume's philosophy,
makes this influence much more explicit, Kemp Smith now as¬
serts that Hutcheson's influence is dominant not only in
Hume's moral theory but In hi3 theory of knowledge. In fact
one of the keys to the understanding of all aspects of Hume's
philosophy is the evaluation of this Hutcheson influence.
Historical evidence presented to support this sec¬
tion of the new view of Hume's philosophy is circumstantial.
Hutcheson was the dominant figure in Scottish philosophy dur¬
ing what we can consider to be Hume's most formative years,end
his two most influential works were published just before or
during the period that Hume was working on the Treatise. It
was to Hutcheson that Hume turned for advice on the composi¬
tion and publication of the Treatise, and it was the lack of
Hutcheson*s support in the competition for the chair of philos¬
ophy in Edinburgh University that disillusioned Hume the most.
Probably of greatest importance is the fact that the tone of
Hume's works as a whole is moral. The writers he cites at
the beginning of the Treatise are predominately those inter¬
ested in moral theory, and later in life, when evaluating his
literary work, he named The Enquiry on Morals as indisputably
the best. Kemp Smith sums up the evidence by saying that
"Hume entered philosophy through the gateway of morals" and




Hutoheson cannot be truthfully called a Scot al¬
though he is listed in most histories as founding the school
of Scottish philosophy. Although he achieved a great deal of
popularity in the years following the appearance of his two
important works he hasbeen, with Justice, regarded as a figure
of minor importance in eighteenth century philosophy. His
characteristic position has been obscured, however, by the
immediate proximity on the one hand of the early eighteenth
century giants, Locke and Shaftesbury, and on the other, by
Hume. In that his work was avowedly a defence of the prin¬
ciples of Shaftesbury constructed on the system of Locke, he
has generally been dismissed, as by Green, as having altered
neither in any very significant way. It has also been noted,
as by Green, that Hutcheson was of some influence on Hume. It
is obvious that Hume in many instances adopts the terminology
used by Hutcheson. In spite of this, the Christian benevolence
1. W.R. Scott, Francis Hufeoheson. His Life, Teaohing and
Position in Philosophy. Cambridge, l'96'b.
Francis Hutcheson, 1&94-1747, was the son of an Irish dis¬
senter minister, attended the University of Glasgow and
became an ordained minister, but soon went to Dublin where
he founded a school for the children of dissenters living
there. It was in Dublin where he published his first
work and soon after this he was offered the chair of moral
philosophy :at the University of Glasgow, He came to Glas¬
gow in 1727 and remained there until his death. Only in
one case does the work published while at Glasgow compare
with his earlier production, and that is his "Essay on
the Nature and Conduct of Passions and Affections with
Illustrations on the Moral Sense." Other than these two
works he produced no original writing except that designed
for text-book use in his classes, and the work vie have
already noted, published after his death.
and deeply religious work of Hutcheson has been considered to
have been related almost by accident to the sceptioal eonclu*
sions of Hume, Kemp Smith, having for long insisted on the
primacy of naturalism in Hume's philosophy, and now advancing
the theory that Hume was in essence a moral philosopher, turns
naturally to Hutcheson for the answers to the problems of
derivation found in that philosophy.
Hutcheson does not assume importance only in his re¬
statement of Shaftesbury's theory of the moral sense, although
it is only through him that this theory is lent any of the
dignity of a system. It is in Hutcheson's modifications of
Locke's theory of ideas that his greatest resemblance to and
Importance for Hume's philosophy lies. This modification is
the clear recognition of impressions of reflection, those im¬
pressions which are not the copies of impressions but arise
from the mind itself antecedent to impressions. The most
obvious examples of this type of impression are those of sweet¬
ness or bitterness. It is Hutoheson's contention that all
aesthetic and moral judgments are included in this category,
for we are determined in our judgments of good and evil and
aesthetic beauty or deformity, by the "original frame of our
nature." The good is known in three general classes: natural
good, moral good, and aesthetic good. These are the same in
that they are involuntary, painful and pleasurable, and that
pleasure and pain are not determined by the will. Judgments
of this type are "disinterested" in that they are determined
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for us and cannot be altered to suit selfish interest.
Further likenesses are that they are, for us, certain and
necessary, and they lack any sort of rational justification.
Two points which follow from this are that moral judgments
are in the last analysis non-cognitive, and disinterested.
The former doctrine might be said in a sense to derive from
Locke and the latter from Shaftesbury, Hutcheson proceeds
from these to formulate his doctrines of the use of reason
in the formulation of moral judgments. Two types of reas¬
ons can be given concerning moral acts. The first, excit¬
ing reasons, are our reasons for doing any act considered
morally; and the second, justifying reasons, those which
comprise our reasons for giving moral approval to any act.
Exciting reasons presuppose certain instincts and affecta¬
tions, and In the same way, justifying reasons presuppose
the moral sense itself. These instincts and the moral
sense can in some ways be modified by education and other
influences; they can also become diseased or be lacking to
an extent in certain individuals. Any moral education,
however, presupposes their existence.
The general position and central theme of all
Hutcheson's teaching, is that moral and aesthetic judgments
are non-cognitive. That is to say, they are not based on ra¬
tional grounds and are arrived at Immediately upon the appre¬
hension of their object. Hutcheson's criticisms of the other
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prominent contemporary moral theories are based on this posi¬
tion. It is surprising how closely Hume adheres to the cri¬
ticisms of moral theory found in the works of Hutcheson, and
this position, Kemp Smith asserts, forms the central unity of
his philosophy. The subordination of reason to feeling and
instinct dominates throughout. Book I of the Treatise is the
result of the extension of these doctrines, first noted in
connection with moral and aesthetic judgments, into the realm
of the theory of knowledge.
If the fundamental judgments of morals, as of
aesthetics, rest on feeling not on reason, and if in
matters of moral conduct nature had been thus careful in
providing us, independently of all calculation and re¬
flection, with these 'immediate monitors' may it not be
likewise in the professedly theoretical field? May not
our judgments of knowledge in regard to matter of fact
and existence be really acts of belief, not of knowledge
— belief being a passion and not a form of insight, and
therefore, like all passions, fixed and predetermined by
the de facto frame and constitution of human nature. 1
By discovering the main lhfluences on Hume's philosophy in
Hutcheson, Kemp Smith, if he can substantiate his case, has
added an important link to the chain of interpretation he had
founded forty years previous. In placing the burden of the
major derivation of Hume's philosophy on that of Hutcheson,
Kemp Smith has strictly limited the influence of the other
and more traditional sources. It is hie opinion that al¬
though Hume derived to a great extent the formulation of his
philosophic problem from Hutcheson, his philosophic method
1, Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, London, 1941,
p. 44*
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comes from Newton and Locke. Aside from the more obvious
mechanical explanations of mental phenomena which are plainly
derived from the Newtonian view of physics, Hume*s emphasis
on experiment or experimental reason and his complementary
doctrine, that there are ultimate human experiences resting
for us on secret causes, occupy a central position in philos¬
ophy and are directly traceable to Newton. And tt is these
doctrines which involve Hume in some of his more obvious and
perhaps more important difficulties. In the case of the em¬
phasis on experiments, Hume, like many empiricists, fails to
explain how they are controlled or directed. He seems to as¬
sume that the experiments tell their own story or perhaps in
J ■
some way are guided by instinct or feeling. What the mechan¬
ism is that accomplishes this task is never shown. A second
difficulty, and this one, in connection with the ultimate
factors of experience, is the determination of whether or not
an experience is ultimate. Kemp Smith points out that Hume
has a distressing tendency to multiply his ultimates in order
to extricate himself from philosophic problems.
The third major influence on Hume is, of course,
Locke. While some implicit central factors of Hume*s philos¬
ophy can be attributed to Hutcheson and Newton, the termino¬
logy, and most Important, the sensational basis of all Hume* s
thought, are plainly Lookian. furthermore, the philosophy
of Locke is well suited to the uses for which Hume wished to
employ It, It is not difficult to demonstrate, on the 'oasis
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of Locked theory of Ideas, the restrioted content of the in¬
formation we receive through the sense, and as Hume's object
was to show our dependence on instinct and feeling in the
moral and aesthetic as well as the epistexaological field,
this was a very Important function. It might be said that
Kemp Smith never tries to depreciate the influence of Locke
on Hume, but seeks to present this influence in Its proper
context, a procedure that is impossible to complete if the
only supplementary influence considered is that of Berkeley.
In fact, Berkeley-'s is the traditional influence which suffers
the most in Kemp Smith's hands. As for the two aspects of
Hume's philosophy traditionally considered to have been deter¬
mined mainly by Berkeley*s treatment of similar problems,
Kemp Smith finds Hume in disagreement on the most fundamental
points. The first aspect is the existence of a material world.
Kemp Smith says that one of the primary misinterpretations of
Hume's philosophy is that he is thought to have followed the
Berkelian system to the extent of a complete denial of the
material world. Hum© agrees with Berkeley in denying the
knowabillty or the possibility of the logical demonstration
of the material world. In view of this one must not lose
sight of Hume's central problem, to show that the belief in
this world does not rest on logical proof. The further as¬
sertion, that as it does not rest on this type of proof it
therefore does not exist, is for him superfluous.
The second aspect concerns universals. Hume is
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Indebted to Berkeley only in respect to his investigation of
how images (and universale must be images in his philosophy)
function as though they v/ere universals. He seems to have
taken only this isolated part of Berkeley's theory concerning
abstract ideas. Hume, says Kemp Smith, gives a misleading
account of Berkeley's representative function of particular¬
ized Images when they act as universals, and altogether ig¬
nores his tenet that spirits and relations are not images.
In fact, Hume seems to have been little Interested in the phi¬
losophy of Berkeley and to have had an Incomplete idea of the
1
content of that philosophy.
After provisionally assessing the relative import¬
ance and role of what he considers the major influences on
Hume's philosophy, Kemp Smith proceeds to substantiate his
case. He does It in two ways: the opening sections of the
■Treatise which have always come in for such severe handling
and treatment from his critics are explained and clarified.
This is done, not by attributing their faults to corresponding
deficiencies in Hume's character as has been the usual prac¬
tice, but by attempting to ascertain the difficulties which
the young Hume would naturally have encountered in attempting
to 'found a science of human nature on a basis almost entirely
new.' Assuming that Hum© was subject to the influences of
Locke, Newton and Hutcheson, how can the early sections of the
1. Kemp Smith, p. 257. (footnote).
Treatise be connected with these influences and with the re¬
mainder of the Treatise?
The second method Kemp Smith uses in his explanation
is to show that Hume had worked out his theory of the pas¬
sions; in particular his doctrine of sympathy in regard to
morals, and had achieved a satisfactory method for the subordi
nation of reason to feeling and instinct in this field before
his attempt to achieve the same result in epistemology. It is
shown that the difficulties, other than those inherent in any
strictly empiricist system, which Hume meets in the first sec¬
tions of Book I are due to this attempt, since the problems
encountered in the epistemologlcal investigation call for the
revision of central portions of the work on morals. This
revision is conspicuous by its absence in the Treatise, but
evidence that Hume was aware of its need is found in the com¬
parative study of the Treatise and the Enquiries. The study,
conducted on this new basis, throws light on omissions found
in the revised work which Hume wished to represent his final
statement in philosophy. A consideration of the two philos¬
ophical works from the naturalistic position, which Kemp Smith
maintains is the central theme of each, results in a new con¬
ception of Kume*s mature philosophical studios, and disposes
of the myth that Hume in his later work merely deleted those
portions of the Treatise he considered too abstruse for gen¬
eral consumption. Kemp Smith demonstrates, by considering
the sections deleted in relation to the central problems of
fciie Treatise and in relation to the Treatise as a whole, that
Huiae was in many ways his own best oritio. He came to recog¬
nize the sections which failed to be of service in solving
the problems he had set for himself, and this is more than
can be said for his contemporaries. In particular he came to
distrust the associational explanations with which he had
tried to reduce natural beliefs to more ultimate principles.
The first task of any study which seeks to explain
the Treatise in this way, is to explain the relation of its
opening sections to the rest of the book, and indeed to Hume*s
philosophy as a whole. It is these sections more than any
others which have caused Hume to be called a subjective ideal¬
ist, and which have been criticized as the incomplete begin¬
nings of a psychological theory. Kemp Smith, assuming that
Hume has already worked out in some detail his theory of
morals and is attempting to apply the principles used therein
to epistemology, tests the assumption by considering the open¬
ing sections from this viewpoint. It must be remembered, how¬
ever, that Hume's doctrine of sympathy, which he is trying to
utilize, rests on two epistemologica1 assumptions: that ideas
are such exact copies of impressions that merely through the
enlivening contact of the 'impression we have the self they
can be made to resemble impressions of sensation to such an
extent as to be undifferentiable from them. The other as¬
sumption is that we have an impression of the self.
Keeping this in mind and turning once again to the
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opening sections, we now see in a new light the concentration
on the problems of causal inference to the exclusion of what
would seem the more basic problem of sense perception. This
concentration appears as the natural result of the transfer¬
ence of the doctrine of sympathy, and we find this doctrine
very suitable for dealing with problems which arise in the con¬
sideration of causal inference. Belief in causal inference,
Hume argues, is not conditioned by the inference, but rather
1
the inference is conditioned by the belief. Hence, the two
impressions, cause and effect, are enlivened in a character¬
istic manner by belief, and thus the analogy to the doctrine
of sympathy is completed. As the investigation proceeds, how¬
ever, and the problem of ordinary sense perception is reached,
the utility of the doctrine of sympathy in its epistemologi-
cal application sharply declines. In this latter problem,
there is no question of the enlivening of ideas. Perception
carries us to matter of fact and existence in a manner which
our experience in moral, aesthetic, and causal matters does
not. According to Kemp Smith, it is the concentration on
causal Inference, which chronologically would be a secondary
problem, that results In some of the misleading exposition
found in the first three sections of the Treatise. This is
not, he continues, the only source of confusion. Another ef¬
fect of the policy of transference from the moral field is
1. We have already seen the method by which he arrives at
that position.
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possibly evident in the confusing method of beginning his
investigation by trying to determine the exact nature of
ideas, Instead of proceeding to determine the exact nature of
impressions, as one would think natural bearing in mind his
Insistence that all ideas are derived from impressions. This
problem does not have the same obvious explanation as that
afforded by the theory in the case of the preoccupation with
causal inference. The position Kemp Smith suggests, although
he admits that it is to a large extent hypothetical in nature,
is that Hume is intent on showing that the ideas he considers
in this fashion (space and time) arise not froip. impressions
themselves, but from our manner of viev?ing them. There are
no "impressions" of space and time, so the only method of ap¬
proach must be through the medium of the ideas we have of them.
If this explanation is accepted it harmonizes readily with
that already advanced concerning the concentration on the
problem of causal inference.
Another much criticized aspect of these early sec¬
tions is the naive-realistic terminology and attitude adopted
by Hume, further complicated by the fact that he does not
mention his doctrine of belief until it seems that he has
specified completely the contents of our experience. Here the
precise sources from which the usual criticisms have arisen
can ba seen with greater clarity. It seems from a cursory
examination that these sections, if they are interpreted in
what we could oall the naive-realistic manner, exclude a
Ilk.
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great deal of huipan experience. This defect, says Kemp Smith,
is much easier to reconcile with the remainder of Hume's
philosophy than the two we have just considered. We must
remember that Hume is concerned with two aspects of experience:
(1) the criticism of the vulgar method of speaking of that ex¬
perience, and (2) the criticism of philosophical theories
about the nature of experience. The reason this criticism ap¬
pears in such a confusing light is because Hume allows one of
the conclusions, which he reaches as a result of the criti¬
cism, to intrude upon these early passages. Hume argues that
in ordinary consciousness we do not in fact distinguish be¬
tween the physical body which acts on the eye, and the object
as seen. This attitude is both realistic and naive and its
correction is demanded by the data which it itself presents.
Thus, implicit in the vulgar theory we have two conflicting
theses,that objects are independently real, but that we only
know them through psychologically conditioned perception. As
we can only become aware of the problems involved in percep¬
tion through this vulgar theory, Hume has no choice but to
employ its terminology until the distinctions between immedi¬
ate experience and belief, and impressions and ideas as op¬
posed to independent existences, are made. Philosophical
re-interpretation rests on the vulgar theory of experience,
and it is only by means of the vulgar system that we become
aware of the problems of experience. Hence, Kemp Smith main¬
tains, it is not Hume's use of language which is to be
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criticized* as he could "get at" the problem in no other way,
but his inadvertent inclusion of the sensational basis of ex¬
perience, properly a conclusion, in his formulation of the
problem. This, too, tends to obsoure the other aspect of his
conclusion: the importance and even the existence of natural
belief, which, with theoretical justification, he fails to
mention until the problems of experience have been illustrated.
From the non-technical viewpoint, the explanation of
the first sections of the Treatise is the crucial task which
any interpretation of Hume's philosophy must satisfactorily
complete. If elementary students in philosophy become ac¬
quainted with the original texts of Hume's philosophy at all,
they are usually referred to the opening sections of the
Treatise. It would probably be better, in the absence of an
introduction which can link these sections to the rest of his
philosophy, to confine these students' studies to the En¬
quiries, and yet there is much to be said for an early consid¬
eration of the more difficult Treatise, "hen the opening sec¬
tions have no suitable introduction, however, students con¬
clude that Hume, in restricting experience to a merely sensa¬
tional level, adopts the position Green and fielby-Bigge
attribute to him. In accepting this as the basis of Hume's
philosophy, they not only ignore the positive aspects of Book
I but also of Books II and III. The danger in students adopt¬
ing the "naive-realistic" approach to Hume's philosophy during
and after reading the opening sections is that they are not
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prepared for the introduction of his later doctrines. The
main objection to a complicated interpretation of the early
sections for elementary students is that there is noineed for
special interpretation, as these sections are found at the
beginning of the Treatise, and as Hume, unlike Kant, wrote
his philosophy in a straightforward manner,not on the margins
of other books, Kemp Smith shows that Hume's presentation may
not be as straightforward as has been presumed. A mitigating
factor, however, is that these passages, taken at their face
value, constitute one of the best examples available of the
pitfalls of empiricism. They have formed, in conjunction with
Hume's sceptical arguments, a very useful background and intro¬
duction for the philosophy of Kant. On the other hand, the
new interpretation,by demonstrating the way in which Hume ar¬
rived at the problems, his criticisms of other solutions of
thenx, and then his own solutions as contrasted with those of
Kant, should be an even more productive introduction to modern
philosophy.
Another interesting and neglected aspect of Hume's
influence on German philosophy, other than the philosophy of
Kant, is that of the "faith" philosophers, Hamaan, Herder and
Jacobi, They used the positive doctrines of Hume's philosophy
in the refutation of the "intellectual" position of Kant.
These critics of Kant "... relied chiefly on the thinker whose
work Kant had helped to continue and overcome, the man to whom
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1
he o%ved his awakening, i.e. Hume." Hamaan in particular was
of the impression that Kant was the "German Hume" but it must
be emphasized that this was in connection with the sceptical
2
application of Hume's naturalistic doctrines. By Hume's in¬
sistence on the primacy of "feeling" in all spheres of human
activity, he was the philosopher "par excellence" for the faith
school. In this way he is much closer to these German philos¬
ophers than any subsequent school of British philosophy, as is
illustrated by the importance they attached to Hume's doctrine
of "natural belief," one of the central doctrines of his phi¬
losophy. Subsequent British philosophy seemed unaware not
only of this doctrine but also of its influence on German
philosophy.
The avenues of historical development opened for
further investigation by Kemp Smith are many, and while the
modification of interpretation of Hume's philosophy on the gen¬
eral level is one of the most obvious, others show promise of
interest and fruitfulness. As has been mentioned, there is a
great need for studies, both at the technical and general
level, concerning Hume's political and economic works. This
philosophical work which begins to show his conception of
human nature and the objective toward which his philosophy is
directed should be invaluable as a starting point. Another
1. H. Eoffding, A History of Modern Philosophy, translated by
B.E. Mayer, London, 1900, p. ill.
2. Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,
Second Edition, Hew York,'1$50% p. 305*
study which should be of great value for students of the his¬
tory of philosophy would be an examination of the reactions
to Hume's philosophy, not confined as is usual to Kant, but
Including philosophies of the Scotsmen, Reid and Adam Smith,
and the German faith philosophers just discussed. The study
which has not yet appeared, and which, will probably be pro¬
ceeded by all those just mentioned, is that biography of Hume
considering his life and work in their many aspects, relating
him not only to his predecessors and to those who follow in
the eighteenth and nineteenth century, but also showing his
position In the romantic movement as a whole. The problems
faced by the author of such a work will be many, and not one
of these will be the temptation to simplify Hume's life and
work. When writing of Hume the philosopher, however, one must
never forget the complexity of his philosophy. It is ration¬
alistic, naturalistic, and empiriclstic, and although we have
argued that the naturalistic basis is that which forms its
unity, the other aspects must never be ignored. In this way
we will be able to reconcile the conservative political phi¬




THE HISTORICAL LINKAGE OF HUME TO LOSICAL POSITIVISM,
AMD THE POSITIVISTAS USE OF HUME'S CAUSAL THEORY
During our examination of the interpretation of
Hume's philosophy, from its first expression in a letter to
the Englishman's Journal in 1739 to Kemp Smith's book in 19WL,
we have noted several general tendencies. The most important
of these has been the steady progress, since 1903, toward an
integrated and comprehensive view of Hume's philosophy which
tends to resolve many of the basic contradictions which cri¬
tics and reviewers had previously considered important. This
newer view of his philosophy stresses positive aspects which
had long been ignored by emphasizing his more radical and
paradoxical conclusions.
In turning now to the separate problem of the rela¬
tionship of Hume's philosophy to that of the logical positiv-
1
ists, we must consider this newer interpretation in the light
1, There is the question, encountered so often in recent
years, of how the school known as 'logical positivism'
throughout the '30's should be referred to today. The
term 'logical positivism' has become unpopular throughout
the movement itself as it is considered to imply a posi¬
tion which is not held today. This refers to the word
'positivism' and thus the alternate term 'empiricism' has
come into wide usage. Since we are endeavoring to sig¬
nify not the type of philosophy a school of thought ad¬
vocates, but to indioate a group of philosophers who have
become known as the members of a philosophical movement
throughout the last thirty years, the earlier and faore
widely used name should have greater utility, (cont'd.)
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of the positivistic Interpretation. The two questions which
must be discussed in this section of the thesis are: (1) the
historical question of the direct or indirect influence of
Hume*s writings upon logical positivists, (2) the aforemen¬
tioned problem of positivistio interpretation. The latter In¬
volves a discussion of the problem of causation or induction.
After the appearance of the works of Held and Seattle
in the latter half of the eighteenth century, interest in
Hume's philosophical works never again completely lapsed. In
spite of the fact that he was In vogue principally as a bad
example, his philosophy remained close to the mainstream of
modern speculation. In recent years, however, Hume has been
much more in the limelight, and this is probably due not so
much to the modern re-interpretation of his works as to the
(continuation of footnote from previous page.}
In fact, whether the character of the philosophy the school
now advocates Is so much different from the philosophy they
advocated ten or fifteen years previously Is a point which
I do not believe is as yet sufficiently clear. In a review
of a recent work on Spinoza it was remarked that while the
book was a fair and on the whole excellent treatment of
that philosopher, one always had the feeling that the
author had the verification theory up his sleeve and was
ready to spring it at any moment. This is exaotly the posi¬
tion in which we find ourselves when we consider changing
the name of the movement (in an historical treatment of this
sort) at a time of transition. A change in terms might be
confusing, and there is no assurance that it would be accur¬
ate. Those who object to the use of the term 'logical posi¬
tivism* to Indicate the philosophy of Mach as well as the
latest writings of Professor Ayer may insert the tern 'logi¬
cal empiricism* at any point they wish.
121.
emergence of a new school of thought.
The logical positivisfc movement has advocated meth¬
ods of dealing with philosophic problems which seem to be
violently opposed to those methods traditionally employed.
Philosophy, the positivista insist, has been concerned In the
past with problems which are the result of the faulty and mis¬
leading use of language. These problems disappear when the
language in which they are expressed is analyzed, and with
them goes most of what has hitherto been known as philosophy.
The consequences for the study of the history of philosophy
are plain, For those who hold this view, the study can only
be, with few exceptions, an investigation of the mistakes of
others. It follows that once those mistakes have been clearly
recognized their further study does not require the services
of a fulitiine discipline. Hence, in consistence with its
principles, the logical positivist movement has shown little
or no interest in the history of philosophy. It Is not our
intention here to argue the merits or demerits of this posi¬
tion, but merely to inquire how the eighteenth century philos-
ooher Hume has become so closely associated with the movement.
1
Is there a direct historical connection between the two phi¬
losophies which the positlvists themselves have not been in¬
terested in making explicit, or have both those within and
1, By'historical connection' is meant the direct influence
through the medium of a philosopher's works, or indirect
influence so evident that no difficulty is encountered in
making the line of derivation explicit.
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without the movement merely noted the likenesses of the two
philosophies? Are these similarities such that they account
for the connection? We shall attempt, initially, to determine
whether or not there is an historical connection between the
two philosophies.
There is not, of course, a complete absence of his¬
torical contextual treatments of the logical positivist move¬
ment, Such treatments are usually found in introductions to
the philosophy and are, from an historical point of view,
fragmentary and non-systematic. In these introductions the
history of the movement is extended back in time to include
aspects of the philosophies of the here-to-fore giants of
philosophy. Some aspects of the philosophies of Kant, Spinoza
and Mill are often listed as having significantly contributed
to positivist doctrine. The references to these philosophers
vary from account to account, sometimes one or the other being
omitted entirely. One persistent and often central aspect of
these introductions is the affiliation of positivism with
Hume, Two examples of this are the introduction found in I.R.
1
Weinberg's Logical Positivism, and I0rgen Jjtfrgensen's recent
2
Logiske Empiric!smes Udvllkning. Both v;riters claim that the
1. Weinberg, J.R., Logical Positivism. London, 1936.
2. When this thesis was begun no English translation of
Ipfrgensen' a book had appeared. Now. however, a good trans¬
lation has been published by the University of Chicago
Press as Volume 9 of the Encyclopedia of Unified Science
Series. The book's English title is The Foundations of
Logical Empiricism. As this work is now generally avail¬
able in translation, I have omitted many long and what
would how be tedious references to it.
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ultimate source of important and definitive positiviatic doc¬
trines is to be found in Hume. In the introduction to his book,
Weinberg writes: "Many if not all the principal doctrines of
1
contemporary positivism derive from Hume." In his view, the
empiricist trend of this modern school may safely be traced to
2
Hume. Jprgensen also traces the ultimate source of positiv¬
ism to Hume, Neither Weinberg nor J0rgensen considers the
question of how these aspects of logical positivism were actu¬
ally derived from Hume. J^rgensen, however, does inolude a
list of the founders and members of the school of logical em¬
piricism. Initially, he lists Hume, and then there is a
chronological lapse of almost one hundred years until he comes
3
to what he calls the "founding philosophers" of "logical em¬
piricism," These are Mill, Comte, and Maeh. W© shall now
attempt to determine what direct contact there was between
these three philosophers and the philosophy of Hume, It must
be remembered that we are not Interested In a comparison of
their respective philosophical positions, but rather in what
these philosophers said about Hume's philosophy, their refer¬
ences to it, and any other evidence of their Indebtedness to
it.
Of the three philosophers, it is Mill who should have
been most Influenced by Hume, for Mill writes in English and
1. Weinberg, p. 4.
2. Weinberg, p. 4,
3. In the English translation of his works the philosophers
are called "philosophers of the enlightenment,"
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is a member of the school loosely designated as British Empir¬
icism. Also, his interests, like Hume's, cover a wide range
including moral and political theory, natural religion, and
the logic of induction. In spite of outward signs that Mill
might have been influenced by Hume, we find the actual evi¬
dence in support of this supposition exceedingly slight: when
Mill does mention Hume directly he, with few exceptions, as¬
sumes a position which is very similar to that taken by most
nineteenth century critics and philosophers. It is clear
that In all cases he regards Hume's philosophical works to be
of a strictly negative character, and, therefore, having little
in common with his own positive approach to philosophy. This
opinion is expressed by Mill only in connection with Hume's
work in the theory of knowledge. As far as can be determined,
he expressed no opinion at all concerning Hume's moral and
religious theory. It is said that Mill had not read Book III
1
of the Treatise nor The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,
although we may assume that he was familiar with the Enquiry
Concerning the Principles of Morals. Insofar as he expresses
an opinion we find that Mill has, in this respect, much in
common with Dr. Johnson, He believes that Hume takes advan¬
tage of paradoxes and carries his scepticism too far. He seems
unaware that there is a positive aspect to Hume's causal ana¬
lysis. In this respect, Mill, unlike his contemporaries, does
1. Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, p. 521.
not accuse Hume of downright dishonesty (except in t
ing of history), but it is obvious from random remark
he considered Hume's influence on his own philosophy to
negligible. Such random remarks are perhaps not a suffi
foundation upon which to base a conclusion. But we find t
such a conclusion receives further support if Mill's philos
ophy is considered from another point of view.
Mill's philosophy was severely criticized by Bradley
and Bosanquet. In fact, idealists and empiricists alike have
been extremely critical of Mill's cannons of induction and his
1
treatment of inductive inference. His final position that
the scientific principle or inductive sylogism is itself
based on induction has been shown to be based on both logical
and ontological presuppositions which, when made explicit,
vitiate his explanation, This view can be found in many
sources, but in at least two important works on logic we find
it coupled with the accusation that Mill failed to understand
— or was unaware of Hume's problem. Thus L. Susan Stebbing
writes, in A Modern Introduction to Logic, that Mill was un¬
aware of the difficulties involved in inductive reasoning,
2
provided that what Keynes calls the 'inductive hypothesis' is
hot assumed. That is, Mill assumed that the inductive
1. As A.D, Ritchie says in Mind 1926, "Since Mill built up
his system of logic the rest of us have been doing our
best to tear it down." He also says that the defects of
Mill's logic are the result of its being built on the
faulty scepticism of Hume.
2. Stebbings, L.S., A Modern Introduction to Logic, London
1949, p* 406.
principle "required no principles which could not be proved."
Keynes also adopts the same position and says that "the full
force of Hume's attack and the nature of the difficulties which
it brought to light were never appreciated by Mill and he makss
1
no adequate attempt to deal with them." Here Keynes is refer¬
ring to Hume's analysis, which shows the inductive principle
to be subjectively conditioned, and what follows from this,
that it does not provide the certainty which Mill supposed it
did. Mill assumes that the difference between true inductions
and false inductions is a matter of absolute certainty, where¬
as it is Keynes's and Stebbing's position that Hume has shown
beyond all doubt that the difference is one of degrees of pro¬
bability.
But, it can be asked, does the fact that Mill held
the opinion that inductions can attain absolute certainty
necessarily imply that he was "unaware" of Hume's problem?
This may be said to be true in a sense, but not in the com¬
plete sense which Stebbing'a and Keynes's position seems to
imply. Mill held the view, so prevalent in the nineteenth
century, that Hume's conclusions are so preposterous,,that
he failed to oonsider the grounds on which they are based.
Mill is aware of Home's problem only in its most exaggerated
form, and in this h8 fails to see the positive analysis which
la so important for Keynes and Stebbing. Through Mill's eyes
1. Keynes, J.M., A Treatise on Probability, London, 1921,
p. 272.
we see Hume's association of ideas as a psychological rather
than an epistemological theory, according to which causation
is based on habit or custom, these words being used in their
crudest sense, Viewed in this light, Mill*a answer to Hume,
while it is on a different plane from the answers or refuta¬
tions of Hume by the common sense school of philosophy, has
much in common with them. It would be contradictory for Mill
to assert that science is in some sense, perhaps in a basic
sense, unscientific, and this is what Hume*s analysis seems,
for Mill, to emphasize.
But what can be said concerning the influence of
Hume on Mill and the former's connection with logical positiv
ism? We may paraphrase Ritchie and say that, as far as Hume*
philosophy is involved in that of Mill, Mill's theory of in¬
duction is based on, or in reaction to, a faulty view of Hume
scepticism. Both the absence of the positive influence and
the presence of the negative influence of Hume are to be de¬
plored. If traces of this negative influence can be discover
ed in logical positivism, they might be said to have come by
them through the study of Mill, But it is difficult to be¬
lieve that a line of historical influence can be traced from
modern logical positivism through Mill to Hume, as Hume's in¬
fluence on Mill and the latter*s knowledge and opinion of
Hume's work was of such a fragmentary nature.
Turning to the second "philosopher of the enlighten'
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merit" listed by Jorgensen, we find that Comte is isolated
almost entirely from the influence of Hume, No reference to
the philosophy of Hume can be found in Comte's work, who not
only seems unaware of any comparative likeness between his
own philosophy and that of Hume, but seems altogether unaware
of the existence of Hume's philosophy. This is not surprising
when we consider the philosophers to whom Comte acknowledged
his greatest debt. They are D'Alembert, the Encyclopedists,
and such writers as Condillac, Cabanis, Tracy, Turgot, Condor-
2
cet, Maistre, and Bonald, Of these, we can find no one fam¬
iliar with, or influenced by, Hume's philosophical works.
This is not surorising when we consider that the Treatise was
3
not even partially translated into French until 1878 and, as
far as can be determined, has not yet been completely trans-
»
lated. In France, as in England, Hume's popularity did not
extend to his philosophical works, although he was widely known
and respected for his political essays. This view is supported
4
by Michel Uta who says that Hume's philosophy was almost un¬
known in France at the time the philosophers who influenced
1. As the term is translated in the University of Chicago
English edition.
2. These references are from Michel Uta, La Theorle Du Savior
Dans La Philibsophle D'Auguate Comte, (Bourg, Victor Ben-
tho'd, 1923)," p. T and 2; T. Whit taker, Comte and Mill,
London, 1908, p. 4.
3. T.I, Jessup, A Bibliography of Scottish Philosophy, p. 14.
4. Michel Uta, p. 2, "La philosophie anglaise n exer'ce' une
forte influence sur la pens^e des Encyclop^distes, On a
cherche' le orlgines du positisme dans la phenomenisms de
Hume, ce qui est absolutment impossible, puisque le posi-
tivisme francais se forme unea'epogue, ou la philosophie
de Hume est completment inconue en France."
129
Corate were writing. Comte is undoubtedly influenced through,
these men by Bacon, Locke, Newton, and Berkeley, but not by
Hume.
However we may account for the radically different
nature of Comte's philosophy, it cannot be attributed directly
or indirectly to the philosophy of Hume. Ernst Gassirer says
that in his early years, Comte (this is the closest analogy I
can find either in Comte's works or in works about Comte to
Kant's statement concerning his awakening from his dogmatic
1
slumber) acquired an extensive knowledge of the philosophy of
Hegel. At this point in his career, Comte concluded that the
Hegelian system was "hypothetical" and began the exposition of
his own positive philosophy. However, as far as can be deter¬
mined from Comte's works, or from studies of those works, Hume
played no part in Comte's decision. Of the historical rela¬
tionship between Comte and Hume, we can only say that one of
the paradoxes of the history of philosophy is the fact that
Comte seems so unaware of Hume.
The historical relationship of Ernst Mach to Hume is
somewhere between that of Mill and Comte, Mach is neither so
intimately connected with Hume as Mill nor so isolated as Comte.
Actually, we find, while developing his philosophy,Mach was
completely uninfluenced by Hume, In none of his scientific
books do we find references to Hume. This, in itself, is not
surprising as these are philosophical only in their implication,
1. E. Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge. New Haven, 1950, p.247.
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1
if at all. In his one specific philosophical work, however,
we do find references to Hume, and the most important of these
supports explicitly the point made above regarding Comte and
Mill. Mach writes; "By studying the physiology of the senses
and by reading Herbart, I then arrived at views akin to those
of Hume, though at that time I was still unacquainted with
2
Hume himself," Here we have testimony in Machfs own words
that Hume was of no influence. Machfs admission is supported
by two other sources. Mordchai-Ber Rudajew, in 1913, main¬
tained that it is obvious Mach had made no objective study of
3
Hume. Hence, his treatment in Mach und Hume is carried out
on a purely comparative basis. He makes no attempt to show
that any of Mach,s doctrines are derived from the philosophy
of Hume, In 1937, C,B, Weinberg wrote that Mach "came to rec-
4
agnize a kinship between himself and David Hume." But he adds
that it was only after his own philosophical position had been
formulated that Mach became aware of Hume.
Perhaps a measure of the absence of a direct con¬
nection between these philosophers and Hume is the speed with
which all available data on the subject is exhausted. But we
can arrive at one definite conclusion. Though Hume is
1. Mach, The Analysis of Sensations, trans, by C.M. Williams
and revised supplemented by S, Waterlow, 1914.
2. Mach, p. 363.
3. Mordchai-Ber Rudajew, Maoh und Hume. (Heidleberg Dis¬
sertation, 1913) pp. 1-4,
4. C.B. Weinberg. Mach*s Empirico-Pragmatlsm, {Doctoral
thesis, Columbia University, 1937) p. 3.
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referred to as the fountainhead, or the "classical father,"
of logical positivism, it is obvious that a direct historical
link between these "founders of logical empiricism" and Hume
cannot be demonstrated. It is also obvious that this conclu¬
sion can be applied equally well to other important contri¬
butions to positivlst theory such as those of Frege and Poincare,
Nor need we stop here. This conclusion can Also be applied to
members of the Vienna Circle and to all those modern philoso¬
phers whose doctrines derive mainly from that Circle. This
is clear from an examination of the early publications of the
Circle, in which Hume Is seldom mentioned, and from their
present day writings. Consider two examples, Rudolf Carnap's
1
the Logical Syntax and Philosophy and Motfte" Schlick*s Fragen
2
der Ethic. In the former, it is plain that the view for
which Camap appeals to Hume for support is not derived from
Hume but from altogether different sources, principally Maoh.
Hume is used as a oorroborative authority. The group which
can be Included with Mach, Comte, and Mill as deriving little
directly or indirectly from Hume includes Carnap, Herbert
Feigl, Schlick, and Hans Reiehenbach. Sven A.J. Ayer must be
Included, for, to date, he has remained much closer in his
philosophical outlook to the Viennese group than have many of
1, Rudolf Carnap, Logical Syntax and Philosophy. London,
1935, p# 35.




If we wish to be comprehensive in our analysis of
references to Hume's philosophy in positivist literature we
cannot fail to consider Ayer's British contemporaries. These
philosophers who are followers of Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore,
and Ludvig Wittgenstein, have many points in common with the
philosophers of the Vienna Circle but defy strict classifica¬
tion as to school or method. H.H. Price labels them the "Cam-
2
bridge-Analysts" and Price himself must acknowledge a consider¬
able debt to this group. Their consideration in this context
is not meant as a classification,and two factors necessitate
this consideration. (1) They have certain points in common with
the logical positivists and any consideration of the ramifica¬
tions of positivism which omitted them would not be comprehen¬
sive, and (2) they have been directly Influenced by Hume's phi¬
losophy. Only insofar aa their varied approaches to Hume's
philosophy warrant will their philosophic position be considered.
One aspect of Hume's philosophy, namely his analysis
1. That Ayer can be considered to have remained closer to the
Vienna Circle than his British contemporaries is illus¬
trated not only by the radical position which he adopted
in Language. Truth and Logic, but by his continued use of
the verification principle. He insists that it can be
used as a method of excluding a wide range of propositions
as meaningless, while others in Britain have come to re¬
gard it as "a device which has brought out a great variety
of differences between lots of legitimate utterances',!
G. Ryle, "The Verification Theory," Revue de Philosophic,
Fasdcule 17rl8, 1951, p. 252. '
2. H.H. Price, 'Clarity is not Enough," Analysis and Meta¬
physics,, Aristotelian Society, Sup. Vol. XIX, p. 9.
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of cause and effect and inductive reasoning or arguments from
experience, has influenced the philosophers whom we shall now
consider. These philosophers have variously considered them¬
selves to be in accord or in basic agreement with this analy¬
sis, but differ from Hume in that they either think his posi¬
tion is incompletely worked out or they disagree with the in¬
ferences they believe Hume draws from it. Contemporary
discussions in which these agreements and disagreements arise
have usually been designated as discussions of "Hume's problem,"
but we must remember that when we speak of "Hume's problem,"
we refer to a problem whibh Hume solved, at least to his own
satisfaction. There are, of course, those who hold that Hume
was not happy in his empirical position and was struggling to¬
ward a rationalist outlook,but this is unsupported by direct
philosophic evidence, and is indeed controverted by his last
1
words on the subject in the Dialogues. Whether or not Hume
was happy in his empiricism, we have no reason to doubt that
he thought it the correct position, and we may, therefore, say
that he had no "problem." We would speak more correctly, then,
if we referred to these discussions as the problem of Hume,
because it is Hume that philosophers and others have hoped to
1. Hume, Dialogues. K.S. Edition, p. 189, Cleanthes says,
"There* Is no Being ... whose non-existence implies a con¬
tradiction. Consequently there is no Being, whoso exist¬
ence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely
decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy
upon it," It is obvious that Cleanthes speaks not only
for himself and Philo, but also for Hume. This is a con¬
clusion with which Hume never became dissatisfied.
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"supercede," "modify," "refute," and in the odd case "support."
This aspect of Hume's philosophy which has provoked so much
philosophical activity in the last two hundred years, is what
Price considers to be Hume's most important and permanent
contribution to philosophy, and if volume is any measure of
permanence and importance he is certainly correct. In all
justice, however, when we consider Hume's relationship to logi¬
cal positivism we should limit ourselves to those works which
seem to have some intimate connection with Hume, and not merely
to treatments of the problem of induction in general.
The first instance of interest in Hume's problem
which seems to be intimately connected with the philosophy of
Hume maybe found in Keynes's Treatise on Probability.
Keynes's work is particularly interesting for three reasons:
(1) He says that Hume states the case against induction in a
fashion that has never been improved upon; (2) he claims that
in spite of this his own work would be viewed with sympathy
and approval by Hume; and (3) he also implies that his answer
1
to the problem of Hume might conceivably be accepted by Hume.
In asking why Keynes thinks that Hume presents the
case against induction so well, we may begin with a review of
Hume's statements about arguments from experience as found in
2
tlie Abstract. In general, Hume echoes Mslebranche's criticism
of logic, that it is sufficient in matters of demonstration but
1. Keynes, p. 272.
2. Hume, An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature, Cambridge,
!938.
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fails us in the greater part of our reasoning which concerns
natter of fact. Implicit in this criticism is the view that
all reasoning can be divided, into what concerns either matters
of fact or the relations between ideas. He goes on to say-
that all reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on
the relation of cause and effect, and we never can infer the
existence of one matter of fact to another from the letter's
mere existence. They must be connected either "mediately or
immediately in experience." As for the conditions which gov¬
ern our use of causal terminology, three main conditions must
be fulfilled: (1) events designated in this way must be con¬
tiguous in time and place; (2) the cause must be prior to the
effect; and (3) there must be constant conjunction in our
experience of events so designated (like must produce like).
After listing the empirical criterion on which causal infer¬
ence is based, Hume goes on to enquire into the nature of
causal inference, given these qualifying conditions. He finds
that it is nothing which reason discovers in the relations
specified above which results in our use of causal terminology.
That Is to say, causal inferences or arguments from experience
never amount to demonstration. The opposite of any chain of
causal reasoning is always possible,for "the mind can always
conoeive any effect to follow any cause and indeed any event
to follow any other." For Hume, self-contradiction tests the
truth of any demonstrative argument but the ultimate test of
truth for reasonings concerning matters of fact rest3 on some
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other basis. We cannot say unexpected, events or events which
are contrary to experience are self-contradictory.
What then, for Hume, is the further qualification
which attends arguments from experience if their necessity is
not furnished through logical justification? Hume answers
that all causal reasonings are founded on experience and gives
examples to show that prior to experience wo can have no idea
that any event will cause any other event. He finds, further,
that all reasonings from experience presuppose that constant
conjunction, a necessary concomitant of our use of causal
terminology, will be present in the future as it has been in
the past, Like not only produces like, in the past, which our
experience justifies, but like will also produce like in the
future, a principle for which we have no justification in ex¬
perience or in demonstration. Here in our causal reasoning
or in our arguments from experience, we find a presupposition
which can only be described as "habit," "custom," "felt con¬
nection," or "natural belief." Altnough this natural belief
underlies our reasoning, it does not constitute a part of our
reasoning. In Hume*s words belief is "a raanner of conceiving
an object" or the peculiarly human factor which determines our
experience as much as do the eyes and ears with which we see
and hear the world.
In the light of this,what can Keynes mean when he
says that Hume states the case against induction? Hume never
suggests that arguments from experience are invalid or cannot
be justified. He says only that the formal conception of
validity cannot be applied to inductive reasoning and, if we
speak precisely, we can only say of inductive arguments that
their conclusions are probable as opposed to the certainty of
formal arguments. As for the justification of inductive
arguments, Hume says that this rests on a number of factors
which he does not pretend to analyse fully. On the one hand,
there are the factors of experience such as constant conjunc¬
tion, etc. On the other hand, there are certain psychological
factors listed under the general heading of belief. Again,
Hume emphasized that it is a mistake to apply the term justi¬
fication in the narrow or purely formal sense. How can Keynes
construe this as a case against induction? We could say, of
course, that any analysis which finds arguments from experi¬
ence to include psychological presuppositions would be contrary
to a strict application of the term induction, which means
only uniformity. Actually, Keynes does not insist that psycho¬
logical factors be listed under the general case against in¬
duction, and he claims, on page 263, that we must "validly as¬
sume" them. In fact, this is the case with all of Hume's
major arguments. Keynes accepts so much from Hume it is diffi¬
cult to understand just where he disagrees with him.
The answer to this question lies directly in the use
of language, and particularly in the respective ways in which
Keynes and Hume employ such terms as "probable," "certain,"
and "reasonable." Because Hume uses these terms in two
different ways, Keynes tends to over-sraphasize the differ¬
ences between his own intentions and Hume's, Keynes wishes
to employ these terms in one way and, instead of analysing
their use, opens his treatise by assuming that their meaning
is clear and unequivocal. Thus, in relating his own theory
to Hume's, Keynes represents the letter's intentions in a
much more sceptical light tban is either necessary or justified.
It is not Hume's intention either to condemn or to reform our
use of causal terminology and argument from experience, but
to attempt to determine exactly what we mean when we use this
terminology and what we are doing when we use this method.
When Keynes uses such expressions as "reasonably .justified"
and "validly assume" without supporting analysis to show what
he means by them, his relationship to Hume and his opinions
of Hume's philosophy becomes confusing. This is particularly
true with respect to his statement that Hume presents the case
against induction. Added to this confusing terminology i3
Keynes's acceptance of the major points of Hume's analysis.
Here we find passages like the following:
It is reasonable to maintain with the logicians of
the Port Hoyal that we may draw a conclusion which is
truly probable by paying attention to all the circum¬
stances which accompany the case, and we must admit with
as little concern as possible Hume's taunt that "when we
give the preference to one set of arguments above an¬
other, we do nothing but decide from our feeling concern¬
ing the superiority of their influence," 1
1. Keynaa, p, 70.
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Keynes accepts Hume's position but he pays as little atten¬
tion to it as possible. He exhibits a tendency to see Hume's
philosophy in an over-sceptical light. Either he agrees with
Hume or he does not, and we see that basically he does agree.
He goes on to imply, however, that this is all Hume has to
say about arguments from experience, but this is not true,
since there is a section in the Treatise dealing expressly
with methods of judging causes and effects. This section has
much in common with Keynes's own intentions and also shows
that Hume did not feel himself barred, because of his analysis,
from attempting to outline procedures which might facilitate
our use of arguments from experience. Keynes's repeated ac¬
ceptance of Hume's doctrines only increases the suspicion that
their differences are merely verbal.
In his seoond main reference to Hume it is probable
that Keynes is perfectly correct. It is likely that Hume
1
would have read what Keynes has written with sympathy. At
least Hume would find little to object to in the intentions
expressed in Chapter IX of Keynes's Treatise. Hume would have
been in entire agreement with an attempt to "systematise" the
processes of probable inference and an elucidation of the
rules by means of which the probabilities of different argu¬
ments can be compared. He agreed that the conclusions would
be of great practical importance and that the 'most important
1. Keynes, p. 427.
of these rules is the "Principle of Indifference" or, as
Keynes othervdse entitles it, the factor of "direct judgment."
There is some question as to what Hume meant when he said
that he regarded his philosophy as only the starting point
for philosophers-to-come. There is, however, as much reason
to believe that he meant studies of the sort proposed by
Keynes as to believe that he would have accepted the arguments
of Kant. An enquiry into the logical foundations of arguments
from experience, in the light of the procedures of modern sci¬
ence and symbolic logic, would seem to conflict vdth no Humean
doctrine*
Has Keynes solved Hume*a problem? In one sense it
may be said that he has not. So long as such factors as
"direct judgment" and the "valid assumption" of psychological
presuppositions form a part of an analysis of inductive reason¬
ing it will be impossible to turn inductive reasoning into
deductive reasoning, and that is the only final solution of
Hume's problem. In another sense, If Keynes has attained his
objectives, he has supplemented Hume's analysis In an import¬
ant way, By confining his attention to the practical he has
shown the Importance of analogy in inductive inference and
has also attempted to show how statistical methods can be
utilized. In these phases of his argument he is dealing with
the technical aspects of induction and attempting to make it
a more fruitful method. He is also protected from the criti¬
cism that talking about probability is not the same thing as
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talking about causal inference. It is Hume who draws the
distinction between the probability of causes and the proba¬
bility of chance, but he goes on to say that in practioe we
do not distinguish between them. Speaking of the two philos¬
ophers it might be said that in general Hume'a position i3
primarily an epiatemological one, in which the practical Im¬
plications have been incompletely worked out, Keynes, on the
other hand, represents a practical position, the apistemologi-
cal and linguistic implications of which have not been suffi-
1
ciently clarified.
1. An account of some of the presuppositions which Keynes
makes is found in F»P, Rams.-ey's essay,"Truth and Proba¬
bility^ The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical
Essays. Hew York, 1931. Ills criticisms are briefly as
follows: (1) that Keynes supposes there Is a one one
relationship between relations of probability on the one
hand and degrees of belief on the other. This, says Ramsey,
is not the case and might well serve as^good a ground for
scepticism as the fact that these probability relations
cannot always be measured. The case is that probability
relations do not have a one one correspondence with de¬
grees of rational belief, (2) No such things as proba¬
bility relations can be perceived in the first place,
"All we seem to know about them are certain general pro¬
positions, the laws of addition and multiplication; it
is as if everyone knew the laws of geometry but no one
could tell if a given object were round or square; and I
find it hard to imagine how so large a body of general
knowledge can be combined with such a 3lender stock of
particular facts," (page 164) Keynes himself does not
consistently hold that the numerical or measured degree
of probability must correspond to the degree of rational
belief, (see Keynes, p, 32),
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An analysis of a aeries of articles by R»B. Braith-
waite, who seems significantly influenced by Hume, suggests
v/hy certain logical positivists feel close to Hume. These
philosophers are concerned with, the same problems as Hume;
they reach conclusions which at least are very analogous to
those found in Kemp Smithes interpretation; and their conclu¬
sions may readily be translated into the method and terminol¬
ogy used by the Cambridge and Oxford section of the positivist
movement. Braithwalte examines the difficulties involved in
contemporary expositions of a view of causation vdiich to all
2
intents and purposes is the same as that of Hume. He also
defends it against certain objections which have been leveled
at it since the time of Kant. Although most of the objections
to the theory stem from Kant, they had been presented as
fresh ideas in the years immediately proceeding Braithwaite'a
articles.
Braithwalte maintains that the necessity of any
causal proposition asserts two universal propositions of fact.
These are (1) that as a matter of fact, the properties concern¬
ed in che causal proposition are always associated; and (2)
1. R.B. Braithwaite, "The Idea of Necessary Connection,"
Article I, • Hind, Hew Series, "Vol. 36, 1927; II, Mind,
New Series, Vol, 37, 192S, Edinburgh.
2. It is noteworthy that Braithwaite refuses to be drawn
into matters of interpretation and Insists that he is
defending Hume's analysis of causation only, not his
doctrine of impressions and ideas.
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that the universal proposition just asserted is always be¬
lieved for reasons which are not logically demonstrable. He
limits his discussion to the psychological proposition and
illustrates the differences in his presentation of it from
the way in which it was put forward by Hume, He criticizes
Hume for adopting a psychological atomism which does not admit
belief in general propositions on the same basis as belief in
particular propositions. This psychological atomism breaks down
when one attempts to account for modern scientific procedure
in which causal terminology is used. In most of these cases
the processes being Investigated or talked about are so com¬
plicated that it is impossible to experience "constant con¬
junction," and Hume's transition of the imagination never takes
place, Braithwaite says that it Is Hume's exclusion of direct
awareness of general principles which results in this defect,
"It is ray awareness of these beliefs Lin general propositions]
in myself and my knowledge that other people share them that
is the foundation for my idea of necessary connection (in
1
these special casesi," He does not say, however, that
Hume's atomistic psychology and transitions of the imagination
are insufficient for the uses to which Hume puts them, i.e.
the discussion of our everyday use of causal terminology.
What is brought to notice by Braithwaite is the
peculiar nature of the psychological aspect of the use of
1. Braithwaite, p. 467.
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terminology. This is very ambiguous, and is different for
different people. It is conceivable that after the de facto
proposition asserting constant conjunction has been investi¬
gated or verified, then we should begin to talk about the
character and previous veracity of the person asserting the
necessary connection. In fact, in many cases this is just
what we do do, and it seems that when we consider the psycho¬
logical aspect of causal propositions an appeal to authority
has a real place. This is also the reason why we find that
"... disputes as to whether a certain causal proposition is
1
or is not true are so futile."
In his second article Braithwaite deals with eight
objections to the above theory of causal inference. He des¬
cribes the first five objections as contingencies which never
occur and the final three as necessities which never occur.
2
.As is seen in the footnote, the first five objections arise
1. Braithwaifce, p. 476.
2. Summary of the objections to Hume's theory and Braith¬
waite' s answers to them:
1. The justification of necessary connection in causal
inference is the direct apprehension of that neces¬
sity; the necessity is a component of experience,
ans. This is no argument for one who does not have
that experience and Braithwaite Implies that
he does not.
2. We do have an impression of necessity in our bodily
actions; in volition we are directly acquainted with
causal necessity.
ans. If this argument is accepted it does not
necessarily mean that Hume's analysis of causal
inferenoe is incorrect, but only that his analy¬
sis of volition is incorrect. Further, we
could only know that volition is a sufficient
cause of bodily activity and not a necessary
cause.
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from a number of sources. But the final three are variations
of the objection raised by Kant, Mill, and Keynes; that, as a
theory of causal inference, Hume's analysis excludes the possi¬
bility of the logical justification of induction.
(footnote cont'd.}
And even that possibility is ruled out, Braithwalte
soys, by Hume's point that there are all sorts of
intermediate causes which intervene between voli¬
tion and bodily action.
3. Particular causal propositions are not derived from causal
lavjs but that the reverse is true. That is, "causal neces¬
sity" is primarily concerned with particular relations
between events and that causal laws are derivative from
them,
ans. In our ordinary use of causal terminology it is
not the event which is necessary to the effect but
an event having certain qualities in virtue of
which the effect has certain properties. The
necessity of any event can only be expressed in
terms of causal law,
4. A thing is what it is and from this its causal relations
must follow, else we contradict the law of identity. Or
rather, that a thing must have the causal attribute P to
be what it is, and if it does not have this attribute P it
is not a.
ans. In this case two kinds of 'musts' are confused.
If this is 'merely stating that the assertion of
the causal connection between two particular
things involves the assertion of a causal law* it
is correct (and is also saying nothing different
from the position Braithwaite is maintaining) but
if it i3 meant to assert a logical connection it
is false as the mere proposition 'a has the causal
relation P* does not usually entail the proposition
that 'if a does not have the causal relation P it
is not a,'
5. As a causal law is a universal proposition,its contradic¬
tory must be a particular proposition and we seem frequent¬
ly to deny a universal proposition without the assertion
of the particular proposition. (V,re deny that day causes
night and yet do not assert that some days are not follow¬
ed by nights).
ans. Hume's theory consists of two universal proposi¬
tions, not one, and hence, to deny a causal law is
to assert that the non-psychological universal is
false, or else to assert that it Is not generally
believed.
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We find that Braithwaite's conclusions as to the
implications of his own theory of causal inference to be re¬
markably similar to those which many modern commentators,
especially Kemp Smith, attribute to Hume. Since induction is
based on custom we are unlikely to find any arguments for its
(footnote cont'd.)
6. Universals of law must be different from universale of fact
in that they state not only what does happen but what
could, although as a matter of fact never does, happen.
This argument takes the form that all P's are Q's even if
there are no P's. It is illustrated in the proposition
that gasses with unextended molecules will obey Boyle's
law even though there are no gasses with unextended mole¬
cules. The question is why we believe that this sort of
hypothetical gas will obey this law rather than some other
law.
ans. The first answer is that this universal and uni¬
versals of this type are only more generalized
versions of statements of fact. Here it is a gen¬
eralized version of the universal of fact that the
less extended a gas the greater its tendency to
obey Boyle's law, Bralthwaite says, however, that
he regards objections of this kind as derivative
from the transcendental argument that without
'genuine' causation no knowledge or belief in any
universal proposition is possible, except those
believed on logically demonstrable grounds,
7. Our belief in permanent substances presupposes genuine
causal relationships,
ans. This is also derivative from the desire to justify
induction,
8. The final and most serious objection to analysis along
Hume's lines,"If we accept a theory which reduces the as¬
sertion of causal law to the assertion of two universals
of fact, what justification can we possibly have for the
assertion of these two universals of fact? What rational
basis can there be for the process of induction? What
justification do I have for believing the psychological
universal of fact which I have made one of the criteria
have no logical justification.
And I cannot say what sort of justification would
be required. So I am never convinced by any
'transcendental' argument that certain propositions




justification which will satisfy a logician. Our belief in
scientific method is ultimately based on the fact that "so
far it has not let us down badly." It appears to Braithweite
that as the scientist is concerned with fact the latter Is
justified in his investigations in accepting a simple uniform¬
ity theory of oauaation. On the other hand, when we pass from
universale of fact to universale of law "certain very ambigu¬
ous psychological propositions about our customary beliefs
must be admitted,"
1. As a footnote to Braithwaite'a articles we find F.P.
Ramsey* s ©asay "General Propositions and Causality" in The
Foundations of Mathematics. Ramsey puts forward © defini¬
tion of causal laws which is very similar to that of
Braithwaite but which he says Is not subject to certain
exceptions as was Braithwaite's. The exceptions to Bralfch-
waite's theory (causal laws are believed without logical
justification} are that some causal laws are believed which
can be logically demonstrated, some causal laws are not
believed at all, and some universaIs of fact are believed
on grounds which are not demonstrable. Ramsey states his
theory In two ways; "... when we assert a causal law we
are asserting not a fact, not an infinite conjunction, nor
a connection of universale, but a variable hypothetical
which is not strictly a proposition at all, but a formula
from which we derive propositions," (p. 251} Or, "As op¬
posed to a purely descriptive theory of science, mine may
be called a forecasting theory. To regard a law as a sum¬
mary of the facts seems ... inadequate. It Is also an
attitude of expectation for the future." (p. 255}. Thus
a causal law may be disagreed with but may not be proved
to ba wrong. In this way a variable hypothetical can be
expressed In the form, If I meet an 4 I shall regard it
as an "This cannot be negated but it can be disagreed
with by one who does not adopt it." (p. 241}. Generally
I think it may be said that Ramsey's theory states that
causal laws are descriptions of how the mind works In cer¬
tain cases,or more precisely, in H.H, Price's words, "a
system of predictions."
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During the decade between 1920 and 1930 A.N. White¬
head published important works in which he made many criti¬
cisms of Hume. The philosophical journals of the period indi¬
cate great concern with Whitehead's attacks on Hume. In fact,
there has grown up a considerable body of literature devoted
entirely to the Whitehead-Hume controversy. Much of this
material has no direct bearing on the relationship of Hume to
the logical posltivists. Of course, many of the authors who
defend Hume in this controversy are of an empiricist, realist
or pragmatist persuasion. But we find, as a general rule,
that most of the positivists are uninterested in this sort of
activity and concentrate more on original work in analysis.
Therefore the material dealing directly with the Hume-Whitehead
controversy, with one exception, may be excluded. The exeep-
1
tion is "Hume without Scepticism" by R.3S. Eobart, This
article also has a direct bearing on the problems which con¬
cerned us in Keynes's Treatise on Probability and Braithwaite's
"The Ides of Necessary Connection."
Hobart's main contentions may be stated quite simply.
Hume's complete discovery concerning causation can be put as
follows; "A proposition may Imply another proposition, but a
2
thing may not imply another thing." Hume simply pried apart
two concepts of words which had grown together by examining
1. R.E. Hobart, "Hume without Scepticism," Mind, Vol. 39.
1930, I, II.
2, Hobart, p. 273.
what is meant by a thing and what is meant by a proposition.
This basic position Hobart states again several times and in
several different ways but it is always basically the posi¬
tion that inference is not a property of things, but is a
property of "the meaning of terms" or the "reference of con¬
cepts." His most inclusive statement is that "Hume's deepest
doctrine is not that we cannot discover the secret in the
constitution of one fact by which it implies the coming of
the other, nor yet that we cannot know whether there is such
a secret or not; but that there is not and could not be any
1
such secret." Most of Hobart's first article is concerned
with the defence of this thesis against Whitehead's attack.
The attack which Hobart regards as most serious is that Hume,
in making conjunction in time the sole criteria of cause,
commits a grave error, because succession is a derivative,
not a basic, concept. It is cause from which we derive our
concept of time or succession, not succession from which we
derive our concept of cause. But it is not this argument
which is of the greatest interest to us here. Hobart goes on
to say that Hume was wrong in considering that his analysis
justified a sceptical conclusion. Here we have again, not a
philosopher insisting that he ha3 an answer to "Hume's prob¬
lem," nor a philosopher Insisting that Hume did not have a
problem, but a philosopher insisting that "Hume's problem"
1, Hobart, p. 275.
does not need the answer that Hume by implication thought it
did.
In the purely interpretstional aspect of this prob¬
lem I think it perfectly legitimate to maintain, with Hendel,
that Hume is at heart a sceptic, and still hold that he did
not consider his analysis of arguments from experience des¬
troys their usefol-nsss. It can also be maintained that he
believed that when we became aware of the true nature of
causal inference we become sceptical about the validity of ar¬
guments from experience. In regard to fine points of interpre¬
tation such as these, however, it is undoubtedly true that
Hume's philosophy will support all of them,and this is per¬
haps why it is so influential. Such minor differences of in¬
terpretation must be noted because they seem always to be
Involved in the relationship of philosophers like Keynes,
Braifchwaite, and Hobart to Hume, Each interpretation changes
the question which each asks and eaoh time we get a substanti¬
ally different aspect of the need or lack of need, for logi¬
cal justification of inductive reasoning. Hobart's second
article is concerned with the question of whether Hurae's analy¬
sis of cause and effect and his derivative position on argu¬
ments from experience justify doubt in the validity of induct¬
ive arguments. As we have seen, this is the main reason for
positivist concern with Hume, and philosophers from J.S, Mill
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to Reichenbach^" have assumed that it does justify doubt, and
have presented their own justifications of induction. Hobart,
like Braithwaite, is convinced that on the basis of Hume's
analysis induction does not need the kind of justification
these philosophers attempt to provide.
The discussion is not concerned with a justification
or defence of the theory of causal inference presented in the
first article, but rather with an attempt to determine why it
is that this analysis is not accepted. In the case of causal
inference the lack of acceptance is laid to the inability of
the mind completely to accept the conception of analysis which
Hume applies to causal inference. More directly Hobart at¬
tributes this lack of acceptance, or confusion, to the terms
which Hume employs in his analysis. In this second sense, the
words "sequence only" or "mere sequence" have come to desig¬
nate cases where causal inference is not meant, and this ob¬
scures the fact that we have no other conception with which
to think of causation than that of succession. When we speak
of the dependence of one thing upon another or the "force" or
"power" of cause we are speaking only in terms of strict laws
of invariable succession; and when these laws of succession
1. Reichenbach, H,, Headings in Philosophical Analysis,
p. 305, "The Logical foundations of the Concept of Proba
bllity," "I regard it as a particular merit of the new
theory that it makes possible a solution of the problem
of induction, for which no satisfactory philosophical
solution had been known since David Hume's outstanding
formulation of the problem."
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disappear so also does the "power" or "force." "The idea of
power is the idea of law.""'* The lav/ does not follow frora the
power or force, as Braithwaite also pointed out, but it is
the power or force which follows from the lav/.
We come now to the impact of analysis on the mind
and the mind's subsequent rejection of Hume's analysis. This
rejection is usually found in the assertion that such an
analysis denies the rationality of the world, or as we have
seen, that it removes the force or power from causal sequences.
The real difficulty is that the principle of analysis is only
half accepted, i.e. we v/ant an explanation of the world but
nonetheless insist that,
... there should be just one ultimate in the matter,
namely the nature of substance, of which the world
is composed; so that we might ... read off from this
substance ... all the activities it would display.
Nov/ what Hume has enabled us to see is that to
understand process we have to examine process, it is
not enough to examine substance ... Just as truly
do we take substance from experience so we take process
frora experience ... they are equally ultimate. 2
Thus the demand for the 'rationality' of the universe is really
only a demand that all events be deducible from the nature of
substance taken strictly in itself. This kind of thinking,
Hobart points out, simply does not work and v/e wind up in the
1. Hobart, p. 411.
2, Hobart, p. 415.
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position of having to say that 'the universe retains its
rationality only if we think irrationally,* This only obscures
the fact, however, that it is not the universe's business to
be rational, it is ours, and in this respect Eurae has "not
taken the lynch pin out of the universe, but only the confu-
1
sion out of philosophers'minds,"
The insistence on the ultimaoy of both substance and
process forms the introduction to Hobart's last argument, that
the nature of causal inference does not justify rational doubt
about the validity of arguments from experience. He first
points out that mathematical methods arc nothing but methods
of analysis and in that way are methods of systematizing our
experience. They are not ways of conjuring knowledge out of
the magician's hat for they tell us nothing about facts unless
some universal synthetic proposition is assumed, "It is a
pertinent question," continues Bobart, "why logicans will
demonstrate their thesis triumphantly by sheerest ratiocina¬
tion — granted merely that they may avail themselves by way
of a slight convenient assumption here and there about the
2
future The desire that induction be deduction Bobart
aptly illustrates with quotations from Bertram! Russell, and
he implies that Hume, in principle at least, expresses the
3
same desire.
1. Hobart, p. 417.
2. Hobart, p. 419.
3. Hobart, p, 420. Hume considered that inference from mere
experience is irrational on the same ground, that it is
not deductive, and hence he called his results sceptical.
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But in the end, Hobart says, v/e find not a principle
but a procedure, and it Is this which we must accept as ulti¬
mate. "A vigilant procedure may be as truly ... ultimate ...
1
for the nind as e principle,* and its ultimate justification
Is that it works. It ia irrational to want proofs for that
which has the status of solid fact, "No proof could make it
2
better in our eyes than fact.." The problem does not even
concern deduction, and the questions we must answer are prac¬
tical ones such as "what is the nature of inference from ex-
3
perlenee; what are the nature of its standards," etc. It is
this type of question which Hobart says Hume could have and
should have answered.
The common characteristic which seems to have drawn
forth these two re-affirmations and interpretations of Hume's
causal theory has been criticism of that theory which neither
Braithwaite nor Hobart thought conclusive. In Braithwaite'a
case the criticism was of various kinds and from various
sources, Hobart's paper is a specific answer to the criti¬
cism of Hume's theory by the idealists and more particularly
by Whitehead, In spite of the different stimuli we find
Braithwaite, Hobart and F.P. Ramsey very much in agreement.
All three would agree that there is a problem of induction,
but not the problem which philosophers from the time of Hume
1. Hobart, p, .421.
2. Hobart, p. 424.
3. Kobart, p. 425.
have been trying to solve. All three would agree with Hume
that when we seek the justification of induction we seek it
in the wrong place if we think it must be found in logical
principles. Induction is not deduction and it is futila to
try and make it such. These three writers would disagree as
to exactly what causal propositions are, but it must be noted
that their ideas in this respect are very close, It is in re¬
lation to the validity of causal propositions that all three
believe it is wrong for Hume to consider hi3 arguments of such
sceptical import; and Braithwalte and Hobart also imply that
even Hume is not free from the wish to make induction into
deduction. They all think that Hume, instead of regarding his
arguments in this negative light, could have, and should have,
gone on to give a more complete and practical account of the
implications of his analysis of inductive reasoning.
In one sense the consideration of these three phi¬
losophers has been a digression, as their views concerning in¬
duction are radically different from those thinkers more accur¬
ately designated as logical positivists. Philosophers such as
Reichenbach and Garnap believe, or have believed, that a logi¬
cal principle is indeed the answer to "the problem of Hume,"
and perhaps this is one gauge of the influence of Eume in
their circle. If there is one characteristic which stands
out among the philosophers generally called logical positi¬
vists, logical empiricists, or logical analysts it is their
lack of unanimity on this point. J.S. Mill, Russell, and
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the others mentioned have been uninfluenced by Hume, while
Braithwaite, Hobart, and Ramsey have been very much influenced.
There are two characteristics of Braithwaite's and
Hobart's treatment which open the door to further discussion.
1
It was noted that each writer carefully confined himself to
the defense of only one portion of Hume1a philosophy. Braith¬
waite is careful to isolate his discussion of induction from
the rest of Hume1a philosophy; and Hobart says, "We shall as¬
sume for present purposes, as Hume does in this portion of his
2
work, the existence in some true sense of a physical world."
This assumption leads, indirectly perhaps, to Hobart's final
position that both process and substance are ultimate. Now,
in relation to Hume's philosophy this final position is pecu¬
liar, as it is just this position that led him to his most
sceptical conclusions. These conclusions have more lately
3
caused Hume to be labeled the "perfect pyrronist." The ef¬
fect of Hume's theory of causation on his theory of the ex¬
ternal world is not discussed by Braithwaite and Hobart. In
the introduction to his study of Hume's theory of the exter-
4
nal world Price says that many philosophers who otherwise
acknowledge Hume as their master have ignored this portion of
hi3 philosophy. He adds that this is unfortunate as some of
1. Ramsey is excluded from this generalization as he did not
specifically leave himself this loophole,
2. Ilobart, p. 273.
3. Popkin, Philosophical Quarterly, Oct. 1951, p. 385.
4. H.H. Price, Hume's Theory of tne Bxternal World, Oxford,
1940, p. 9.
Hume's best analysis and last contributions to philosophy can
be found here. Price criticizes Hume for assuming the exist-
1
ence of the external world in his analysis of causation, and
for assuming the existence of a continuant self while analy¬
sing both oausation and the external world. This criticism
can be applied equally well to Hume's modern disciples,
Bralthwaite and Hobart, with one extenuating circumstance;
they tell us they are going to do it. But that they tell us
they are going to do it before they do it does not obscure
the fact that they do do it. If we accept Kemp Smith's inter¬
pretation, it is the conflicts between the natural belief in
causation and the natural belief in the external world which
involve Hume in his greatest problems. Also it is this con¬
flict which results in some of Hume's most sceptical state¬
ments. At this point then, we turn from the consideration of
the problems which Hume did not have to those which he did
have.
In this chapter we have considered two further ex¬
amples of what posterity has written: the attempt to link Hume
historically \vith contemporary positivism, and the use by the
positivlsts of Hume'3 theories about oausation and induction.
The first class of references were found to be unsupported by
historical evidence. The historical ties between Hume and
subsequent philosophical movements are, strangely enough,
stronger between his philosophy and German idealism than
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1
between his philosophy and empiricism. The wide interest in
Hume's philosophy as a positive source of inspiration is
strictly a contemporary phenomena for the positivists and em¬
piricists.
We have seen thRt interpretation determined to some
extent the way in which Keynes, Ramsey, Braithwaite and Hobart
have used Hume's doctrines. Keynes received the least guid¬
ance from Hume because he saw in Hume's doctrines the basis
for a pernicious scepticism, i.e. an attack on inductive reas¬
oning. Ramsey, Braithwaite and Hobart believe that Hume draws
over-sceptical conclusions from his doctrines, but, in con¬
trast to Keynes., do not believe that the doctrines in them¬
selves are of sceptical import. Their own conclusions reached
through the use of Hume's doctrines are not, however, too far
removed from those of Hume according to Kemp Smith's interpre¬
tation. But, although we may note the role which interpreta¬
tion plays, no question of correct or Incorrect interpretation
arises in these cases. The differences can, rather, be as¬
cribed to the wide nature of Hume's philosophy. In the follow¬
ing chapter the use of other Hurnean doctrines by the positiv¬
ists will be discussed,
1. Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,
New York, 1950, p. 596, "Just as Berkeley's anti-mafcerial-
istic philosophy was mainly influential as a step toward
the naturalism of Hume, and as such still survives in the
philosophies of John Stuart Mill, Huxley, Mach and Carl
Pearson, so in turn Hume's anti-metaphysical theory of
knowledge was destined to be one of the chief contributory
sources of the German speculative movement,"
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CHAPTER VI
THE POSITIVIGT USE OF HUME'S THEORY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD,
AND TEIB REFERENCE TO HUME'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN
MATTER OP FACT AND RELATIONS BETWEEN IDEAS
Noting the lack of interest shown in Hume's theory
of the external world by those who, in other matters, acknowl¬
edge Hume as their master, Price sets out to correct this sit¬
uation, His study falls roughly into two parts: (1) the re¬
statement of Hume's theory of perception and the resolution of
his sceptical doubts as to a possibility of a solution for the
problem of the external world, and (2) the presentation, in the
light of this re-statement, of a theory of the external world
which he not only thinks is valid but which Hume would also ac¬
cept, It must be evident, even from this abbreviated state¬
ment, that interpretation plays a large part in Price's study
and that much of this raaterial might well have been included
in Chapter IV, As Price'3 re-interpretation and re-statement
are very difficult to separate and as it is partly the pre¬
sentation of his own ideas with those of Hume which lend inter-
eat to the study, it seems beat to present them here as a unit.
The main point of th.3 reformation of Hume's analysis
of our idea of the external world is Price's contention that
Hume simplifies and misrepresents the consciousness of the
everyday man or, in Hume's words, the vulgar. On the other
hand, Price thinks that Hume's important and original contribu-
tion in this part of the Treatise is his observation and specu¬
lation about the fragmentary or 'gappy' nature of experience.
But even though Hume is the first philosopher to broach this
important subject, the positive contributions he makes in the
explanation of how the imagination overcomes fragmentary ex¬
perience is vitiated by his original mistake. This mistake,
according to Price, becomes most obvious when Kurae attempts to
assess the roles which constancy and coherence play in their
influence upon the imagination. These features distinguish,
for Hume, the fragmentary perceptions which we regard as hav¬
ing constant existence from those not so regarded, Hume
represents the effects of constancy as a compounded illusion
or mistake in the ordinary man*s idea of the external world.
This confusion first arises in connection with our idea of
identity, which is itself a confusion between unity and tem¬
poral multiplicity, i.e. an object which is a unity is not
supposed to change itself but is supposed to 'participate' in
the changes which take place around it. In constancy our con¬
fusion is even greater as we not only ascribe identity to a
single 'unchanging entity' but to two of these entities with
a lapse in time between them. This prooess takes place as
follows: there is an absence of qualitative difference between
the two entities; our raental attitude is the same as it was in
the case of identity; the passage of time is scarcely felt;
and we have a smooth uninterrupted passage of the imagination
from one resembling entity to the other and vice-versa.
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As a result, the mind ignores the gaps between the two resem¬
bling impressions. This is only half the process, however,
for if the mind could always overlook the gaps between re¬
sembling impressions the problem of the existence of the ex¬
ternal world would never arise. As, however, some of these
gaps ccannot help but oome to notice in our memory, the mind
goes even farther and postulates additional particulars to
fill up these gaps. For Price, even this simplified version
of Hume's long and involved analysis is too complicated; the
difficulty lies in Hume's original analysis of identity. Here
Hume makes use of the term "constant uninterrupted perceptions
and Price insists that according to Hume's theory of percep¬
tion (which he thinks is correct in principle at least) there
is no such thing. Because of his theory that all ideas are
derived from impressions Hume is "committed to an event theory
1
of continuance," and hence, perceptions can give us an aware¬
ness of only a continuous series of impressions or events,
the members of this series being much like one another, and
not in the least like Hume's constant uninterrupted percep¬
tions, According to Price, we know that our perceptions must
be a series for two reasons: the perception of anything could
have been Interrupted at any time; and, though the perception
may remain qualitatively the same, its relations change, and
these are as real as any of its other characteristics. Thus
1. Price, p. 47
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xvhat we postulate in the imaginative supplementation is not
the uninterrupted continuance of an impression but a series
of events going on while v;e are not observing it. What we
ignore is the numerical difference between these events. It
also follows that the Humean "constancy" is merely another
name for a monotonous series of events.
This brings us to Price's criticism of Hume's ac¬
count of the effects of coherence upon the imagination. It
is easy to predict on the basis of the foregoing account of
constancy that Price will find very little difference between
the two principles. In considering the effects of coherence,
Hume himself introduces the idea of a series, although it is
a series of a slightly different hind than that introduced by
Price in respect of constancy. In this case it is a variegat¬
ed series as opposed to the monotonous series of constancy,
and similarly, we fill in the missing parts of the series by
postulating the existence of particulars which we have not ob¬
served, In ordinary language this might be called argument
from analogy as it takes the following form: we have observed
instances of ABCD repeatedly in the past; now we observe AB-D
and postulate the existence of the unobserved particular C.
This process is also, in some respects, similar to causal
reasoning but is different in that it concerns only broken
series and not constant conjunctions. For Hume it is also
different from constancy, because he does not attribute the
influence of coherence to a confusion or mistake but to an
original tendency or principle of the mind; in Price's words,
to the inertia principle. Price thinks that this principle
may also be discarded along with the confusion and mistake of
constancy.
Because of Hume's original mistake or over-simplifi¬
cation in the analysis of the perception of the vulgar, it is
Prioe's opinion that we must entirely discard Hume's positive
account of the effects of constancy and coherence on the
imagination. What we then have left is the empirical fact
that all of our impressions are fragmentary and that many of
them are "gap-indifferent." The question still remains as to
what characteristics impressions are to have if they are to
be gap-indifferent. Price's answer (and he thinks it is per¬
fectly consistent with Hume's philosophical position) is that
the supplementive principle, on the basis of gap-indifference,
is the assimilation of one sense given complex to another, or
the assimilation of a partial form A3-DE to a complete form
ABODE, He calls this process the "assimilation of complexes"
or "the assimilation of series." Within this process there
are two different kinds of assimilation: that in which a com¬
plete series is given in experience and the interrupted series
recalls the complete one; and a more complicated kind in which
a complete or standard series is never given in experience.
We may have experienced A-D or -B-D but we have never experi¬
enced ABOD in that precise form. What we do here, according
to Price, is to assimilate not the broken series with the
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complete one, but the fragmentary series with one another;
and in this process the differences in the fragmentary series
are as important as their resemblances. The gaps cannot al¬
ways appear at the same places. Another modification which
must be introduced to account for the ordinary man*s consci¬
ousness is that co-existent with gap-indifferent forms, there
must be succession-indifferent forms; for we only see one as¬
pect of an object at a time and it is "succession-indiffer¬
ence" which gives our perceptions their three dimensional
quality over and above their persistence through time.
What the ordinary man does finally conceive of as
the external world or as material objects is a continuing
form or family of sensed particulars or aensibilia, and this
is in no way different from what is given in experience. It
is true, says Price, that we are not always perfectly consci¬
ous of the exact determination of this form or family but we
do regard it as exactly what it is in experience. Hume is
right insofar as he says that the vulgar do not regard it as
fleeting representations of something different, we know not
wha t,
At this point few will argue that Price has not
proved his thesis that Hume over-simplifies the consciousness
of the vulgar. There is one point, however, which must be
questioned. It seems that his ground for discarding Hume's
.'inertia-theory as superfluous is his view that constancy
and coherence are the same thing. The question is not whether
they are the same, but whether Priced principle of assimi¬
lation by convergence and superposition can be explained
without the assumption of some sort of principle which must
be very like Hume's inertia theory. Why is it that the ima¬
gination notes the filled parts of the forms of experience
and assimilates them to other filled and unfilled parts of ex¬
perience? We do not merely assimilate with no general prin¬
ciple to guide us. If Price answers simply that it is a fact
of experience that the mind works thus, is this any more than
Hume claims? There is this principle of symmetry and it is a
matter of experience that the mind does work in this way.
We now turn to the second aspect of the problem.
Here, we find that Price's critical discussion depends large¬
ly on the way in which this section of Hume's philosophy is
interpreted. It Is held by Kemp Smith, as well as more re-
1
cently by Popkin, that this part of the Treatise is meant to
be purely destructive. Although they disagree as to Hume's
ultimate intentions, they agree that the specific aim of this
section is to show that no positive theory of the origin or
nature of our sense data is tenable. Price makes the as¬
sumption {and this Is not to say that the assumption has no
basis in Hume's philosophy nor that it is absolutely Incor¬
rect), and bases the first sections of his argument on it,
that Hume means to present the "generative theory of percep-
1. Popkin, Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 2, 1951, p. 385.
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tion" as a true one. Once this assumption is made it is not
difficult for Price to show that the theory is untenable for
two reasons: (1) the empirical evidence which Hume presents
in support of his contention that "our sensible impressions
are dependent on our organs and the disposition of our nerves
2
and animal spirits" at best only proves that some of the
time some of our impressions are either partially or wholly
dependent in this way; and (2) the generative theory ultimate¬
ly proves false the premises on which It rests. Here we can
3 4
compare Price's criticism with a passage from Kemp Smith to
show that he thinks Hume Is maintaining just what Price is
criticising. At the end of this passage, however, we find
Price admitting that this may be just Hume's point and we find
5
further support of this interpretation in C.D. Broad.
Hume maintains that we unrefleetiveiy adopt a sel¬
ective theory of the external world, while experience shows
1. Price contrasts the generative with the selective theory
of perception. The former states that insofar as vie can
determine, the external -world is dependent on sense per¬
ception for its actual existence, perception generates
its objects. The latter theory holds that the external
world exists and perception selects particulars from it.
2. Hume, Treatise, S.B. Edition, p. 211.
3. Price, "It "tthe generative theory] can only be stated in
the 'realistic' language of eyes and fingers, sense or¬
gans, nerves and animal spirits ... And yet if we do
state it so we land in an intolerable paradox." p. 120.
4. "... but the two [the natural beliefs In the external
world in causality] turn out to be in irreconcilable con¬
flict with one another; in acquiescing in the first be¬
lief we run ... in the face of all the supposedly ration¬
al ... consequences of the causal postulate." Kemp Smith,
The Philosophy of Hume, p. 127.
5. Price, p. 122.
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us that our perceptions are at least partially dependent on
"our organs and the disposition of our animal spirits." Fur¬
ther, it is by definition impossible to prove that all our
perceptions are absolutely not dependent in this way. It
seems to follow, also, that we know without doubt that some
of our perceptions are physiologically and psychologically de¬
pendent, and this seems to cast doubt on all the rest of our
perceptions, although in a majority of cases we would not be
able to actually prove they are psychologically dependent.
From the nature of the problem we see that, although it is
possible to amass a certain amount of evidence in support of
the generative theory, it is impossible to collect any evi¬
dence at all in support of the selective theory. The most one
could say is that, in many cases, perhaps a large majority of
cases, it is impossible to prove the selective theory false.
But this for Price is meaningless support. Price makes a mis¬
take in assuming that evidence against the generative theory
is evidence for the selective theory. What he might have
said, had he not thought that Hume was presenting the genera¬
tive theory as true, is that the generative theory, while
supported to some extent by experience, is logically unsound,
and the selective theory, supported by no evidence nor any
method of obtaining evidence, is unverlfiable and, hence,
meaningless. But this position would probably be considered
a pyrrhonism as bad as Hume's,
Price, in any case, takes a different position.
Since there is some evidence to support the generative theory,
and. it is impossible to prove the selective theory false, he
supposes there is reason to believe that they both are partly
true. He notes that we all distinguish between perceptions
which seem to be more or less physiologically and psychologi¬
cally conditioned, and it seems In every day life we use a
kind of scale. The generative theory is at one end of this
scale and the selective theory is at the other, and our par-
1
ceptions never actually reach the generative level at the one
end, nor the purely selective level at the other. Thus we see
that the two theories represent differences in degree rather
than kind. For Price perception consists of portions or sec¬
tions of series of events, and it is not logically impossible
that these series go on both before and after perception has
taken place. It is obvious, however, that the perceived ev¬
ents in a given series are somewhat different from the unper-
ceived events, and because of this the generative theory can
never bo completely eliminated. It is also obvious, for Price,
that some perceived events in certain series are very similar
to those events which proceed and follow them and some are
very different from those which proceed and follow them. We
find the former at the selective end of the scale while the
latter are found at the generative end. The only remaining
1. One wonders if it could not be argued that there are purely
generative perceptions but i3 reminded of Bradley and
Bosenquet's position on falsity. Every statement must
touch upon reality at some point, however obscure. In
this case we would have to say that every perception is
to some degree selective, however small the degree.
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problem is to find out whether a given number of events is
more like those which we presume proceed and follow them or
less like those which preceed and follow them. Price main¬
tains that we do have criteria for determining the degree of
similarity and dis-similarity, namely his doctrines of gap-
1
-indifference and spatial synthesizability. We now see that
the whole question of the existence of unsensed sensibilia in¬
volves merely a confusion about questions of origin and con¬
tinuity. Once we understand that the main question is whether
the series of events resemble those events which preceed and
follow them to a greater or lesser degree, the question of the
2
origin of these events "now becomes a question of detail."
Leaving aside this theory, Price now asks us to
assume that Hume's empirical evidence does not, in fact, throw
any doubt on the selective theory. How then would Hume answer
the question, do unsensed senslbllla exist? Price believes
that at this point Hume is forced into the position that he
should have assumed, and almost did assume, at the beginning
of his discussion, which opens with the following statement,
"We may well ask what causes induce us to believe in the
1. Both of these doctrines, if I interpret Prioe rightly,
are ultimates of experience, Speaking of spatial syn¬
thesizability Price says "This characteristic of them
[families of sense data] is just as much given as colour
or shape.... It seems to me no mors in need of explana¬
tion than colour or shape — and no more likely to get
it." H.H, Prioe, Perception, London, 1950, p. 217.
We have already seen tiiat ga'p-indifforence is a 'faot of
experience.'
2. Price, p. 132,
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existence of body but 'tis vain to ask whether body exists or
1
not." As we have seen in his investigation of the first
clause of the sentence, Price disposes of explanations which
Hume presents, and the notice of gap-indifferent series is
the only positive value of Hume's treatment of the effects of
coherence and uniformity on the imagination. The second
clause represents,for Price,what Hume's true position must be.
He says that Hume, by this clause, can only mean that ques¬
tions concerning the existence of unsensed sensibilia are
meaningless, as such questions are by definition unverifiable.
But the matter cannot be left thus, for although questions
about the existence of unsensed sensibilia are meaningless,
material objeet statements play an important role in our lang¬
uage and it is imperative that we be able to say whether or
not they are true or false. If we accept Price's interpreta¬
tion of the second clause of the sentence quoted, we see that
the question which Hume should have answered is of a logical
and linguistic rather than a psychological nature. What is
needed is a theory of language which will explain how it is
possible to make meaningful statements, i.e. verifiable state¬
ments, about material objects, if questions about the actual
existence of material objects are by definition unverifiable.
The first theory which Price presents as a way out of
this difficulty is the 'as if theory, which states that with-
1. Hume, Treatise. S.B. Edition, p. 137.
in the syntactical form of our language it is meaningful to
say that a certain sense data is as if a certain material ob¬
ject existed, although any statement about the actual exist¬
ence of that object would be neither true nor false. Accord¬
ingly all realistic propositions of the material object type,
such as 'I see a piece of paper,1 are abbreviated forms of the
s (sense data) is as if P (material object)proposition. In its
completed form such statements state that ay present percep¬
tions (a white patch) are the same as they would be if they
were members of a certain sort of a complex and spaciallv-
-anified group of sensibilia (a piece of paper) which goes on
whether I am sensing it or not.
Price illustrates many of the difficulties which
arise in the adoption of this theory, but once it is admitted
that there can be degrees of 'as if-ness' most of these diffi¬
culties are disposed of. There is, however, one criticism
which he raises against Hume's account of the effects of co¬
herence and uniformity on the imagination which he does not
consider in connection with his own theory. The 'as if' pro¬
cess obviously enters into our language at its very lowest
levels. The child pointing at a teddy bear is the basic il¬
lustration of the 'as if' theory, and to paraphrase Price, it
is incredible that the vulgar — the children and peasants —
have passed through this labyrinth of 'abbreviation' whenever
1
they attribute continued existence to a 'hat, shoe or store.'
1, Price, p. 45.
172
One story (Hume's) seems to be about as much of a nightmare
in this respect as the other (Price's). But it is obvious
that Price'3 criticism of Hume and my criticism of Price are
pointless. Hume cannot be criticized, on the grounds that his
explanation of the "causes which induce us to believe in an
external world" are too complicated for the reflective pro¬
cesses, as he is explicit in stating that this process depends
not at all on reflective processes. We believe in the exist*
ence of the external world naturally and spontaneously, and
in fact, in Hume's eyes, we do so in the face of a certain
amount of contrary evidence. The unreflective belief in the
external world is a natural belief which we cannot abandon,
except perhaps in the privacy of our study, even in the face
of this evidence. As for my criticism of Price, it is point¬
less largely for the same reason. Price never says that any¬
one actually reflectively goes through the process of 'as if'
abbreviation. It is merely that the syntax of our language,
if we are to explain how we make meaningful material object
statements, is such that we unconsciously fall into this kind
of abbreviation. Perhaps what Price would say is that the
language lends itself so naturally to abbreviation that it is
only at a more advanced philosophical stage that we become
aware of our habits of language. His criticism of Hume's
theory as too complicated, merely on the grounds of its com-
1
plexity, is even more surprising when we find later that he
1. Price, p. 188.
rejects such a criticism of an even more complex phenomenalist
account of external object language. Here he specifies his
reasons for rejecting such an argument, and it seems that the
same reasons would have led him to reject a similar argument
in respect to Hume.
The major difficulty Price finds confronting the 'as
if theory is much the same as that which F.P. Ramsey brings
against the causal theory of Braithwaite, that it does not en¬
able us to say in what way material object sentences, having
no possibility of de facto verification, can be true or false.
Ramsey finds that Rraithwaite'a causal theory affords no
methods of dealing with unknown, that is, de facto unknown,
causal lav?s except by refering to them as meaningless. Price
finds that the 'as if theory, unless it is modified, affords
no way of attributing truth or falsity to de facto unverifi-
able material object statements, except to refer to them as
meaningless. This difficulty only applies to specific material
object statements, as general material object statements are
genuine examples of the 'as if theory. Specific material
object statements of this type still present a difficulty and
Price finds that he must modify the 'as if theory to some
1. "Our sense-impressions are as if there were a vast and
complicated world of sensible particulars, having a de¬
terminate structure. But they are also as if the vast
majority of these particulars were not sensed by anyone;
and they are even as if very many of these particulars
were such that we have no evidence as to their specific
qualities and relations." P. 169.
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extent. The modification consists in the addition of another
'if* clause to the 'as if1 formula. The formula now takes the
form that s is as if p, if p were checked by actual sense ex¬
perience, but the explanation which he advances for this
special kind of material object sentence is in no wise differ¬
ent from the phenomenalist explanation of all material object
statements. The special form of the 'as if* theory required
for these statements includes directions for the verification
of the sense data asserted to exist, and it is the phenomenal¬
ist position that all material object statements, or those
statements which assert the existence of unsensed sensibilia,
include these directions. The abbreviation is merely greater
in the phenomenalist account than in the 'as if theory. Price
points out in respect to the phenomenalist theory that the
'hypothetical sense-impressions' (used to supplement gap-indif¬
ferent series as opposed to Hume's unsensed sensibilia) them¬
selves lead to unending series of hypothetical 'ifs,' and one
can never reach the end of the abbreviation. He says it is
probable that the phenomenalist thinks of unsensed-sensibilia
in the first place and then changes them or infers from them
the hypothetical sense-impressions. But in spite of these
objections to phenomenalism, the 'as if' theory must become
phenomenalist to account for the truth and falsity of unknown
material object statements, and the choice between the two
theories narrows really to the question of the amount of ab¬
breviation in material object statements.
Price's second method of solving Hume's problem,
while of a purely linguistic nature, is much more Humean in
its conception. In labeling it the 'expressive* theory, Price
is extending Ramsey's theory of causation to the problem of
the existence of external world. The expressive theory states
that general material object sentences, such as 'there is an
external world,' include two different statements. First,
they 'give expression to' certain kinds of mental processes,
I.e. the activities of our minds in the coordination of our
sense data. Second, they state that there are sense data to
which these processes apply. When we become aware of these
two components of general material object sentences we under¬
stand why arguments as to their truth or falsity seem "silly"
and why, if forced to argue, it seems less silly to affirm
than to deny them. The first component, that they "give ex¬
pression to mental processes," Is not a statement to vdiich
truth or falsity can be applied, as we cannot say that a pro¬
cess is true or false. We can say that it works or does not
work but not that it Is true or false. The second component
of the general material object sentence, the affirmation that
there are sense data to which these processes apply, is so ob¬
vious an empirical fact that no one can meaningfully deny it.
That there are gap and succession-indifferent series of sense
data Is why the whole question of the external world arises,
and in this empirical fact that we have the roots of the 'vul¬
gar' affirmative answer to questions about the truth or falsity
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of general material object statements, and why, even for phi¬
losophers, it seems "less silly" to answer in the affirmative.
Specific material object sentences, words, and
phrases, according to this theory, are the specific instances
of the habit or process of supplementation to which they give
expression. They are formulae, recipes, or "dodges" for co¬
ordinating our fragmentary sense data, and each of us has a
great number of such formulae, depending of course, on the
size of our material object vocabulary. These formulae, as
with the general process of which they are the specific in¬
stances, are neither true nor false. Second order true or
false statements can be made about them, but strictly speaking
we do not negate the formulae but discard them when they prove
to be of no use in the coordination of our sense data.
We now arrive at the nature of this coordination of
our sense data. In Ramsey's theory of causation, causal lang¬
uage is concerned solely with predication. Is this the case
with material object language? Price says that it is not, for
two reasons. First, material object language is not only con¬
cerned with prediction but with "retrodiction" and "justa-
diction." Second and basically, material object language does
not predict sense impressions, as does causal language, but
predicts, retrodicts, and justadicts sensibilia or unsensed
sense impressions. It does not say that sense impressions will
be observed, but that they would or could be observed. In this
sense material object language is not a process of predicting
sense impressions but a process of accomodating them should
they arise, It is a method of fitting possible nev; sense data
into a system, the sensibilia with which we supplement our
fragmentary sense data being the framework to which we attach
those data. As for the unobserved sense objects which troubled
the 'as if' theory, they are explained in much the same way as
they were in that theory. Sentences of the unobserved mater¬
ial object type always include directions or instructions for
their possible verification. If they were checked by actual
sense impressions, the actual sense impressions would be co¬
ordinated by the material object sentence, word, or phrase
used. Since the expressive theory is not one of abbreviation,
it does not run the risk of being confused with a phenomena-
listic theory as did the 'as if theory.
Two suppositions are required for the imaginative
supplementation process expressed by material object language.
The first is that the selective theory of perception is true.
This assumption is necessary because, if we are to coordinate
sense data, we must have something (not sensibilia) to co¬
ordinate, We cannot test our imaginatively constructed sys¬
tem unless we assume with the vulgar that sense impressions
exist independently of our perception of them. The second
supposition is that the mind has the tendency to interpolate
the facts of experience and to reject the interpolations which
are not 'fitting.' In Price's words, "the mind brings to ex¬
perience," (1) the assumption that this experience is not
sense dependent, (2) the tendency to interpolate certain types
of experience, namely, gap and succession-indifferent series,
and (3) the further tendency to reject or accept these inter¬
polations depending on their *fittingness,' or in idealist
terminology, their ♦coherence,1 and in pragmatist terminology,
their 'usefulness.'
In reviewing Price's theories and his treatment of
these sections of the Treatise, it is not our object to point
out the defects, if such there be, in those theories. If we
are to give a linguistic account of material object language,
it is clear that the two alternative theories presented by
Price are eminently satisfactory. It is likewise clear that,
of the two theories, the expressive theory is much more Huraean
In character as It at least emphasizes the existence of the
factors which "the mind brings to experience",or,alternatively,
"the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of the
external world" other than those given in sense perception.
The question which must be answered when we consider the re¬
lationship of Price and Hume is whether the answers (two lin¬
guistic analyses of material object language) which Price
gives are the answers in which Hume is interested. Does not
Price In his interpretation of Hume commit the latter to posi¬
tions which he might not have necessarily accepted, and as a
1
result answer not Hume's question but his own?
1. Here I adopt much the same position as that of Ralph Church
in his review of Price's work in the Philosophical Review
of 1943, P« 317. This view has been expressed, however,
by others much more sympathetic to Price's book than Church.
The process of substituting his own question for
that of Hume is most evident in Price's interpretation of
Hume's original formulation of the problem. What causes in¬
duce us to believe in the existence of an external world?--
becomes for Price — what characteristics of sensory experi¬
ence necessitate our belief in the external world? This, of
course, changes the nature of the answer expected. Hume wish¬
es to know why we attribute continued existence to external
objects, whereas Price merely says the only possible answer
to his question is that we observe gap and succession-indif¬
ferent series of sense data. Price says, in further support
of his view, that Hume's question is too psychological. But
even if Hume's question is too psychological, is that -justifi¬
cation for substituting another question and calling it Hume's?
A second instance of the 're-reading' concerns the second
clause of the passage just quoted above. Hume says "'tis vain
to ask whether there be body or not? That is a point which
we must take for granted in all our reasonings." Here it must
be admitted that Price makes a good case for his interpreta¬
tion that all Hume can mean is that questions about the ex¬
istence of the external world, or unsensed sensibilia, are by
definition incapable of being answered.. What Price fails to
note is that another interpretation, which is in many ways
simpler, is held by a good many philosophers and that they
make out an equally good case for their version. By this in¬
terpretation Hume now is held to be interested in belief, and
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that in this particular passage he is admitting that he must
work within this particular belief, or, that our reasoning
at all times presupposes the existence of the external world.
Hume is, in effect, warning us of the paradox which results.
He finds himself forced to use realistic language to formu¬
late his argument, yet the conclusions of that argument con¬
tradict the suppositions of this realistic language. The
existence of the external world is a belief which is not by
definition unverifiable but one which is, for Hume, verifi-
ably false, and even if Price has completely refuted (and I
cannot see that he has) the evidence which Hume presents
against this belief, the question still remains, what are the
causes which induce us to go beyond the evidence of our senses
and attribute a continued existence to the external world?
These criticisms are of minor Importance, however,
and could easily be remedied by the placing of a footnote here
and there noting the existence of alternative interpretations.
Hume's philosophy, particularly in the type of scrutiny and
"imaginative supplementation" which Price gives it, will sup¬
port various interpretations. It would have perhaps been bet¬
ter had Price noted this. The major criticism of Price's work
is more fundamental, being noted by hostile critics such as
1
Church and those friendly to the book such as A.C. Swing; the
book's title is a misnomer and the positive theory which Price
1. A.C. Ewing, The review of Hume's Theory of the External
World. Mind 1941, Vol. 50.
presents should not have been attached to Hume*a name In the
first plaoe. There is much to be said for this view and it
is,for these philosophers, the worlds major flaw, There is
no doubt that when we study the Treatise we find theories of
various kinds. Many philosophers have believed that a theory
of perception can be found in the Treatise but all who believe
this have found the theory of perception extremely faulty.
Wot only that, but if Hume's doctrine of impressions and ideas
is taken as a theory of perception, it can be shown to be
faulty by any first year student of philosophy, and Huxley's
question as to whether or not Hume could have meant to build
such an imposing epistemological edifice on such shaky psycho¬
logical foundations is certainly justified. There are three
main ways, and we have seen examples of all three, of regard¬
ing Hume's theory of impressions and ideas. (1) It is possible
to regard it as a faulty theory of perception and then carry
the faults of this theory over into Hume's other theories and
show how incapable it is of supporting them. This is Green'a
method, (2) It Is possible to regard it as a faulty theory of
perception and pay no further attention to it. This is the
method of Braithwaite, (3) It is possible to regard It as a
"logical tool," a method of determining logical priority and
the method by which Hume brings us to his analysis of accusa¬
tion, the external world, the self, and his constructive theory




Now we may ask, how does Price regard Hume's theory
of impressions and ideas? The key sentence in this respect
is one already quoted, "Hume's whole theory of knowledge —
the fact that he starts from impressions and will admit no
idea not derivable from them — commits him to what is called
2
an Event-Theory of Continuance,"' Taken in itself this state¬
ment might not mean much more than Mendel's and Ayer's "logi¬
cal tool," but what we actually find Hume committed to in the
remainder of the book is Price's theory of perception. From
this point onwards the discussion is carried on in terms of
"series," of "series of particulars," "series of unsensed
particulars" and "unsensed senalbllia," In other words an
"even-theory" of perception. This is not a criticism of
Price's theory of perception but only a question as to wheth¬
er he is justified, on the basis of Hume's theory of impres¬
sions and ideas, in committing Hume to it. Does Hume's philos¬
ophy need a theory of peremption? If so Price does not show
that it does, and this is partially the grounds for Church's,
%
B.M, Laing's and Swing's suggestions that Price's theories be
divorced from Hume,
1. British Empirical Philosophers, Edited by A.I. Ayer and
Haymond '."inch, London, 1952, "p. 12,
2. Price, p. 47.
3. B.M. Laing, the review of Hume's Theory of the External
World, Philosophy, 1941, 7ol. 16, p, 313,
Tiie other ground for these suggestions lies in the
very title of the book itself, Hume's Theory of the External
World. There is a great deal in Hume's philosophy, and this
whole thesis has been mainly concerned with the dispute over
what is and what is not in his philosophy. One thing which
most commentators would agree on, however, is that there is
no theory of the external world. To be sure there is a theory
about our belief in the external world, but this is not the
same as a theory of the external world, a fact v/hich is obvi¬
ously true from even a casual examination of the theories
which Price presents. They are not to be found in imperfect
form in the pages of the Treatise nor can it even be said that
they are suggested by what is found in the Treatise. They are
suggested, rather, by the writings of the modern empiricists,
and the 'as if and expressive theories cannot be said to be
more than linguistic explanations of the way in which we use
material object language. Indeed, this is perhaps their
greatest virtue, but in any case they do not provide a sub¬
stitute for Hume's theory of belief.
Price could hove avoided these criticisms of his
relationship to Hume merely by following the example of
Braithwaite, Ramsey and Hobart, Bralthwalte considers the
problem of belief, but strictly limits his analogical relation
to Hume. Ramsey says that Hume looks for the impression of
necessary connection and in so doing departs from the question
which he (Ramsey) asks, Ramsey says that he does not know
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whether or not there Is such an impression; and Hobart dis¬
misses the whole question of a theory of belief as "mere psy¬
chology." None of them attempt the attribution of their own
views to Hume. This attribution is at best a very uncertain
process.
We must also mention in this context the forerunner
to Price's linguistic theories, the sense data theory general¬
ly attributed to Bertrand Russell. The terminology used by
Russell in presenting his theory in Our Knowledge of the Ex¬
ternal World bears a great resemblance to that used by Hume in
Treatise, and it is Important to determine if this resem¬
blance stems from an historical or derivative relationship.
There are two factors which lead us to suspect that the resem¬
blance is due to the fact that Hume and Russell are merely
talking about the same problem. The first reason which would
lead to this conclusion is that it is impossible to specify
the nature of this derivation or historical influence. Russell
gives the impression that the influences which lead him to the
formation of his "hard sense-data theory" were the works of
Frege and Whitehead, and discussions with Wittgenstein. In
another context Russell acknowledges a more general debt to
2
Hume, but In such a technical matter as the hard sense-data the¬
ory he is never mentioned.
1. Ramsey, p. 254.
2. Russell, Bertrand, Our Knowledge of the External World.
London, 1914, p. 2337 Here Russell mentions Hume's dis
cussion of causation.
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The second and more basic reason which leads us to
believe that the terminological likeness between Hume and
Russell is merely superficial lies in the nature of the sense-
-data theory itself. The theory is one which seeks to explain
how, given certain sense impressions, physical objects neces¬
sary for science can be logically constructed from them. It
is Russell's objective to explain how, if we had no belief in
the existence of external objects, this belief could be logi¬
cally justified, Hume, on the other hand, begins with our
belief in the external world and tries not only to explain how
we come by this belief, but also what its effects are.
The differences between the theories of Russell,
Hume, and Price my be clearer if we contrast them in the fol¬
lowing way, Hume is concerned with the causes which induce
us to go beyond the evidence of the senses and believe in the
existence of the external world, Russell is concerned with
the problem: given certain types of sense perceptions, by
what method is it possible logically to construct material ob¬
jects. Price wishes to render material object language syn¬
tactically consistent.
Price, Hume, and Russell are similar in the follow¬
ing ways: they are all concerned with the same general prob¬
lem, each thinks that he is attacking the basic aspect of the
problem of the external world, and each is primarily concerned
with sense experience. It is probably this last similarity
which results in the use,by all three, of similar terminology.
As we have seen in the ease of Price, attempts to carry the
analogy further ere dangerous because of the tendency to mis¬
represent Hume's position and the tendency to substitute
other questions for those asked by Hume, ana then attribute
the answers to Hume. In Russell'3 case we find not only that
he is concerned with the objects of science rather than the
objects of everyday life, but also that Russell, in seeking
logical justification, looks for that which Hume concludes is
impossible to find.
Another problem which Hume himself finds most perplex¬
ing and with which he publically expresses dissatisfaction, is
his treatment of personal identity. We find that the positiv-
ists, on what we have called the general level in Chapter IV,
are Interested In this problem and tend to identify their
views with those of Hume. A very early example of this in
positivist literature is to be found in Ernst Mach*s Analysis
of Sensations, Here Mach identifies the views of Hume and
1
Ribot concerning the ego (in Hume's case the self) with his
1. On page four of this work, in speaking of the ego, Mach
gives the following reference to the Treatise — Vol. I,
Part IV, He gives no indication of what edition of the
Treatise this reference refers to, so it is uncertain
"Just which passage he means. In the Selby-Bigge edition,
and hence the first edition, this page (186) discusses
the nature of belief in the sceptical arguments regarding
reason. As Mach Is refering to the attribution by Ribot
of "the principle role in the continuity of the ego to the
general sensibility" (page 4) it Is difficult to see how
Mach could be refering to this passage. The Green & Grose
edition is almost identical on Part IV, page 6, with the
Selby-Bigge edition. As yet I have not been able to loc¬
ate a copy of the 1826 edition of the Treatise and it is
this edition which one may suppose Mach to have used.
own. Later in the work Mach identifies the views of Hume and
Lichtenberg with his own demand that "the Lobserver] should
consider the ego to be nothing at all, and should resolve in-
1
to a transitory connexion of changing event?Mach, however,
never goe3 beyond this tentative equation of Hume's views with
hie own and never discusses the Appendix to the Treatise.
There are no positivist studies of Hume's theory of
personal identity of the type that Ramsey, Braithwaite, and
Iiobart give to his theory of causation and Price to his ac¬
count of the external world. The problem of Hume's philosophy
is for the positivists only two-thirds solved, with perhaps
the most difficult aspect remaining. They, like Hume, assume
the existence of the external world when talking about causa¬
tion and the existence of a continuent self when talking about
causation and the external world. The only work in which we
find a positivist advocating Hume's theory of personal identity
while taking into account his rejection of that theory is
Ayer's Language Truth and Logic. Ayer's argument is too
briefly and inconsistently stated to be considered on a level
with the arguments we have been considering in Chapters V and
VI, but through a re-statement and amplification of it we can
perhaps observe the course a linguistic account of personal
identity might take.
Ayer says that the positivists "... have solved
1. Mach, p. 356,
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Hume's problem by defining personal identity in terras of bodi¬
ly identity, and bodily identity is to be defined in terms of
1
the resemblance and continuity of sense data*" "To say any¬
thing about the self is always to say something about sense
experiences; and our [the positivists] definition of personal
identity is intended to show how this reduction (from state¬
ments about self to statements about sense-experiences) could
2
be made." This doctrine is combined with a further principle
which asserts that no sense experience can be a member of two
life histories. The first difficulty which a theory resting
on these principles must face is the escape from solipsism, and
to see how Ayer does this, his theory must be re-stated*
First, we must understand just what Ayer is trying to do.
Ayer is attempting to give a linguistic account of
3
personal identity: he is trying to formulate a theory which
4
will render our *same person and other person language1 syn¬
tactically consistent. He begins this theory by analysing
♦same person1 or ♦! and me* statements, and maintains that they
are always translatable into statements about the resemblance
and continuity of sense contents. Sense contents are by
1, Ayer, p. 127.
2. Ayer, p* 128.
3, We must assume this,as the only evidence he gives in sup¬
port of his argument is linguistic. See p. 127*
4. By other person language we mean In particular the pro¬
nouns you, them, they, etc. as well as statements about
the existence of others in more general terras* Same
person language is mainly concerned with the use of per¬
sonal pronouns I, me, etc..
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definition restricted, to one life history: "it is logically
impossible for a sense-experience to belong to the sense
1
history of more than a single self." But here in his analy¬
sis of 'same person' language the Imputation of solipsism
first arises, but we see that because Ayer himself refers to
this difficulty as solipsism he expresses himself very poorly.
Instead, it Is really a question about the use of language, and
his problem is the syntactical form of 'other person* language.
Given that the foregoing is a correct analysis of 'same per¬
son' language, how are 'other person* statements to be affirm¬
ed or negated? We see that questions about the data upon
which 'same person* statements rest are meaningless when ap¬
plied to 'other person'propositions. As a sense-experience
cannot be a member of two life histories such questions are,
by definition incapable of being answered.
To solve this difficulty Ayer introduces an 'as if'
theory of 'other person' language. 'Other person* statements
are of the type, P is as if it were possessed of C: or, a
sense content I now have is as if it were possessed of the
same consciousness which I possess myself; or again, a thing
which I call George is as if it were a self-conscious human
being such as I am myself. It is not as if it were a robot
obeying certain laws of physics, nor is it as if it were a
vegetable following certain biological trends.
This is what we must assume Ayer moans when he says
1. Ayer, p. 125.
190.
"... one cannot in any 3ense observe the existence of other
people, one can nevertheless infer their existence with a high
1
degree of probability from one's own experiences." Or that
"... my observation of a body whose behavior resembled the be¬
havior of my ovm body would entitle me to think it probable that
that body was related to a self which I could not observe, in
2
the same way as my body was related to my own observable self."
We must, of course, re-interpret Ayer's use of phrases such as
"high degree of probability" and "entitled to think it prob¬
able." Neither we nor Ayer are talking about the use of logic
*
but rather about the use of language. If Ayer insists on the
phrases just quoted we should be forced to consider his ex¬
planation vitiated,because the point of the argument is just
that we are not entitled to infer the existence of other
selves. Such Inferences are by definition impossible of veri¬
fication and hence, meaningless.
To continue with the theory, in the case of general
other person statements, the 'as if' theory works perfectly
satisfactorily. We have the evidence of myriads of other
things acting as if they were conscious beings like ourselves,
and we also have the evidence of the complicated social organ¬
izations which can only be explained in terms of self-conscious
human beings. In any case,general other person statements are
1. Ayer, p. 128.
2. Ayer, p. 129.
seldom objects of dispute. As for particular other person
statements,the "as if theory works equally well and also
clarifies some of the ways in which we use these statements.
¥«e see that there is no single factor upon which the 'as
Ifness' of these statements depend# Let us consider for ex¬
ample, the physical form common to the species "homo sapiens.*
Is this an indispensable concomitant of any 'other person*
statement? Vie could almost say that it is until we consider
the possibility of life on other planets. Here we find no
contradiction in saying that a nan on Mars might have a defi¬
nitely non-human shape. This holds true for all the particu¬
lar manifestations of sense data upon which this type of
statement depends and no one factor can be singled out as con¬
stituting the essence of other person 'as ifness,' Their 'as
ifness' depends, rather, on the context in which specific
'other person language* sentences are used.
But even though the 'as if' theory works well enough
in 'other person' language, it fails as a theory of same per¬
son language. We find that it is not applicable, We cannot
meaningfully say, *'I am as if I were a conscious being," be¬
cause the 'as if in this statement is merely redundant. It
presupposes the knowledge of what being a conscious being is
like, and yet the only way it is possible to attain this know¬
ledge is through our own experience. The only meaningful same
person statement is "I am a. conscious being," yet on what
basis are we to affirm or negate this type of statement?
With this difficulty in mind I let us go back to
Ayer's original statements about same person language: that to
say anything about the self is always to say something about
sense experiences, and also that personal identity is to be
defined in terms of bodily identity, and bodily identity is to
be defined in terms of the resemblance and continuity of sense
contents. Now it is obvious that both these statements will
have to be radically modified before they can be accepted.
When we use same person language what is it we say about sense
experience? Is there not another equally important factor to
which we refer^ namely what the mind does with sense experi¬
ence? To use Price's words again, the sentence, "I am a cons¬
cious being," is a compound statement. First, it states that
I have sense experience and, second, it "gives expression" to
the way in which the mind treats this sense experience, When
Ayer says that personal identity Is to be defined in terms of
the resemblance and continuity of sense-contents,we may pre¬
sume that he is talking about the former aspect of same per¬
son statements. But when he goes on to say that he has "vindi
cated" Hume's contention that it is necessary to give a pheno-
1
menalist account of the nature of the self," we can conclude
that he is talking nonsense in more ways than one.
First, Hume made no such contention. It is Hume's
contention throughout the section on personal Identity that
such an account, far from being necessary, is impossible.
1. Ayer, p, 127.
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This Is amply attested by one of many of iluraefs own defini¬
tions of personal identity: "that [personal] identity Is noth¬
ing ... belonging to these different perceptions iAyer1s
sense-contents] and uniting them together; but is merely a
quality we attribute to them, because of the union of their
1
ideas in the imagination, when we reflect on them," This is
but one of Hume's definitions and we see that it is in imagi¬
native rather than phenomenologioal terms.
The second way in which Ayer may be wrong in saying
that we must give a phenomenological account of the self is
that his own definition of personal Identity is itself not in
phenomenologioa1 terms. This difficulty revolves around the
question of whether or not the relations of resemblance and
continuity are phenomenal; that is, are we aware of tho res¬
emblance and continuity of sense data merely through observa¬
tion or do these terms refer to Price's "dodges" or formulae?
Do they not "give expression" to processes of the mind? Hume
would perhaps take the former position,but even granting Ayer
this, it must be emphasized that what is refered to here is
not the resemblance and continuity of the external world but
the continuity and resemblance of sense contents. Can we
give a phenomenological account of this resemblance and con¬
tinuity? It would seem that the continuity and resemblance
of sense contents is something we add to sense experience and
not something given in sense experience.
1. Hume, Treatise, Selby - Bigge Edition, p, 260*
Our discussion has indicated that the expressive
theory suggested by Price in connection with the problem of
external world terminology might also serve as a theory of
same person language. Again we may say that in the discussion
of Ayer's treatment of the problem it has only been our objec¬
tive to point out the direction such a theory might take. One
thing should be made clear, however, and that is the import¬
ance of maintaining a sharp distinction between what is Hume,
and what is added to Huipe• It would also be of assistance if
alternative interpretations are at least noted. Further, it
should be emphasized that the linguistic answer is not the
answer to Hume's problem but an answer to the linguistic as¬
pect of Hume's problem. That the positivists consider Hume's
answer to his problem too psychological need not obscure the
fact that he gave this answer.
Aside from the pitfalls which the expressive theory
itself encounters the most propitious beginning for such a
theory might be a thorough analysis of the Appendix to the
Treatise. To say, as Ayer does, that Hume found himself un¬
able to perceive any real connection among innumerable dis¬
tinct impressions is merely to parrot Hume's conclusions with¬
out knowing why he came to them. What would be of the great¬
est utility would be the answers to the questions: In what
manner is Hume dissatisfied with his own theory, and how may




The third general type of reference to Hume, baaed
on a comparison, not of any particular doctrine, but of the
positivists' and Hume's general philosophic objective, is
best illustrated in the opening essay of a collection of posi-
2
tivist articles entitled Readings in Philosophical Analysis.
Feigl contrasts the schools of thought which he says have
characterized the history of philosophy. On the one hand are
the philosophers who have a "... respect for the facts of ex¬
perience, an experimental trial and error method, and the cap¬
acity for working in an incomplete and unfinished world view."
On the other hand, are the philosophers who have no regard
for the facts of experience, are not open minded, and who tend
toward all sort3 of "dilettantish and quackish" projects. In
the one camp reside the exponents of Empiricism, Naturalism,
Positivism, and Pragmatism; in the other the exponents of
Speculative Metaphysics, Intuitionalism, Rationalism, and
4
Absolute Idealism. Hume is regarded as the proponent, par
excellence, of the first group.
1. Hume, Treatise, S.B, edition, "I pretend not, however, to
pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or
myself may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile
these contradictions," p. 636.
2. Herbert Feigl, "Logical Empiricism," Readings in Philos¬
ophical Ana lysis, Selected and Edited by Herbert Feigl
and Wilfrid Sellars, New York, 1949.
3. Feigl, p. 4.
4. It is perhaps noteworthy that Feigl's sentence is con¬
structed so that the former group is capitalized and the
latter group is not.
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On a superficial examination, there seems to be
little to recommend this method of interpreting the history
1
of philosophy. In Hume1s case the method has already been
used by T,H. Green, but from a different philosophical stand¬
point, Green attributed the aspects of Hume's philosophy with
which he disagreed to defects in Hume's character, while this
author, in a more sweeping manner, attributes the aspects of
which he approves to the excellence of Hume's character. Un¬
doubtedly Hume would have agreed that there is some truth in
each approach, but would have gone on to insist that neither
furnishes an adequate basis for the explanation of his philos¬
ophical outlook. We are even further impressed by the inade¬
quacy of Feigl's principle when we consider other figures in
the history of philosophy. It is not true that Bradley and
Bosanquet were unable to work in an incomplete world order.
In fact, on most interpretations it is their insistence on
our partial and incomplete knowledge of the world which charac¬
terized their philosophy. Further, even the positivists in
recent years have come to admit that metaphysical and theo¬
logical thinking is not entirely analogous to animistic, magi¬
cal, and mythological thinking, and they do not entirely
1. As Felgl notes, a history of philosophy has been written
on this basis, Tragikomoedle der Wei she! t by H. YJahle.
This book furnishes many amusing insights into the history
of philosophy but it is so limited by the author's under¬
lying thesis,that philosophy is a function of personality
that it has remained a philosophic oddity.
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represent, as Feigl suggests, attempts to explain experience
in ways which lack the distinguishing marks of science. It
also seems difficult to characterize philosophers such as
Kant and Kegel as "tender minded."
But such reference to Hume Is prevalent in posi-
tlvist literature and is not always accompanied by the implica¬
tions for the history of philosophy which Feigl maintains, k
closer inspection shows that these inferences are based on
something more solid than mere similarities of personality.
Beverting to J^rgensen and Weinberg, it is obvious that al¬
though they emphasize empiricism and positivism, these doc¬
trines are important only insofar as they permit the positi-
vists to introduce science into philosophy. The positivist's
first principle is that if philosophy is to be meaningful it
must be scientific. For the positivists, doctrines such as
positivism and empiricism are but means to that end. Ultimate¬
ly, metaphysics, ethics, and the history of philosophy are ex¬
cluded either because a scientific study is impossible or be¬
cause a study of them does not contribute to scientific know¬
ledge. Striking comparisons can be drawn between the positi¬
vists' intentions in this respect and Hume's, In the intro¬
duction to the Treatise Hume describes the state of philosophy
in his own time as a climate in which "principles are taken on
trust, consequences lamely deduced from the/a, want of coherence
1. Feigl, p. 5.
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in the parts and of evidence in the whole, these are every
where to be met within the systems of the most eminent philos¬
ophers, and seen to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy it-
1
self." This type of polemic against the philosophy of his
time is often repeated by Hume and is repeatedly used by the
posltivists today.
There is a real basis for this type of reference to
Hume and it ultimately rests on Hume's initial distinction be¬
tween matters of fact and relations between ideas. Hume is of
supreme importance to the positivists in that he clearly draws
this distinction. He is not the first philosopher to do this,
as Leibniz preceded, and in many ways went farther than,Hume in
substantiating the distinction. Hume is, however, one of the
first philosophers to make the distinction in no uncertain
2
terms.
D.G.C, MscTfebb, speaking of this aspect of Hume's
philosophy, says that Hume's distinction between analytic and
synthetic propositions has become the chief cornerstone of
3
modern empiricism and its main weapon against metaphysics.
But MscKabb's statement is far too simple. Other factors have
entered into the empiricist's use of Hume's distinction, and
1, Hume, Treatise. Selby-Bigge edition, p. xvii,
2, Perhaps Hume was influenced by Leibniz between the times
of the publication of the Treatise and the Enquiries. In
the former he holds that geometry is empirical while in
the latter his position is identical with that of Leibniz,
i.e. geometry is tautological.
3, D.G.C. MacNabb, David Hume, His Theory of Knowledge and
Morality, Bondon, 1951, p. 4&.
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even Hume*s own use of it must be taken Into consideration.
There are three factors which lead to the modern empiricist's
use of Hume's principle: (1) the development of non-Euclidian
geometries, (2) the proof by Frege and others that mathematics
is tautological, and (3) the Prinoipia Mathematics which shows
that logic is also of an analytic nature. Thus, the modern
empiricists are able to sustain the distinction between an¬
alytic and synthetic propositions in ways which were available
neither to Hume nor Leibniz, Kant would be forced radically
to alter his refutation of Hume insofar as it is based on the
belief that geometry and mathematics are synthetic.
One further development of positivism must be noted
before It becomes fully evident how Hume's distinction has
been used as a v/eapon against modern metaphysics. The direct
result of the posltivlst ability to substantiate the distinc¬
tion between analytic and synthetic was the formulation of a
formal criteria of meaningful statements. This development is
stated succintly by Ayer, "A simple way to formulate it would
be to say that a sentence had literal meaning if and only if
the proposition it expressed was either analytic or empirically
1
verifiable," The question here is not the determination of
whether or not a proposition is analytic, as that is obvious,
but the establishment of a criterion of empirical verifiabil-
ity. The criterion set up by Mach is a rigid specification
1. Ayer, Language, Truthasfl'Logic, London, 1943, p. 5,
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that propositions, to be empirically meaningful, must be em¬
pirically verifiable through sense experience. Ayer modifies
this criterion by not insisting that an empirical hypothesis
be conclusively verifiable, "but that some possible aense-
*experience should be relevant to the determination of their
1
truth or falsity." But the intent of both Maoh*s and Ayer*s
principle is the same; the exclusion of certain propositions
from philosophical discussion, not on empirical grounds, for
the empirical test merely follows from the original distinc¬
tion, but on formal grounds.
The range of this exclusion was, at first, very
wide. Consider, for instance, an early American positivist,
J.A, Irving, in his chapter "Toward Radical Empiricism in
2
Ethics." All propositions asserting value judgments are an¬
alysed as "aesthetic": "the aesthetic temper may be detected
3
at the heart of every ethical system." Ee also excluded dia-
4
lectical and intuitive metaphysics as altogether meaningless.
In fact the term "metaphysics" designates, for the positivists,
those statements whloh are merely instances of bad grammar
and, thus, meaningless. In this article can be found almost
all the arguments put forward and popularized by Ayer several
years later. Ayer, however, goes farther afield than Irving
1. Ayer, p. 31.
2. «T.A. Irving, American Philosophy Today and Tomorrow, New
York, 1935, pp. 229-247.
3. Irving, p. 241.
4. Irving, p. 236.
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and adds that all religious arguments about a transcendent god
are meaningless.
Now let us return to Hume and consider the effects
of his distinction between analytic and synthetic on the method
he follows in his own philosophy. We find that, unlike the
positivists,he fails to limit discussion on merely formal
grounds. One passage in his philosophy suggests that he did
at least consider such a method. At the conclusion to the
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding we find the following
statement, "If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity
or school metaphysics for instance; let us ask, Does it con¬
tain any abstract reasoning concerning quality or number? No*
Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter
of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for
1
it can contain nothing but sophistry and Illusion," Here it
cannot be doubted that we have a classic expression of the
positlvist principle, but in Hume*s philosophy is there any¬
thing which corresponds to the positivist practice? The an»~
swermust be no, for in Hume's philosophic writings no single
instance can be found of the implementation of the criterion
just enunciated. Consider the way in which he speaks of dis¬
cussions of natural religion in the Dialogues. "These have
been always subjected to the disputations of men: Concerning
these, human reason has not reached any certain determination:
1. Hume, Enquiries. S.B. edition, p. 165.
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But these are topics so interesting, that we cannot restrain
our restless enquiry with regard to them though nothing but
doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction, have, as yet, been the
1
result of our moat accurate researches."
Hume not only fails to implement his criterion; in¬
deed, in his philosophy as a whole his general policy is to
avoid discussions of the relations between ideas. He, as was
the general rule in the eighteenth century, seemed in the
Treatise to incline toward the belief that mathematics is an
empirical science. In the Inquiries Hume seems to wash his
hands of the whole dispute. As for geometry, he holds, in
the Treatise, that it is empirical, and in the Enquiries that
it is not. Of the reasons given by commentators for his re¬
luctance to commit himself fully on relations beU^een ideas,the
following statements describe his position best: First, he
3
under-estimated the importance of relations between ideas,
and second, he became aware in his later works that these dis¬
cussions involved him in questions which he could not answer.
Modern empiricists claim that these questions can now be an¬
swered .
It appears that Hume's practice and that of the
1. Huae, Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Edi¬
ted by Kemp Smith, Edinburgh, 19%7, p. 128.
2. Hume says in a note on page 156 of the Selby-Bigge edition
of the Enquiries, "Whatever disputes there may be about
mathematical points, we must allow that there are physical
points," The complicated discussion of mathematics found
in the Treatise is discarded,
3. Hume refers bo relations between ideas as "objects of curi¬
osity."
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positivists is radically different and this difference might
be traced to discoveries in logic, geometry, and mathematics
made more than a century after Hume's death. But this theory
is tempered by a recent evaluation of the verification theory.
Ryle says, "... the needle of the verification principle wa3
so narrow that it excluded not only a few Teutonic camels but
nearly all domestic animals ... it has done what was not in¬
tended; brought out a great variety of difference between lots
of classes of legitimate utterances. What was bought as a
1
lens has worked as a prism." We see that Hume's practice
would not be far from one based on this view of the verifica¬
tion theory. Although only uncertainty and contradiction have
been the result of the discussions of natural religion so far,
Hume seems to think that some sort of conclusion is possible.
It is clear from the arguments of the Dialogues that the con¬
clusions at which we arrive will not have the certainty or
finality that belongs to our conclusions about relations be-
2
tween ideas and matters of fact. But even so Hume never
seems to doubt that some sort of knowledge is possible.
Perhaps, after all, Hume is on safer ground in his
failure to carry through the criterion of formal exclusion
1. Ryle, 0., "The Verification Theory," Revue Internationale
de Philosophle, 1951, P. 252.
2. An example ofthis is Pamphllus's statement at the end of
k*16 Dialogues "... that Philo's principles are more
probable than Demea's; but that those of Cleanthes ap¬
proach still nearer to the truth." Dialogues, Kemp Smith,
Editor, p. 228.
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formulated in the Enquiries than at first appeared. If Ryle
is correct,the verification principle does not show Hume to
be inconsistent in his overall philosophic method but lends
theoretical justification to that method, Kyle's formulation
need not provide re-entrance for the Teutonic camels of dia¬
lectical and intuitive metaphysics; it need merely show the
wide difference between that hind of statement and a state¬
ment concerning matter of fact. Ordinarily this in itself
will exclude such metaphysical statements from discussion,
Hume, in any case, devotes very little time to examining these
metaphysical statements and in the Dialogues is mainly con¬
cerned with religious arguments which Ayer fails to consider.
The argument Is not that a transcendent god exists, but the
empirical argument that the observed world leads us to believe
in an immanent diety. Although It may be difficult to deter¬
mine Hume's own answer to this question, he indicates the con¬
clusions at which we might arrive. He clearly thinks that the
problem is a fit subject for philosophlo enquiry.
In this chapter we have again been concerned mainly
with the positivist use of Hume's philosophy. Price has shown
that Hume's contributions to the problem of the external world
are equally as helpful and challenging as is his theory of
causation. The detailed analysis of the sections of the
Treatise dealing with the problem of the external world high¬
lights many of the problems which linguistic analysis must
face, and in the end leads Price to the formulation of the
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"as if" and "expressive" theories. Although Price, in this
process, leaves himself open to various criticisms concerning
his treatment of Hume's philosophy, it is difficult to agree
with critics such as Swing and Church who maintain that his
theory should be separated completely from Hume, Price could
easily answer the criticisms by using greater care in dis¬
tinguishing his own theories from those of Hume, He might
have been more successful had he drawn a strict distinction
between his work as a creative philosopher and his work as an
historian of philosophy. In attributing certain views to Hume
he should have kept in mind and made specific note of the role
interpretation plays. But the complete separation of Price's
work as creative philosopher and as historian of philosophy
would probably reduce the value of each.
In this chapter we have also attempted to indicate
the direction which the positivist use of Hume's theory of
personal identity might take. The positivist failure to at¬
tack the problem along Humean lines must prove significant
for those who maintain that Hume's philosophy stands or falls
on its ability to account for personal identity. If we con¬
sider the questions which Hume asks in Book I of the Treatise
and in the Appendix to the Treatise, we must conclude that,
above all others, the problem of personal identity is "Hume's
problem," and is, perhaps, one which the poaitivists should
have attacked first.
The analysis of another prominent reference to Hume's
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philosophy found in positivist literature has shown that Hume*a
distinction between matters of fact and relations between
ideas does not play the same role in his philosophy as it
does in positivist philosophy. Although in one case Hume
formulates the distinction in the form of a criterion which
seems very close to early positivist doctrine, he is slow
indeed to exclude classes of statements from philosophical
discussion on formal grounds alone. But we have also seen
that later positivist writers have in theory and in practice
reached positions much closer to Hume. They do not exclude
classes of statements on formal grounds but distinguish care¬
fully between different kinds of statements. It seems that
as positivist philosophy proceeds the importance and perti¬
nence of Hume's writings become even more evident. This is
particularly true in both Hume's and the positivists' demands
that philosophy be scientific.
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CHAPTER VII
HIJME AND P03ITIVI3T MORAL PHILOSOPHY
We have now examined four significant types of posi-
tivist references to Hume: reference to his theory of causa¬
tion and analysis of induction; to his theory of the external
world and of the self; the historical reference; and the
reference to his distinction between matters of fact and rela¬
tions between ideas. The only major class yet to be consider¬
ed is the positivist references to his moral philosophy.
Their characteristics have, of course, been largely determined
by the positivists' conception of moral philosophy as a whole,
and in tracing the history of this conception we find that in
the early days of the movement there were three main positiv¬
ist approaches to moral philosophy.
Morita Schlick relegates the main task of moral
philosophy to the science of psychology. He contends that
philosophy is an activity which clarifies and demonstrates
the meanings of the statements of science. Hence, to be con¬
sidered meaningful the statements of moral philosophy must
be scientific. The scientific study of ethics, for Schlick,
falls into two parts: the definition of moral tefms; and the
causal Investigation of why moral codes form the standard of
human conduct. The former activity, says Schlick, is neces¬
sary but routine, i.e. largely a matter of statistical in¬
vestigation. The determination of the psychological laws of
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motivation, however, is, for Schlick, the main tasic of sci¬
entific ethics. We need not go into his actual formulation
of these psychological laws, for he makes no mention of Hume,
Schlick says, however, that ethics is not a set of philoso¬
phical propositions except when it is concerned with the
classification and meaning of scientific statements. Thus,
he wishes neither to abandon its study nor to equate ethical
statements with those of metaphysics, but rather to investi¬
gate scientifically their causal implications. This he does
in terms of psychology.
J".A, Irving presents a second, and more comprehen¬
sive, positivistic view of moral philosophy. He is concerned
with the kind of knowledge we can expect from the study of
moral philosophy; or rather the kind of questions which we
can expect moral philosophers to answer in light of the dis¬
coveries in logic and mathematics discussed in Chapter VI..
He says that moral philosophy has been traditionally concerned
with the definition of the "final end of nan,". The methods
that have been used traditionally in these attempts are three:
dialectical metaphysics, intuitive metaphysics, and scientific
generalisation. The propositions of the first method, says
Irving, are admittedly unverifiabl© and, by poaitlvistic
standards, meaningless. The intuitive metaphysicians,on the
other hand attempt to communicate their own private feelings
and have in this attempt "built for themselves a kingdom of
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1
metaphor." But, says Irving, "... logically the core of
2
their intuition is a fluent blur." The third group includes
hedonists, utilitarians, and evolutionary moralists such as
Stephens and Herbert Spencer. Hedonists and utilitarians
have failed, says Irving, because they have been able to give
no adequate positivistic analysis of the terms "pleasure" and
"the general good" which they equate with the final end of
man. The evolutionary moralists, on the other hand, in chang¬
ing the moral "ought" to the physical "must," repudiate the
questions of moral philosophy altogether.
For Irving the implications of this critique of
previous moral philosophy can have but one issue: "The con¬
cept of a final end is meaningless; it has been for centuries
the ignis fatuus of Ethics, Hume realized ,.. that the ulti¬
mate ends of human action can never be accounted for by
3
reason; and all of our researches have confirmed his position."
But what are the results of this position? Irving replies that
"... It is the destiny of the men of the twentieth century
frankly to admit ethical relativity — and to ... establish a
4
scientific Ethics," which will study the moral consciousness.
Its primary questions will be, "Under what conditions does the
moral consciousness arise? ... Y/hat is the function of the
5
moral consciousness in a specific social order?" Scientific
1. J,A, Irving, American Philosophy Today and Tomorrow. Edited
by Horace M. Kalien and Sidney Hook, New York, 1935, p. 236.
2. Irving, p. 236.
3. Irving, p. 241.
4. Irving, p. 243.
5. Irving, p. 245.
ethics will go for its data to the social sciences es well
as to psychology, and will require a much more comprehensive
investigation from these studies than has yet been produced.
1
Ethics will become the "queen of the social sciences."
The third positlvist approach to moral philosophy,
represented by Rudolf Garnap, is the least critical of the
three. Carnap dismisses ethical statements as metaphysical
and, henoe, meaningless. He does not imply that the study of
moral philosophy should be reformed, as do Irving and Sohllck,
but that it should be abandoned entirely. He gives no advice
at all to the psychologist or the social scientist and, ap¬
parently following his own criteria, does not mention the
study of ethics again.
These first expressions of positivist moral theory
all refer to Hume in one way or another. Irving notes Hume's
contention that reason cannot give us knowledge of ultimate
ends. It was this point in Hume's philosophy which enabled
Irving to unify his treatment of ethic3. Wittgenstein's and
other positIvista'treatment of ethics were too vague and ob¬
scure, Irving maintains. It was Hume who enabled him to apply
the conclusions of positivist episteraology to ethics. Schlick
also refers to Hume, but only when he discusses the freedom
of the will, Oarnap's reference to Hume is indirect; he
equates ethical statements with metaphysical statements, and
1. Irving, p. 21+6,
in dealing with metaphysical statements, quotes with approval
the passage found at the conclusion of the Enquiry Concerning
1
the Human Understanding.
All of these references are clearly limited. While
we might find Irving*s conception of moral philosophy to be
similar to that of Hume, we also find that the evidence he
presents in support of it is derived, not from Hume, but from
other sources, Irving believes Hume's position to be correct,
not because he has been convinced by Hume, but because he has
been convinced that Hume*a position follows from discoveries
concerning the nature of metaphysical systems, which in turn
follow from discoveries about the nature of logic and xnathe-
matics, i.e. the nature of deducibility. Nonetheless, Irving*
knowledge of Hume enables him to focus the discussion of
ethics on the problem of "final ends." Schlick derives much
less support from Hume for his general method in ethics than
does Irving. It Is true that he refers extensively to Hume
in his discussion of the freedom of the will, but freedom of
the will occupies merely a subordinate position in Schlick's
moral theory. It is not a fundamental problem, but a con¬
fusion which must be clarified and which he simply wishes to
lay in its grave. The lengthy controversy ovei* this problem
is "one of the scandals of philosophy," says Schliok, who
never considers Hume's general ethical method or conclusions.
1. The passage In which Hume lays down a strict formal
criterion and which was discussed at the conclusion of
Chapter 5Tt~»
As for Carnap* a reference, we have already discussed its im¬
plications regarding metaphysics, and it is plain that Hume
does not equate the statements of moral philosophy with those
of metaphysics. These first expressions of positivist ethical
theory are, to a great extent, the last by these particular
philosophers, Irving has become interested in the philosophy
of language, the relation between anthropology and ethics, and
the methodology of the social sciences. His activities in
these fields have ethical implications, but he no longer writes
of ethical theory in the manner of the logical positivists,
Schlick suffered an untimely death, and Carnap has remained
true to the criterion laid down in Philosophy and Logical Syn¬
tax, Positivist ethical theory has passed into other hands.
Subsequent development of positivist moral philos¬
ophy has not proceeded along any of the three lines just con¬
sidered, Since the publication of Ayer* s Language, Truth and
Logic and C.L, Stevenson's "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical
1
Terms," positivist moral philosophy has been concerned mainly
with the analysis of ethical terns. The clue to this preoccu¬
pation with ethical language can perhaps be found in Ryle's
reformulation and re-evaluation of the verification theory,
Ryle tells us that this theory has proved useful as a method
of showing lots of differences between lots of different kinds
1, C,L, Sbevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms,"
Mind, 1937, vol, 46.
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of statements. Hence, positivist philosophers have not dis¬
missed. ethical statements as meaningless, but have attexapted
to determine the ways in which we use ethical language. This
development was anticipated by Irving in the chapter previous¬
ly mentioned, where he says that "there are two uses of
1
language — the logical and the aesthetic." Logical language
"refers to our public world of ... communicable meanings ...
in which every proposition can be verified by means of public
exhibition of the structure of the situation to which it re-
2
fers ..." Aesthetic language refers to, or rather, repro¬
duces, "... my private world of immediately perceived sense
contents ..." Ethical statements, Irving insists, are in¬
stances of the aesthetic use of language. From this position
3
it is but a short step to the emotive theories of Ayer and
Stevenson.
In Stevenson's original articles in Mind 1937, and
in Ayer's Language^., Truth and Logic the emotive theory assumes
a radical tone, Stevenson says, "Their Cethical terms] major
use is not to indicate facts, but to create an influence."
The statement "X is good" Is almost always translatable into
1. Irving, p. 232.
2. Irving, p. 232.
3. Irving has stated that he considered taking this step
as early as 1932. But he rejected It as too crude a
move In the light of what was known concerning the
psychology of emotion. Irving believes that the term
"emotive," as used by Stevenson, is itself an excellent
example of the emotive use of language.
"we like X"; in cases where the statements "we like X" and "we
do not like X" occur in the same context, no rational method
can be employed to dissolve this contradiction. Stevenson
maintains that most ethical disagreements reduce to an irredu¬
cible emotional basis. The emotional basis cannot be changed
by exapirical method since this method is only of utility in
the modification of belief, not attitude. There is a method
of obtaining ethical agreement, however, but "it is persuasive,
not empirical or rational." What Stevenson disputes is that
"all disagreement is rooted in disagreement of belief," Tra¬
ditional ethical theory has neglected the emotive raeaning of
ethical terms. This is also the general position of Ayer in
his chapter on ethics in Language, Truth and Logic.
During the next seven years Stevenson modified his
theory. Whereas in positivist epistemology we find a transi¬
tion from a "strong verification theory" to a "weak verifi¬
cation theory," and, finally, a complete modification of the
supposed conclusions of the verification theory, we find that
Stevenson goes from a "strong emotive theory" to a "weak emo¬
tive theory," There is no counterpart in Sthica and Language
to the 1937 statement that the major use of ethical language
is to create an Influence, for it is merely insisted that
there are two kinds of ethical disagreement; that which in¬
volves belief and that which involves attitude. The technical
aspects of Stevenson's work, important as they may be, need
not concern us here since we are concerned only with Stevenson'
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references to Hume. But before considering them in detail,
it must be emphasized that there has been no general agree¬
ment in positivist ranks about an "emotive theory."
An instance of oositivist disagreement with Steven-
1
son and Ayer is H.D. Aiken's review of Ethics and Language.
His criticism begins at the point where one might suppose
Hume would have disagreed with Stevenson, Aiken challenges
the distinction between "disagreement in attitude" and "dis¬
agreement in belief," and also the conclusions drawn from
2
this distinction. His main criticism is that "belief" and
"attitude" are both effective-ideational prooesses: both be¬
lief and attitude are in the strict sense attitudes. In the
case of differing beliefs as in the case of differing attitudes,
the use of language is emotive in the sense that it attempts
to modify attitudes. "We do not say, however, that the ef¬
fectiveness of the statement in changing a belief forms a
3
part of what is meant by the statement." Aiken goes on to
say that "Stevenson's doctrine would have a point ...only if
he could show (a) that in some (important) cases the utter¬
ance of a proposition has a merely emotive or expressive sig¬
nificance, and (b) that ethical judgments usually, or always,
are cases of this type." Stevenson, says Aiken, is able to
show only that ethical judgments have emotive causes and
1. H.D. Aiken, Journal of Philosophy, 1945, vol. 42, pp.
455-470.
2. Aiken, p. 459.
3. Aiken, p. 459.
4. Aiken, p. 461.
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effects; but this is a truism, since all judgments have
emotive aspects.
The difficulty encountered in determining what is
meant by an attitudinal difference is evident in Stevenson's
work. In fact, he finds the only precise method to be the
use of illustrations rather than definitions. Thus, in his
illustrations, we see what Stevenson is concerned with, but
when we attempt to define attitudinal differences we can only
say that they are exhibited by individuals for no assignable
reason. But, as Aiken has pointed out, all disagreements are
disagreements of attitude; while, on the other hand, all dis¬
agreements are also disagreements of belief, for we can never
be sure that they are not. This, we could suppose, would be
one of Hume's criticisms, i.e. that it is impossible to speci¬
fy the difference between "disagreement of attitude" and "dis¬
agreement of belief."
Later we shall consider one other recent positivlst
contribution, but now let U3 turn to the references to Hume
found in Stevenson's moral theory. From the point of view of
this thesis the most interesting and important aspect of
these references is the change in the interpretation of Hume's
moral philosophy found in Stevenson's later work as compared
to his earlier work. In the 1937 article we find that Hume
is mentioned prominently, Stevenson says that for Hume "good"
means approved by most people;*" or again, "For according to
1. Stevenson, p. 15.
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Hume, to recognize that something is "good" is simply to
recognize that the majority approve of it.... This require¬
ment excludes any attempt to define "good" in terms of the
1
interest of people other than the speaker"; or finally, "ac¬
cording to Hume's definition, one may prove ethical judgments
2
(roughly speaking) by taking a vote." Stevenson dismisses
in a few short sentences the Hume represented by these refer¬
ences. And if the references accurately represent Hume's
position in ethical theory, there can be little doubt but
that Stevenson is well justified.
Thus far we have seen Hume's position in moral
theory characterized as complete hedonism by Green, complete
utilitarianism by Stephens, and as complete statistical compu¬
tation by Stevenson. By now it is clear that Hume's moral
theory affords various interpretations. There is even a
change of interpretation in Stevenson's own thought, as can
be seen by his comments on Hume in Ethics and Language: "Of
all traditional philosophers, Hume has most clearly asked the
questions that here concern us, and has most nearly reached a
3
conclusion that ... [Stevenson] can accept," Stevenson then
4
quotes a passage from the Enquiries in which Hume gives a
1. Stevenson, p. 16.
2. Stevenson, p. 17.
3. Stevenson, Ethics and Language. Mew Haven, 1944, p. 273.
4. "The hypothesis we embrace is plain. It remains that all
morality is determined by sentiment. It dbfines virtue
to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a specta¬
tor the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the
contrary." Hume, Enquiries, S.B. edition, p. 289.
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sentimental rather than a statistical definition of ethical
terns. In his later work Stevenson's criticisms concern a
point, the moral sense theory, which is not considered in
his earlier article. As an introduction to Stevenson's charac¬
terization of this critloism of Hume let us consider its dis¬
cussion by another contemporary moralist, S.E, Toulmin, In
discussing the "objective approach" to ethical problems, he
says that "Hume, in his ethical theory, had to assume that
there would in fact be no ethical disagreements between fully
Informed people," Toulmin then quotes the following passage,
"The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all
mankind, which recommends the same object to general approba¬
tion, and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same
2
opinion toward it," The factor which immediately impresses
us concerning Toulmin'a statement as compared with the quota¬
tion from the Enquiries is Toulmin*s peculiar and misleading
use of language* He says that Hum® "had to assume" there
would be no ethical disagreement between well informed persons.
When we examine the passage quoted, however, we find that
Hume says, "the notion of morals implies some sentiment common
3
to men," It is probably gratuitous to point out that there
is a wide difference between the verbs "to imply" and "to as¬
sume", but herein lies what could be called a massive mis-
1, S.E, Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason in
Ethics. Cambridge, 1950, p, 21.
2, Hume, Enquiries, 3,3. edition, p. 212,
3, My Italics,
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representation of Hume's position. Hume, in the general con¬
text of his philosophy seldom puts himself in the position of
"having to assume" anything. It is, rather, his policy to
make a specific point of the examination of things which we
think we have to assume; or which we assume without making ex¬
plicit. This, however, is only one aspect of Toulmin's mis¬
interpretation, for in the equation of Hume's position with
"assumption," Toulmln ignores the whole intent and achievement
of what is known as the "moral sense" school of ethical theory.
What lies beyond Hume'a use of the word "implies"
in this context? We find that the work of Shaftesbury, Hutche-
son, and Butler, In addition to Hume's own work In classical
philosophy and history, and political economy, form the data
from which Hume draws the implication. Viewed from our twenti¬
eth century perspective, we should by now begin to see that
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler's works, insofar as they
concerned the foundations of ethical judgments, were analyses
of the use of ethical language. What Hume says is that the
use of ethical language implies a large area of agreement in
ethical judgments. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler had,
before him, taken on themselves the analysis of the formation
and determination of roots of ethieal language. Ilume is not
making an assumption when he says that the educated men of
ancient Greece, seventeenth century France and eighteenth
1
century England WiOuld have the same ethical norms. He is
1, This is one of Hume's general arguments in The Principles
of Mora Is. and he supports it with a host of literary
references.
stating what he considers to be the correct position, in view
of all available evidence; we may question his evidence, but
we may not accuse him of making an unsupported assumption.
Nor is Hume•s position so far afield from that of some posi-
tivlst philosophers, Irving, it will be recalled, says that
moral philosophy's role is the investigation of the moral
consciousness in a specific social order. This conception of
a moral consciousness implies a wide area of agreement about
moral judgment, and Irving quotes C.I. Lewis as saying, "If
we had no moral sense, philosophy would not give us one." Is
this more than Ilurae (or for that matter Hutcheson, Shaftesbury
or Butler) mean when they speak of a moral sense, or when
Hume says, "the notion of morals implies some sentiment common
to man?" In the discussion of Hume's so-called assumption,
Toulmin's criticism is that the moral sense is not completely
1
analogous to any other sense, in this case the sense of sight.
This is, of course, the criticism of several generations of
British philosophers, but it pertains only to those passages
where the moral sense philosophers attempt to draw a strict
analogy. Undoubtedly they were guilty, at times, of stretoh-
ing their evidence too far, yet the criticism is not valid
for the passage Toulmin quotes. There Hume refers to an
1. Toulmin, "No one thinks it necessary to make such an as¬
sumption when accounting for the general agreement about
ordinary simple qualities. No one suggests that the
notion of redness implies any * sentiment common to all
mankind...'" P. 21.
empirical fact, which, is an empirical fact even by positivist
standards.
Although Stevenson also parts company with Hume at
this same juncture, he does not do it in the same way as
Toulmin. Stevenson says, "it ... would be paradoxical if dif¬
ferent spectators would experience approbation in opposed
ways, but such a possibility is excluded by an explicit as-
1
sumption which underlies Hume's whole work." He then quotes
the same passage as Toulmin. Stevenson's criticism, however,
is as follows: he asks what the case would be should the infer¬
ence which Hume draws prove to be incorrect, and, in answering
this question, says, "... nothing would be a virtue and nothing
a vice," Stevenson maintains that his analysis has shown the
contention that "all disagreement in attitude is rooted in
2
belief," to be doubtful. He concludes, therefore, that there
must be 3ome other way in which we use ethical statements.
But, he continues, attention must be paid to this central
theme of Hume's argument, "for when [this inference proves
3
false] ethical disputes will have no scientific solution."
Stevenson maintains that Hume, like so many other moral the¬
orists, emphasizes disagreement In belief to the exclusion of
disagreement of attitude. But we might be more precise if we
said that Hume emphasizes moral agreement, whereas Stevenson
1. Stevenson, p. 275.
2. Stevenson, p. 275.
3. Stevenson, p. 275.
emphasizes moral disagreement. He also says that Hume gives
a "persuasive" definition of ethical terms. This criticism,
however, has been tempered, first by Aiken, and then by Irv¬
ing, Aiken says that all language has an emotive aspect,
and Irving says that Stevenson himself gives a "persuasive"
definition of ethical terms. If Aiken is correct, Irving has
to be correct, because a non-persuasive definition would be
impossible.
This excursion into interpretation has been most
interesting, but we may now ask what real bearing this shift
has on Stevenson's moral philosophy and on positivist moral
philosophy as a whole, Although Stevenson amplifies and modi¬
fies his argument and in this process is influenced by Dewey,
Ayer, and Oarnap, as well ea Hume, the crucial point of Stev¬
enson's moral theo^ is reached in liis consideration of Hume,
When Stevenson concedes that no scientific solution of ethical
disagreements is possible if Hume's criterion fails, he, in
effect, concedes Irving's, Aiken's, and,-in the end, Hume's
point, Aiken says, in effect, that a change in attitude al¬
ways involves a change in belief, and vice-versa. Stevenson
parts company with Irving, Hume, and Aiken whan he maintains
that diaagreoment in attitude and in belief can be theoreti¬
cally and operationally separated. The positivist3 were first'
attracted to Hume by his insistence upon scientific answers
to the questions of philosophy, and by his stated objective,
the foundation of a science of human nature, Stevenson is
evidently not attracted in this way, but, through the greater
emphasis on disagreement of belief found in his later work,
the influence of Hume becomes- apparent. In his admission
that his own method of reconciling ethical disagreements is
unscientific, Stevenson also admits Aiken*s central argument,
that the modification of ethical judgments through persuasion
involves the modification not only of attitudes but the modi¬
fication, for no scientific reason, of belief about matter of
fact. Even though seemingly scientifically unsolvsble ethical
disputes do occur, it is difficult to see how Irving and Aiken
can accept Stevenson's procedure as the final method of their
solution. It might also be supposed that if Stevenson's
basic moral theory were to undergo any change (and this possi¬
bility should not be disregarded, for it has seen a radical
change in the past) it would be toward a rapprochement with
the positions of Aiken, Irving, and Hume.
1
In "Emotive Meanings and Ethical Terms" Aiken
points out that the "emotive theory" may have the greatest ap¬
peal to the "ethical intuitionalisms." When analysis shows
that the simple, unanalysable quality to which "... on his
[the ethical intuitional!stJ view 'good1, in its ethical mean-
could (only) refer, just la not there, he ha3 no other
recourse than to adopt an emotive theory if he is not to deny
altogether the phenomenon of ethical discourse and ethical
1. Aiken, "Emotive Meanings and Ethical Terms," lournal of
Philosophy, 1944, vol. 41, pp. 456-470.
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terms." Since Stevenson has at least modified his theory in
the direction of a naturalistic theory of the type both Hume
and Aiken hold, his abandonment of the "emotive" theory repre¬
sented in Ethics and Language should not be too surprising,
In any event, this, for Aiken, would be a much less surprising
development than G.E, Moore's complete acceptance of the emo-
2
tive theory.
As for positivist moral philosophy as a whole, it
is Aiken's contention that the issue is joined at the point
noted in Stevenson's review of Hume's moral theory. The crux
of the controversy over the emotive theory, Aiken says, lies
in Stevenson's analysis of the nature of ethical disagreement
and in his insistence "that no ethical theory can be main¬
tained which would render unintelligible disagreement 'on'
3
ethical Questions," To fulfill this requirement ethical dis¬
agreement must be simply "a matter of suggestion and counter
suggestion." But this analysis breaks down when we consider
ethical controversy and the role which belief plays, As
Aiken points out, once it was understood "that when I say *X
is good' I am merely trying to re-direct your interest, the
very real power of ethical discourse, its 'magnetism', would
4
rapidly fall to a vanishing point." He continues, "One of
1. Aiken, p. 469.
2. (I.E. Moore, The Philosophy of G-.B, Moore, edited by Paul
Schilpp, "I am inclined to think that ... [the emotive
theory] is so, but I am also inclined to think that it
is not so; and I do not know which way I am inclined the
most strongly." ' P. 554.
3. Aiken, p. 464,
4. Aiken, p, 462.
the merits of Hume's raoral philosophy which Professor Steven¬
son and I admire for partly different reasons, is that it
recognizes the futility of a theory of obligation or duty
which fail3 to account for the 'appeal' which every call to
1
duty ... may be expected to take." Stevenson and Aiken would
be in agreement in their approbation of Hume concerning this
point. It is possible that Aiken would also approve of Hume's
"explicit assumption," i.e. that "the notion of morals im¬
plies some sentiment common to all mankind ..."
The above account should not indicate that the posi-
tivist philosophers, including Hume, believe language has no
emotive, or better, aesthetic use. In fact, an American posi-
tivlst, A.I. Meldln, finds in Hume's philosophy an emotive
theory which he considers superior to Stevenson's. Meldin
contrasts the two aa follows: "For Hum© ... the ethical term
good is, ... an 'epithet', since it expresses an approval,
namely, a felt pleasure, which occurs vrfien, under certain
conditions, the pleasantness, immediate or indirect, of the
object is contemplated. For Stevenson ... there is, in the
experience in (sic) the speaker, a liking which occasions a
wish that others share it and which is the essential function
p
of the ethical term to express," It appears that this inter¬
pretation of Hume's moral theory is the result of a closer and
1. Aiken, p. 461.
2. A.I. Meldin, "Two Notes on Utilitarianism," Philosophical
Review, 1951, Vol. 60, p. 509.
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more technical study than has been given to it by previous
moral philosophers. The difference between Meldin's version
of Hume's "emotlvism" and Stevenson's "emotivism" is indicated
by his statement that Hume thinks "good" is an "epithet," and
Stevenson believes that "the essential function" of ethical
terms is to express a liking and a wish that others share it.
The significant deletion in this version of Hume's emotive
theory is Meldin's failure to say that this is the only way
in which Hume believes ethical terms are used. Also, Meldin
does not say that emotive use forms a part of their meaning.
In other words, when Stevenson discusses ethical terms he
constantly stresses their emotive meaning, while Hume, pre¬
sumably, could discuss the meaning of ethical terms without
taking the epithetical aspect of their use into consideration.
This latter methhd is, in fact, adopted by Aiken
who maintains that "... we must distinguish between the inten¬
tion which activates us to describe from the meaning of the
description," Whatever we nay say about Hume's contention
that equally well informed persons would make similar moral
judgments, we are not justified in "... regarding ordinary
ethical discourse as a totally different sort of thing from
2
ordinary 'descriptive* communication." The reason, Aiken
says, that ethical terms have more consistent and pervasive
emotive, or epithetical, uses is because they enter "so closely
1. Aiken, p. 467.
2. Aiken, p. 467.
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1
into contexts which affect human interests or ends." This
failure to distinguish between the uses of ethical terms and
their descriptive meanings, Aiken implies in his later review
of Stevenson1s book, is no mere academic problem but a very
practical one. In the techniques of psychological propaganda
we see the attempts at the "persuasive" transformation of
2
"attitude" with the resultant unscientific shifts in belief.
Let us stop at this point and consider the positi-
vist moral philosophy which we have discussed. We find it
amounts only to two books and a relatively small number of
articles; yet it cannot be doubted that these writings repre¬
sent not only the most significant, but also the bulk of
positivist moral philosophy. From our discussion and from
the fragmentary and contradictory nature of the material dis¬
cussed we may draw two conclusions: (1} that Hume, of all the
figures in the history of philosophy, has had by far the
greatest influence on positivist moral philosophy; and (2)
1. Aiken, p. 467.
2, Aiken puts this well when he says that "... purely from
an ethical point of view we should not wish to extend
the notion of 'meaning1 in suoh a way that it could be
significantly applied to wholly irrational and non-cogni¬
tive stimulus-response mechanisms ... because we should
not wish to leave open the possibility that ethical judg¬
ments are neither true nor false. To do so ... would
invite even more irresponsibility and unscrupulousness in
public means of communication than now exist. Persuasion
without meaning might be used to good effect by men of
good will ... but Ttf~aeems far more likely to be the
weapon of the charlatan and sophist," Aiken, p. 47.
From his general view of human nature we could expect
Hume to arrive at the same ethical judgment.
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that positivist moral philosophy is still in an intermediate
stage of development.
In connection with the first conclusion, a close
parallel can be drawn between positivist moral philosophy and
positiviat epistQiao logy. In both cases many of the early
positivists' knowledge of Hume was superficial and fragmentary.
In some cases, as in those of Mach and Stevenson, Hume's doc¬
trines are oversimplified and the versions they give differ
little from those given in traditional interpretation. But
in the case of the development of positivist epistemology, this
phase quickly passes and the positivists become interested in
the close analysis of Hume's doctrines and their application
to present day problems. In positivist moral philosophy the
attraction to Hume has proved even stronger, and this attrac¬
tion is well illustrated by the comparison of Stevenson's 1944
evaluation of Hume's position with his evaluation of Hume in
1937. It is Hume's philosophy which forms the crux of Steven¬
son's disagreement with other positivists; and it is arguments
derived from Hume's general philosophical position which are
used to counter Stevenson's position.
As for the second point, it is obvious that positi¬
vist moral philosophy has not developed nearly to the same ex¬
tent as has positivist epistemology, but if their development
is analogous we may expect in the future a positivist analysis
and application of many of Hume's specific moral doctrines.
The pattern in epistemology was: superficial reference to Hume;
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more extensive study and appreciation; and the analysis and
application of specific doctrines such as Hume's theories of
causation and of the external world. The pattern in positivist
moral philosophy has, so far, been: superficial reference; and
more extensive study and appreciation. If the analogy becomes
complete we could expect, for instance, a positivist analysis
of Hume's theory of sympathy, using as its tools, not only
linguistic analysis, but also contemporary discoveries in
psychology, sociology, etc. The same might be done with Hume's
doctrine of utility. But here, as in epistemology, special
attention must be paid to the role of the self, for as we have
seen, it is an essential component of his moral as well as his
epistemological theory.
As has been recently pointed out, T.H. Green made
one of philosophy's greatest mistakes when he said that Hume's
1
philosophy was "played out." Positivist moral philosophy
becomes more and raore Humean in its character as its develop¬
ment proceeds; and this is but one instance of Hume's influence
on contemporary philosophy. In the field of moral philosophy
Hume's main attraction to the positivists is his objective,
the formation of a science of human nature. It is true that
his utilitarianism, his "emotive" theory, and the strictures
he places upon the role which reason can play in ethical
1. Hendei, "The Character of Philosophy in Canada," University
of Toronto Quarterly, vol. 20, 1950-51, p. 128.
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judgments, are all Important, but lying behind this is "the
science of human nature." The implications of a science of
human nature in contemporary social science have been recent¬
ly examined by Irving, and he finds some of tlie first evidences
of the use of the comparative method in Hume's philosophy. He
says, however, that the comparative method had to wait for
"the theory of evolution to supply the key to the genetic rela¬
tionships of all living organisms before it could become of
1
truly scientific and philosophical importance." Hume went on
to the social sciences and to classical literature for the
data of the science of human nature. Irving maintains that
this is the course which the 3tudy of ethics must take, but
qualifies this position by stating that we must also realise
the limitations of the comparative method, Hendei says In
his interpretation of Hume's moral philosophy, that it is, in
2
its completed form, a study of man in society. Irving says,
"the development of an adequate theory of human nature requires
3
the consideration of man in his social environment ..." In
the Integration of the data of the social sciences into sci¬
entific ethics, the further Investigation of Hume's procedures
and conclusions should prove to be of great importance, show¬
ing the pitfalls as well as the advantages of this contempor-
1. Irving, "The Comparative Method and the Nature of Human
Nature," philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol,
IX, no. 3, 1919, p. 545.
2. Hendei, Seminar on the Philosophy of Hume, Yale University,
Spring term, 1953.
3. Irving, p. 548.
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ary development. In any case, it is clear that at least one
positivist believes that he is carrying on Hume's work when
he says, "Suoh a comparative science of human nature consti¬
tutes the only secure foundation for philosophical anthropology
1
in its twentieth-century search for the idea.of man,"
1. Irving, p. 556,
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CONCLUSION
In the treatment of our subject, Hume and the Logi¬
cal Positivists, the material examined h.U3 fallen into two
sections: the interpretation of Hume's philosophy; and the
positivists' actual connection with his philosophy. Any
study of Hume's influence on contemporary philosophy should,
perhaps, begin by coming to some position on interpretation,
or at least by pointing out the various interpretations which
have been held. In this thesis, however, an extensive in¬
vestigation of these questions was imperative for the follow¬
ing reasons: (1) no history about this aspect of Hume's
philosophy was available, and, historically speaking, these
questions were unformulated and confused; and (2) the prob¬
lem of interpretation is a central one in the attempt to
treat historically the relationship between Hume and the
logical positivists. Of course, it is impossible to specify
precisely the manner in which the positivists come by their
knowledge of Hume, but it is a curious coincidence that the
positivists' attitude toward the implications of Hume's
philosophy has changed in roughly the same way and time as
has modification of the interpretation. This may be mere
coincidence, for it might be pointed out that their own phi¬
losophical position, as well as their interpretation of Hume,
has been modified. One conclusion, however, which has, it
will be hoped, been established beyond all doubt, is the
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importance of careful distinction between the use of doc¬
trines which may be derived from Iluae's philosophy and their
strict attribution to Hume. It must be insisted that the
first procedure is illegitimate only insofar as it intrudes
without qualification upon the second. The strict attribution
of certain doctrines to Hume himself opens up a host of bio¬
graphical, historical and philosophic questions, and this is
where questions of "correct" or "incorrect" Interpretation
arise.
In the first two chapters we concluded that, for
historical, biographical and philosophic reasons, the tradi¬
tional interpretation as represented by Beafctie, Reid, Bain,
Taine, WindMbsnd, Srdraann, etc, was Inadequate as an histori¬
cal explanation of Hume's philosophy. In the third chapter
we considered the most systematic representation of tradition¬
al interpretation by T.II, Green, and the first reaction
against traditional interpretation as represented by McGilvary.
This reaction continued, and in the writings of Kemp Smith,
Shearer, Hendel and others It becomes the mainstream of Humean
interpretation. The movement is not confined to Hume's philos¬
ophical works, but extends to his History and his ISasays.
His biography has also been a central issue, and contrary to
those who wish to explain the shortcomings of his philosophy
by reference to undesirable personal characteristics, his
personality is usually represented In a most favorable light.
Two recent examples illustrate the change in the
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1
modern attitude toward Hume. Vinding Kruse and John H.
2
Randall Jr. present views of Ilune* s personality which bring
to mind the views of Seattle, Mill and G-reen. But, whereas
Beattie, Mill and Green*s views were received with general ap¬
probation and a modicum of protests on the part of support¬
ers of Hume, scarcely a good word can be found for the views of
Kruse and Randall. Kruse has been generally attacked, while
Randall's chapter called forth a highly articulate and docu-
3
mented article by Mossner in the Philosophical Review. It
must be admitted, however, that the modern philosophers who
disparage Hume's personal characteristics are in a mueh weaker
psychological position than their eighteenth and nineteenth
century predecessors. Whereas Beattie dismissed Hume's phi¬
losophy as inconsequential, Mill as purely sceptical, and Green
as "played out1', Kruse and Randall must try to explain how it
is that a man with such faulty personal characteristics has
become one of the aOst influential historical figures in con¬
temporary philosophy; how a man so unsuited for serious phi¬
losophical endeavor could be so phenomenally successful at
it. It is small wonder that Kruse and Randall are attacked
by Jessop, Kemp Smith and Mossner. But it might be noted that
1. Vinding Kruse, Hume's philosophy in his Principal Work,
A Treatise of Human Nature'.and in his Essays, trans.
P.T.' Bederspiel, London, 19T9.
2. John H. Randall, Jr., "David Hume: Radical Empiricist and
Pragmatist," Freedom and Experience, edited by S. Hook
and M.R. Konvitz, New York, 1947'.
3. Mossner, "Philosophy and Biography: The Case of David
Hume," Philosophical Review, 1950, Vol. 59.
although Kruso and Randall adopt the sane biographical posi¬
tion about Hume as did Beattie, Mill and Green, their estima¬
tions and interpretations of his philosophy have radically
changed. For both, he is perhaps the most important British
philosopher, and both admit that his philosophy is not merely
the reductio ad absurdum of Locke's empiricism. To at least
this extent, then, Hume has triumphed.
In chapters one to four it has been shown that the
new interpretation of Hume's philosophy has not been the re¬
sult of any sudden discovery, but, rather, the result of ap¬
proximately forty to fifty years of research and study on the
part of many philosophers and historians. And it is argued
that Kerap Smith's book, The Philosophy of David Hume, is the
most complete and comprehensive expression of the new inter¬
pretation. It would, of course, be ill considered to say
that any one interpretation is the correct interpretation,
but we may say that Kemp Smith seems to gather together the
different strands of the previous forty year's research and
present them as a coherent whole. Together with his own dis¬
coveries and theories he presents an argument which should
not be ignored in the subsequent study of Hume.
It may be claimed that too much space was given in
this thesis to the work of Kemp Smith and that his theories
were endorsed too enthusiastically. There are other reasons,
however, for the emphasis laid on Kemp Smith's work. Initial¬
ly, like Hume's, Kemp Smith's work on Hume has, as yet,
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attracted little of the attention it merits. It is, by all
odds, a book which puts forward controversial theories about
Hume's philosophy, and has, as yet, produced surprisingly
little controversy. We need not go far afield for evidence of
this. In Great Britain, three prominent reviews were published
which are generally favorable. They appeared in Mind, Times
Literary Supplement and in Philosophy; the latter appearing
five years after the book was published. The surprising thing
is, however, that, as late as 1951» the book occasioned no
further comment. But, even more surprising is the lack of
response to the work in the United States. As far as can be
determined no review has, as yet, appeared in the American
journals. Kemp Smith's theories about the derivation of much
of the Treatise, and about its composition are, for the moat
part, unknown^ in the United States.
It is difficult to say just what the reasons are for
lack of Interest in this work. In the United States one reason
must be lack of publicity, for neither American philosophy
nor philosophers have the reputation of provinciality or for
failure to investigate new sources. Jessop, in his review in
2
Philosophy, says that if Kemp Smith's theories are
1. In a large university in the \vestern part of the United
States an eighteen week seminar i3 given on Hume. The
professor in charge of this seminar was unaware that
Kemp Smith had written a book on Hume other than his
edition of the Dialogues.
2. Jessop, review of the Philosophy of David Hume, Philosophy,
1946, vol. 21.
accepted we must radically modify much of what is usually
taught about Hume's philosophy. The question is, do we ac¬
cept them, and if not, why not? Those of us who are con¬
vinced that we must accept them can only be swayed in our judg¬
ment by arguments from those who believe that they cannot be
accepted. But who are these persons who say the theories are
faulty? That we do not know, for there have been no attacks
from a philosophical point of view, and, in fact, there has
been almost no mention of the theories.
This, then, was one of the subsidiary aims of the
first half of the thesis: to show that Kemp Smith's work was,
in many ways, the logical conclusion of forty years of re¬
search by numerous people; to show that Kemp Smith's theories
solve many of the problems and contradictions that we find
in the exegesis of Hume's philosophy; and, to re-emphasize
Kemp Smith's conclusions in the hope that discussion about
them might be stimulated, and, in this way, they would become
the property of the entire philosophic world rather than only
of Great Britain.
The material examined in the second section of the
thesis was mainly composed of references to Hume found in the
writings of the logical positivists and those closely allied
with them. Here again it may be argued that this method of
considering the relationship between Hume and the positivists
is too restrictive and that the subject might be better treated
from a comparative point of view. It must be remembered,
however, that this study has, from the beginning, been his¬
torical. Our objective has been to examine "what posterity
has written" and just as works on Hume form the data of the
first section of the thesis, references to Hume and the use
of doctrines taken directly from his philosophy, form the data
of the second section. In an historical study there is no
objective data for judging the relationship between a school
of philosophy and any proceeding figure in the history of phi¬
losophy, other than what is written and said about the philos¬
opher by the members of the school. Comparisons, no matter
how apt, may be mistaken, because the aspect of the school
being compared may not be derived from the philosopher In ques¬
tion, but from an entirely different source or sources. This,
we have seen, is sometimes the case with Hume and the posi-
tivists.
But it would be naive to expect that an analysis of
positivist references to Hume could answer all our questions
about the relationship of the positivista to Hume. In their
classes and in their discussions, positivist philosophers
mention Hume much more often than in their writings. It may
be that Hume has had a greater influence on their thought
than is indicated by their references to him, and on this
point a comparative treatment is the only method available by
which we may arrive at even tentative conclusions. But, al¬
though an analysis of references will not answer all our
questions about the relationship between Hume and the logical
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positivists, it will answer some of them, and is an indis¬
pensable prelude to the various comparative studies which
could be conducted. It might be pointed out also, that the
conclusions of a comparative study can be only tentative,
while the conclusions of a study based on the analysis of ref¬
erences can be a great deal more definite.
We must first ask ourselves, what questions about
the relationship between the logical positivists and Hume do
we wish answered? The first question, and the one first con¬
sidered, was the historical question. Formulated, it would
be this: can a direct historical lin£ be traced from contem¬
porary positivists — through the founders of positivism —
to Hume? In our researches we have found the answer to be no.
No matter how similar their doctrines may appear, there is
little or no evidence to show that the early positivists de¬
rived their doctrines from Hume. All our researches have
1
tended to confirm the thesis that the positivists derived
their doctrines from other sources and then learned, in one
way or another, about Hume.
But if the answer to this question is no, what is
the significant question which we may ask about the relation¬
ship? In view of the persistence of reference to Hume in
positivist literature, the question which immediately arises
is, what are the reasons for this positivist attraction to
1. Advanced by J^rgensen in conversation in December, 1949.
Hume? Hxoept insofar as it enables us to understand the way
in which the positivists view Hume's philosophy, the ques¬
tion of correct or inoorrect interpretation does not arise.
The positivists have been interested in the truth or falsity
of philosophical doctrine, not in interpretation; and, even
though what they believe to be in Hume's philosophy does not
agree with the latest interpretation, this has no bearing on
the determination of the factor which attracts them to his
philosophy.
We have found that positivist references to Hume
fall generally into six classes: (1) the historical# (2) the
reference to his theory of causation; (3) to his theory of
the external world; (4) to his theory of the self; (5) to
his scientific approach to philosophic questions and his re¬
jection of metaphysics; (6) and to his moral theory, ^e
have already discussed the first type of reference in our
answer to the question concerning historical influence. The
second type of reference is represented by Keynes, Braithwaite,
Hobart, and Ramsey, and if the amount of attention paid caus¬
ation is a gauge of the positivist attraction and the influ¬
ence of Hume's account of causation, it might be said that
this is the major aspect of his philosophy which attracts
and influences them. But when we examine the general nature
of positivists' writings on causation we see wide differences
in their ranks. Some would hold Hume's position with fe\v
modifications, while others would claim that they have solved
Hume's problem. We see that while this doctrine holds out a
special attraction to some positivists, it holds no attrac¬
tion at all to others; we must conclude that this is not the
general principle we are seeking.
The third type of reference is also clearly limited
in its appeal, as is the fourth. In the case of the external
world, the question which Hume asks is not answered by Price,
but another question is substituted for it and answered.
Russell, also, is not interested in Hume's question but in a
question of a different sort. Perhaps the measure of the
attraction for the positivists of Hume's theory of the ex¬
ternal world is, as Price says, their neglect of it. Hume's
theory of the self is also only of minor interest to the
positivists, and their treatment of this problem has, as yet,
been incomplete. It may be, as has been suggested, that
Hume's attraction and influence will become greater as they
consider the problem. That remains to be seen.
The fifth reference forms Hume's main attraction
for positivists, although it is doubtful that it greatly in¬
fluences them. This attraction is more one of spirit and in¬
tent than of any one philosophical doctrine. Ilume is, in a
sense, an iconoclast tearing down the sacred statues built to
pure reason; he emphasizes at every point the importance of
experience as opposed to the powers previously ascribed to
reason. He wishes to be scientific and he is looking for
scientific answers to philosophic problems; he disparages,
with few exceptions, the efforts of the philosophical schools
he sees around hira. All these traits can be found in the
works of the positivists, often expressed in terms similar to
those Hume uses. This was positivism's first bond with Hume,
but in the works of Price, Braithwaite, Ramsey, and Hobart we
have seen the formation of other bonds with Hume's specific
philosophical doctrines. While these are not now generally
accepted in positivist ranks, perhaps,as the positiviat move¬
ment develops and differentiates, other ties will be formed
and Hume will have an even greater influence on twentieth
century philosophy than he has at present.
Let us again consider for a moment the problem of
interpretation. If Kemp Gmith is right, the characteristics
which form the wide basis for the positivist attraction to
Hume also form the external manifestations of a deep seated
naturalism on which his philosophy rests. And, Kemp Smith
maintains, Hume realized the implications of this naturalism.
His philosophy, taken as a unit, is the long and complex ex¬
pression of this realization. What, then, could the ever
widening positivist interest in Hume portend? Could Hume not
become the vehicle by which the positivists come to a fuller
recognition of what is involved in acceptance of the proced¬
ures and doctrines they admire so much in Hume's philosophy?
The possibility of this development depends on two debatable
suppositions; (1) that Kemp Smith's interpretation of Hume
is substantially correct, i.e. that the unity of Hume's
philosophy is of the type described in chapter four; and (2)
that the similarities between positivism and Hume's philosophy
presuppose the 3ame kind of naturalistic basis.
The sixth type of reference, to moral theory, has
been left until the last because here the evidence of Hume's
influence is strongest. Probably the greatest difference be¬
tween positivist philosophy and Hume's, considered in their
broadest sense, is the differing emphasis each places on moral
philosophy. Positivism is mainly concerned with questions
about the method of natural science, logic and mathematics,
Hume is mainly concerned with the problem of man in society,
with man's moral nature and its functions. But recent years
have seen the beginning of an awakening interest in posi¬
tivist ranks to the problems which Hume thought so important.
First we have an interest in the linguistic analysis of
ethical terms, and we find Kume intimately connected with the
controversy which has arisen, 3ut some positivist philos¬
ophers, such as Irving, recognize, as did Hume, that analysis
is only a small part of moral philosophy, and that its larger
function is the examination of morality in society, A new
interest in Hume's philosophy considered in its broadest
sense, as a science of human nature, may yet overshadow his
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